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ABSTRACT  
   
The effectiveness of police behavior on criminal activity has improved 
over the last thirty years. Yet, some police practices remain ineffective against 
crime. Because there is the potential for disconnect between their behavior and 
crime control, the police’s legitimacy is threatened. Legitimacy is important 
because its acquisition is requisite for any organization to exist. Police therefore 
look to other sources of legitimacy, such as their institutional environment: The 
network of agencies who share similar challenges, and the collection of entities 
that influence the form and function of the police (e.g., sovereigns). When the 
police consider the practices and expectations of their institutional environment 
through the process of isomorphism, agencies resemble one another despite 
idiosyncratic exigencies. This process endows them with legitimacy. Largely 
studied at the interorganizational level, isomorphism can also apply at the 
intraorganizational level. This study considers the latter level of analysis. Because 
the study of isomorphism in policing has lacked empirical assessment, the current 
study borrowed from the field of spatial analysis. This is feasible insofar as police 
behavior can be understood territorially, including isomorphic processes. By 
controlling for the most pertinent territorial predictors of police behavior, spatial 
dependence can be understood as the manifestation of isomorphism. Further, local 
indicators of spatial autocorrelation in interaction with spatial dependence can be 
understood as the institutional influence of sovereigns. Considerable attention is 
spent elaborating these concepts. Across four dependent variables (juvenile arrests 
made by the District of Columbia Metropolitan Police Department for 2008 for 
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violent crime, property crime, drug crime, and gun crime), isomorphic processes 
were overwhelmed by ecological variables for three criteria. For juvenile drug 
arrests, the behavior of distinct areal units was influenced by several sovereign 
entities from within the police department. Methodologically, this study 
introduces a novel empirical way of exploring isomorphism. Theoretically, it 
enriches the study of isomorphism by introducing the importance of territoriality. 
In terms of police practice, it suggests an innovative method for police 
organizational change, a process that is typified by resistance. By engaging 
sovereign entities in the change process, this resistance can be overcome in a 
naturally occurring ecological phenomenon.  
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Chapter 1 
PROBLEM STATEMENT 
The etiology of police behavior is understatedly complex. At the 
individual level, we have an idea that departmental policy (Fyfe, 1982), personal 
background, and suspect demeanor (Smith, 1981), among others, have some 
impact on how an officer behaves. At higher levels of aggregation, such as the 
precinct or agency, we believe that the political climate of the city (Wilson, 1968; 
Chappell, 2006), demographic characteristics of their service area (Kane, 2002), 
and the areal based work group (Klinger, 1997) all influence police behavior. We 
have, therefore, a picture of how police act and why they act that way. This 
picture yet remains incomplete. Although we “know” and “understand” these 
things about police behavior, the fact remains that police often behave in ways 
that are not rationally connected to their ultimate goals of crime control and 
public safety. Indeed, the research just cited often suggests as much. Underlying 
this research on police behavior, therefore, is the question why do police behave 
in ways that, for all intents and purposes, is detached from their goal? This is the 
question with which, ultimately, this dissertation is concerned. A related question 
that also concerns the current investigation is why is it that police appear similar, 
in form and function, despite idiosyncratic pressures that may lead to great 
variations in the ways in which they behave? 
 For example, many rural police departments have paramilitary policing 
units yet lack the same exigencies faced by urban police agencies that justify such 
a force-oriented special operations unit (Kraska and Cubellis, 1997). To be sure, 
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such units often exist due to the availability of federal monies in support of their 
creation. But federal support for their creation suggests something about the way 
the American public perceive the police – and the way that police see themselves. 
As rural police agencies ask themselves “what does a cop look like, and what 
does a cop do?” they may look towards larger, big city police departments who 
have SWAT-like units. Or they may look towards other big city police agencies 
which have abandoned the class A uniform in favor of a more militarized cargo-
pants and muscle shirt ensemble, where the vest is worn visibly on the outside of 
their clothing. In undertaking this observation, these rural agencies are answering 
their questions about what does a cop do and look like. And they are answering 
the real question, which is “what should we look like, and how should we 
behave?” So it is, without due regard to the connection between form and function 
with goals, that police departments begin to be more similar than different, despite 
unique local problems. 
 The concern over appropriate form and function is tied into a police 
agency’s desire and need to acquire and maintain legitimacy. A police agency’s 
legitimacy is its public recognition that it is a needed resource, worthy of funds 
from the public treasury, and necessary for the well-being of society.  Legitimacy 
is therefore a commodity that is vital to an agency’s existence (Suchman, 1995). 
Legitimacy is most readily acquired through a rational connection between what 
an organization does and what it achieves: to the extent that an organization is 
able to demonstrate this connection, it is likely to obtain legitimacy, and maintain 
it (Weber, 1964). For the police, the connection between what they do and what 
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they achieve can be tenuous. That is, police are expected to control crime and 
their behavior and deployments are typically centered on achieving this goal. Yet 
the connection between police behavior and crime control is not always apparent, 
sometimes unfeasible, and typically difficult to realize within the constraints of 
resources and the rule of law.  Thus, linking legitimacy to crime control outcomes 
(which encourages the liberal use of coercive behaviors) can therefore be a 
dangerous proposition, particularly with respect to the conventional mechanisms 
of police accountability. 
 Legitimacy can, however, be acquired through other means. Rather than 
looking inwardly at their behavior, police agencies may instead look outwardly to 
discover what other agencies are doing. Legitimacy can be acquired by modeling 
the behavior of other institutional actors who are already perceived as legitimate. 
This is a process termed isomorphism (Meyer & Rowan, 1977). Isomorphism 
explains how organizations from disparate environments who share some 
common challenges converge in form and function rather than remaining 
idiosyncratic: a few sovereign members of an institutional environment stand out 
as being legitimate, and the remaining members of the same institutional 
environment emulate the behaviors of sovereigns thought to achieve that 
legitimacy (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983). So it is that police departments share 
similar hierarchical organizations, nomenclatures, motivational tools, goals, and 
even special operations units (Crank, 2003). The same explanation applies at the 
meso-level for large police departments where each precinct (or equivalent) tends 
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to be more similar to its neighbors than what would be expected given the 
different pressures from each precinct’s environment. 
 While a compelling proposition, isomorphism, and institutional theory 
more broadly, have been difficult to test empirically at any level of aggregation 
(Katz, Maguire, & Roncek, 2002). The territorial organization and nature of 
policing may provide an answer to this difficulty. The police behave within a 
territorial framework (Herbert, 2001; Rubinstein, 1973). It is within this 
framework that norms and standards for behavior are created and enforced 
(Klinger, 1997). In addition, police are held accountable for the state of their 
particular precinct (Reuss-Ianni, 1982; Rubinstein, 1973), suggesting that police 
legitimacy is earned and retained largely through the territorial behavior of the 
police. It is plausible, therefore, to explore the process of isomorphism not using 
standard social science regression models, but by borrowing from spatial analytic 
techniques.     
 All forms of spatial analysis rely on Tobler’s (1970) first law of 
geography: "Everything is related to everything else, but near things are more 
related than distant things." Black (1976), in The Behavior of Law, 
unintentionally demonstrated that some aspects of the law behave according to 
Tobler’s assertion, as well. For example: the nearness of the relationship between 
victim and offender is related to the extent to which the law is applied. Although 
Tobler was clearly speaking to geographic proximity, Black’s observations open 
the door to using spatial techniques to tap into myriad “proximity” variables. 
Many criminal justice elements can be understood both in terms of the kind of 
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abstract proximity to which Black is alluding, as well as the geographic proximity 
on which Tobler is focusing. For example: the police. By design, the police 
behave territorially within their precincts. We should, therefore, be able to 
observe spatial processes at work at this level of aggregation. Precincts 
contiguous to one another should be more similar than distal precincts in terms of 
aggregate characteristics (e.g., racial and economic composition) and the standing 
patterns of behavior they support and/or foster. This similarity is often referred to 
as spatial autocorrelation: statistical “noise” caused by geographically proximate 
neighbors which share characteristics. I am proposing that we can treat the 
“noise” of spatial autocorrelation, and the existence of areal units with undue 
spatial influence (e.g., local indicators of spatial autocorrelation, LISA), as 
evidence of institutional processes
1
.  
Due to the territorial nature of policing, precincts may look towards their 
neighbors in order to better understand what their form and function should look 
like. If researchers can control for the most important predictors of police 
behavior, and neighboring precincts continue to have an effect on any given 
                                                 
1
 To be sure, although the theoretical framework presented here suggests that spatial 
autocorrelation can correctly be interpreted as institutional processes, competing explanations for 
autocorrelation may exist. It may, for example, represent a general application of a particular 
departmental policy (Fyfe, 1982). Were this the case, we would expect to see global spatial 
autocorrelation, but not necessarily LISA’s. Additionally, similarities between PSA’s may have 
more to do with shared environmental characteristics than with police behavior. As described, this 
is controlled for in terms of structural disadvantage. Perhaps most important, were a spatial error 
model found to be more appropriate than a spatial lag model (Anselin, 2003b), one might surmise 
that there are spatial processes at work, but that these processes are distinct from the dependent 
variable. That is, there is spatial dependence in the model wherein an independent variable is 
influenced by its neighbors, and this, in turn, is having an impact on the dependent variable. As 
this dissertation is only focusing on one element of the police institutional environment – namely, 
their peers – it may be the case that other sovereign actors (politicians, media, community leaders, 
or individual officers) are influencing police behavior, as well. As is discussed below, this 
possibility was checked for each dependent variable by examining the viability of a lag model 
over an error model. 
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precinct (ie., spatial autocorrelation and LISA), then they can theoretically 
suggest that this represents the institutional environment influencing that precinct. 
In other words, just as physicists can predict the location of an invisible planet 
based on that planet’s gravitational impact on neighboring space stuff, this 
dissertation proposes that we can pinpoint institutional pressure by observing its 
spatial effects. Although a proxy for institutional processes, it is theoretically 
sound and allows a way for empirically observing what most organizational 
researchers have ideographically explored. 
This project speaks directly to organizational change. Bureaucracies 
struggle with change, even when change can result in the furtherance of an 
organization’s mission (Weber, 1964: Merton, 1957). Police, which have been 
bureaucratically organized since the first part of the 20th century, are not an 
exception.  For example, the integration of community oriented policing is often 
held up as a poster-child for the difficulties inherent in organizational and 
behavioral change in police agencies. Even before Trojanowicz and Bucqueroux 
(1990) first fully articulated the idea of community policing as both a basic shift 
in policing form, function, and philosophy, such barriers were readily apparent in 
American policing. To wit, O.W. Wilson, policing reformer August Vollmer’s 
protégé, though successful in reducing corruption among police officers in 
Wichita City, KS, was ultimately forced to resign as chief because of powerful 
political actors who did not appreciate his efforts. While this stands as an example 
of the resistance that efforts of change meet in the policing world, Wilson’s 
failure to successfully adjust policing practices in the face of a racial crisis in 
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Chicago during the 1960's reflects the police agency’s dilatoriness in innovatively 
responding to environmental changes (Walker, 1998). 
The process of isomorphism is best understood as a process of change 
towards similarity. In other words: police agencies (or precincts within a police 
department) are more likely to change their behavior to match the behavior of 
other agencies whom they perceive as possessing legitimacy. Stated in theoretical 
terms: sovereigns can be catalysts for change. Administrators who are able to 
harness the cooperation of sovereign precincts, or police chiefs who can work 
with sovereign agencies in implementing changes, may better be able to create 
organizational and behavioral change with less resistance than has been 
experienced in the past. Theoretically, the findings from this dissertation add 
substance to the conversation surrounding institutional literature generally, and 
improve scholars' understanding of the causes (and consequences) of police 
behavior specifically. 
This dissertation therefore sought to answer the following questions:  
1. Why do police behave similarly across spatial areas, despite 
measurable differences in environmental pressures across such areas?  
2. Why do police behave spatially in ways that are seemingly unconnected 
to their goals?  
To answer these questions, I combined the following scientific 
propositions: First, institutional theory teaches that organizations behave similarly 
in a bid to acquire and maintain institutional legitimacy whenever the connection 
between what an organization does and what it achieves is tenuous. Second, the 
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police are unable to accomplish their goal of crime control to the complete 
satisfaction of their constituents. And third, police are organized and behave 
territorially. Briefly stated: Police behave in ways often unconnected to the goal 
of crime control because they are simply copying other agencies (or districts 
within the same agency) with perceived-legitimacy. We can explore this 
relationship through spatial analytic techniques.  
Combining these three propositions into one theoretical whole provides 
not just an explanation of police behavior, but points in the direction of an 
analytic technique that is at once novel and useful. Importantly, this theoretical 
structure answers these questions (why do police behave the same, despite 
differences in environmental pressures and why do police behave in ways that are 
seemingly unconnected to their goals) which thus far have only been intimated in 
the literature. The data set (described in detail below), in tandem with the 
methodological approach espoused for this dissertation, allow the exploration of 
these research questions by testing the following general hypotheses: the arresting 
behavior of precincts abutting one another will be similar, with differences 
increasing with distance; those precincts closest to sovereign precincts should be 
most similar in terms of their arresting behavior than more distant precincts; and 
finally, the diffusion of arresting behavior should expand centrifugally from 
sovereign precincts, with behavioral similarities decreasing concomitantly with 
distance. These hypotheses will be expanded and discussed in more detail after 
the theoretical underpinnings are presented.  
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This dissertation proceeds in the following manner. In the next chapter, 
these three propositions will be discussed in detail. This will include an 
exhaustive overview of relevant literature. Chapter two will also include a 
discussion of how each of these propositions comes together to meaningfully 
answer questions that, without this theoretical structure, could not otherwise be 
answered. It will conclude with testable hypotheses. Chapter three explicates how 
spatial analysis will test these hypotheses. Specifically, it will outline the logical 
connection between the theory developed in chapter two and the use of spatial 
analytic techniques. It will also extend the dissertation into a more nuanced 
direction, where I not only discuss how to capture isomorphic processes 
empirically, but how to understand why it is going on where and when. Chapter 
three will also include a detailed overview of my unit of analysis (the Police 
Service Area of the Washington D.C. Metropolitan Police Department) and 
articulate how I constructed my data set and statistical models. These models are 
then presented in chapters 4 and 5, with analysis and discussion. The final chapter 
discusses limitations to the research design, general theoretical conclusions, 
policy implications, and directions for future research.  
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Chapter 2 
THEORETICAL DEVELOPMENT 
Introduction 
 All organizations require legitimacy in order to exist and operate 
(Suchman, 1995). As such, the acquisition and maintenance of legitimacy is an 
important research area. One way that organizations can acquire and hold on to 
legitimacy is by the efficient production of needed goods or services (Weber, 
1947). This method is complicated for public sector organizations, however, such 
as the police. The police are faced with two dilemmas that limit the extent to 
which their legitimacy, as an organization, can be gained through the efficient 
production of a needed service. The first dilemma has to do with their public 
mandate. One public mandate the police must satisfy has been described as an 
“impossible mandate” (Manning, 1978). To wit, to fight crime2. This mandate is, 
on the one hand, difficult to quantify, and, on the other hand, constantly being 
reinvented. As a nebulous goal and what amounts to a moving target, the police 
mandate does little in the way of allowing police agencies to evaluate the degree 
to which they are successfully providing a needed service. Even if the mandate 
were more concrete and static, police would still be hampered in their legitimacy-
seeking efforts by the second dilemma: the tool provided for them to accomplish 
their mandate. However innovative police programs may appear, at their heart 
remains that aspect most associated with police presence: the power to arrest, and 
                                                 
2
 This study focused, essentially, on one part of the police mandate. This was not to suggest that it 
is the only mandate, only a driving mandate that is particularly focused in the minds of the public, 
from whom the police garner so much of their legitimacy. 
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its accompanying potential for the use of coercive force (Bittner, 1970). This tool 
puts police in a double bind. First, by using arrest and/or coercive force too little 
or too often, they risk losing legitimacy (Kane, 2003). Second, it is an inefficient, 
and in many ways an ineffective, method for “fighting crime” (Manning, 1978). 
The nebulous and transient nature of the police mandate, combined with the 
limiting tool at their disposal for accomplishing this mandate, place police at a 
serious disadvantage in terms of acquiring and maintaining organizational 
legitimacy.   
 Law enforcement agencies may therefore turn to a different source of 
legitimacy, namely the institutional environment. An organization’s institutional 
environment is composed of powerful sovereigns who dictate how an 
organization is to behave in both form and function (Suchman, 1995). For a police 
agency, sovereigns may include political actors, professional organizations, or 
even other influential police agencies or individual officers within an agency. By 
conforming to the expectations of these sovereigns, an agency is able to hold on 
to legitimacy. This process is known as isomorphism. Police scholars have 
already explored these ideas (for an overview, see Crank & Langworthy, 1992), 
and many have found both anecdotal and empirical support for this institutional 
framework (Crank, 2003). In my dissertation, I contend that such research, while 
important and informative, is missing a vital element for understanding how 
isomorphic processes occur. More specifically, in understanding how police 
agencies seek to acquire and maintain legitimacy by conforming to institutional 
pressures, the territorial nature of police behavior must be taken into account. 
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Police agencies are organized around areal units, and these units have an impact 
on their behavior (Klinger, 1997; Rubinstein, 1973). Whereas the police mandate 
outlines the goals and directs the behavior of the police, it is within specific 
territories that this behavior takes place. By accounting for the territoriality of the 
police, researchers can better understand how isomorphism defuses behavior 
across police agencies.  
I also explore the utility of this framework from an intraorganizational 
perspective. Despite researchers suggesting that isomorphism is both an intra- as 
well as an interorganizational phenomenon (Meyer & Rowan, 1977; Crank, 
2003), most research on the police and isomorphism has taken place at the 
interorganizational level. Large police agencies are essentially composed of 
several smaller organizations, which are delineated along territorial lines. Just as 
some influential police agencies may stand out as sovereigns within their 
institutional environment, so too may some influential police precincts (or 
individual officers) act as sovereigns within their agency, with behavioral norms 
emanating out from them spatially across precincts in an isomorphic process. 
This chapter will proceed in the following manner. The first two sections 
will discuss organizational legitimacy, the police mandate, and the territorial 
nature of the police. The third section will discuss isomorphism, and the fourth 
section will join the policing and isomorphism literature, and conclude with a 
discussion of extending the theory from the inter- to the intraorganizational plane.  
The guiding question for this dissertation is how do behavioral norms among 
police precincts, as understood as arresting behavior, defuse across police 
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precincts within an organization? As this chapter will demonstrate, the isomorphic 
literature, in tandem with a territorial understanding of police behavior, provide 
meaningful hypotheses towards the end of answering this question.  
Organizational Legitimacy and the Police Mandate 
Suchman (1995) defined legitimacy as "a generalized perception or 
assumption that the actions of an entity are desirable, proper, or appropriate 
within some socially constructed system of norms, values, beliefs, and 
definitions" (p. 574). In this light, legitimacy is understood to be a normative 
concept that is contingent on cultural exigencies
3
. In discussing legitimacy, Weber 
(1964, p. 328) delineated the now well-known rational, traditional, and 
charismatic authorities. In addition, Weber also asserted that "[l]egitimacy may be 
ascribed to an order by those acting subject to it..." (p. 130). In synthesizing the 
literature since Weber, Suchman (1995) suggested three essential forms that 
legitimacy can take: pragmatic, moral, and cognitive. Pragmatic legitimacy "rests 
on the self-interested calculations of an organization's most immediate audiences" 
(p. 578), and subsumes Weber's rational authority. Moral legitimacy rests on the 
assumption that what an organization does is just, good, and right, and reflects 
Weber's emotional or affectual attitudes and traditional authority. Finally, 
Suchman's (1995) cognitive legitimacy explains that an organization is recognized 
                                                 
3
 Tyler (2006) also discusses legitimacy in terms of the police. For Tyler, legitimacy is the result 
of police following due process and acting justly and fairly towards citizens. The result of 
perceived police legitimacy is citizen obeisance to the law. For the institutional literature, police 
legitimacy is the result of a direct and demonstrable connection between their behavior and the 
fulfillment of their mandate - crime control, in short. It is important to note that this mandate 
comes, in part, from the public and their perceptions of police behavior. The result of police 
legitimacy is not obeisance to the law, but rather the police organization's access to resources 
necessary for their survival. 
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as being necessary to the functioning of society, and corresponds with Weber's 
legal authority. That is, both cognitive and legal legitimacy assert that an 
organization's legitimacy stems from its value in maintaining some sort of status 
quo or, at minimum, from being an inevitable reality. Suchman (1995) suggests 
legitimacy becomes more difficult to obtain moving from pragmatic, to moral, to 
cognitive, but also becomes more powerful. Legitimacy is most powerful and 
unquestionable at the cognitive level, where it is simply taken-for-granted: when 
an organization has reached this level of legitimacy, the idea that society could 
exist without that organization is simply inconceivable.  
Suchman's (1995) definition came after several generations of academic 
dialog. Initially, organizational theorists, drawing on the works of Weber's ideal 
bureaucratic model, focused on the concept that formal organizations were 
created out of a necessity to navigate complex social and commercial 
relationships. These theorists drew on Weber's (1964) arguments for a rational 
bureaucratic system, where the most successful organizations are those which are 
rationally organized around quantifiable results: their structure and behavior are 
geared towards the efficient achievement of output. To the extent that an 
organization was able to efficiently achieve such outputs it could acquire and 
maintain legitimacy. Stated otherwise, a rational organization’s legitimacy rests 
on its ability to effectively accomplish its mandate (Suchman, 1995).  Meyer and 
Rowan (1977) criticized this vein of thought by pointing out that institutional 
theorists had ignored another source of the legitimacy of complex organizations 
as posited by Weber. Weber (1964) wrote, "Action, especially social action which 
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involves social relationships, may be oriented by the actors to a belief 
(Vorstellung) in the existence of a 'legitimate order'" (p. 124). This posits that 
individuals and organizations behave according to shared beliefs as to what 
constitutes legitimacy that may or may not have anything to do with the efficient 
production of outputs. This shift changed the foundational understanding of 
organizational legitimacy from being the result of pure output oriented behavior 
to introducing social and cultural elements. It was now understood that there were 
multiple pathways to legitimacy, including the classic Weberian concept of a 
rational bureaucracy, but also including conforming behavior that matched with 
institutional expectations.  
Legitimacy is important to understand because of what its acquisition 
means to an organization. As Blau and Meyer (1987) argue, legitimacy is tied to 
power, and power is tied to the acquisition of resources. Subsequently, legitimacy 
promotes organizational success and survival (Meyer & Rowan, 1977). All 
organizations that perform the same or similar functions compete for a number of 
resources, including revenue and customers. What is more, they compete for 
legitimacy (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983). To the degree that one organization 
acquires and maintains legitimacy while other organizations fail to do so, that 
organization will better succeed in the acquisition of all other resources. Suchman 
(1995), in summarizing the legitimacy literature, has pointed out that legitimacy 
brings stability, credibility, and support to an organization. In terms of support, an 
organization may acquire either active support or passive support (or both). 
Whereas active support refers to the actual and regular assistance from 
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institutional constituents in goal achievement, passive support only requires that 
an organization is simply let alone to do what it is that they do, sans interference. 
The assumption is that the organization is acting in good faith (Meyer & Rowan, 
1977). This assumption is one of the fruits of organizational legitimacy. Overall, 
legitimacy is necessary for an organization to survive.   
Applying Organizational Legitimacy to Police Legitimacy 
The legitimacy of the police traditionally has been garnered through their 
impact on crime. Indeed, the focus of Peel's Metropolitan Police was crime 
prevention (Manning, 1978; Uchida, 2005). Although this focus crossed over the 
Atlantic to several early 19th century United States cities, starting in the early 
20th century police impact on crime became operationalized in quantifiable terms 
such as arrest numbers, calls for service, or response times (Reiss & Bordua, 
1967; Skolnick & Fyfe, 1993). This reflected a shift to Weber’s rational order of 
legitimacy: by demonstrating that their behavior was arithmetically associated 
with quantifiable changes in crime, police could be seen as vital and necessary. 
This behavior also manifested itself in legitimacy seeking behavior in line with 
Weber’s traditional authority. Herbert (1997), for example, suggested that the law, 
bureaucratic regulations, a guiding value of machismo, maintaining safety on the 
job, demonstrating competence worthy of respect, and upholding a morality of 
good versus evil, each guide how police officers behave – that is, that police 
behavior was influenced by the notion of “what a cop” looked like and did: fight 
crime and bravely protect the innocent. This behavior, however, must play out 
under the “number’s game” (Skolnick & Fyfe, 1993): Writing about the 
  17 
Philadelphia police, Rubinstein (1973) commented that "[t]he worth of a man to 
his platoon does not depend on his success in preventing crimes, arresting 
suspected felons, or even giving service without complaint or injury...'Activity' is 
the internal product of police work. It is the statistical measure which the sergeant 
uses to judge the productivity of his men..." (pp. 43-44). Rubinstein continued: 
"Arrest activity is computed from what the patrolman 'puts on the books' and not 
by the disposition of his cases in court. Since activity is a measure of his work, his 
sergeant has no interest in what eventually happens to the cases" (pp. 44-45). 
This system of assessment has at least two flaws. First, using arrest 
statistics as the primary example, they are artifacts of police behavior rather than 
of police impact (Manning, 1978). In most introductory criminal justice and 
methodology text books it is pointed out that Crime in America is often used as a 
measure of what police do as opposed to a measure of criminal activity (Lynch & 
Addington, 2007). This will most likely vary by type of crime. This means that as 
police increase their arresting behavior, the crime rate appears to increase, as well. 
This leads to calls for more arresting behavior. This pattern is subsumed by the 
second flaw, articulated by Manning (1978) as policing’s impossible mandate: to 
engage in the "efficient, apolitical, and professional enforcement of the law" (p. 
8).  
The Police Mandate  
Manning (1978) defines a mandate as an organization's right to define the 
parameters and technology of its occupation. He has argued that the police 
mandate is not, however, wholly in their hands. Rather, it is something thrust 
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upon them by public expectations and political deliberation. Because the police 
are part of the executive branch of government, both of these processes are 
ultimately beyond their purview. However, Manning (1978) reminds us that 
American police themselves have accepted and expanded (or, perhaps narrowed) 
this mandate to a professional status, despite that doing so can severely threaten 
the legitimacy of the police (see note 2). This mandate, again according to 
Manning (1978), is an impossible one. The mandate communicates to officers the 
expectation that they can and should have a meaningful impact on the amount of 
crime that occurs in cities. This mandate is impossible not because police have no 
impact on crime whatsoever, but, as Herbert (2001) pointed out "...on their own, 
police can do little to reduce crime" (p. 449) when relying on traditional law 
enforcement techniques (Klofas, Hipple, & McGarrell, 2010). What is more, 
although efforts are made to quantify the police mandate, it ultimately remains 
nebulous (Klockars, 1986), precluding any systematic analysis of the state of 
crime then versus the state of crime now (DiIulio, 1995). The thrust of Manning's 
(1978) argument was that the police had placed themselves in a very difficult 
spot: they had promised a product that they were unable to deliver. 
Sources and Consequences of the Police Mandate  
The model for American policing has its origins in Peel's London 
Metropolitan Police. Peel's vision for a unitary police force was transported across 
the Atlantic in piece-meal fashion in both form and function. For example, for 
Peel, the police prime directive was to prevent crime, and to do so avoiding legal 
sanctions and resorting to violence only in the most extreme of circumstances. 
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During the formative years of policing in the United States, the American model 
did resemble the British model in terms of crime prevention and social assistance, 
though the American police remained exceptionally decentralized and politicized. 
In many instances, this led to laziness and corruption (Strecher, 1991; Walker, 
1998). Through two waves of reform (first towards the end of the 1800s by the 
Progressives and then at the start of the 1900s by reformist police chiefs), police 
agencies attempted to ameliorate these faults through a professionalization 
movement (Walker, 1998; White, 2007). Subsequently, American police rarely 
sought to prevent crime and, as the form of policing became more bureaucratized, 
came to rely extensively on legal sanctions and coercive force (Manning, 1977). 
 This created a situation that stood in stark contrast to the British model. 
Three changes to American policing accompanied this move to 
professionalize the police that would impact the mandate of police agencies 
(unless otherwise noted, this paragraph relies on Manning, 1977, pp. 97-98). The 
first change was the institutionalization of a national database of crime statistics. 
This effort was first spearheaded by the International Association of Chiefs of 
Police (IACP) and August Vollmer, and then taken up by the fledgling Federal 
Bureau of Investigation (Skolnick & Fyfe, 1993). Hoover employed the new 
crime statistics program (the Uniformed Crime Report or UCR, published 
as Crime in America) to highlight the FBI as the professional standard of crime 
fighting experts. Law enforcement agencies around the country took note of the 
FBI’s new status, and soon began to emulate the FBI's training, techniques, and, 
most importantly, professional mandate. The second change came in how police 
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agencies used the data from the UCR: the crime rate became the measuring rod by 
which police success would be judged. This had the effect of quantifying the 
mandate. Finally, police began to focus on the technological tools they could use 
to be professional crime fighters, including patrol cars, two way radios, and latent 
fingerprint recognition. These tools symbolized the police agencies' role as 
professional crime fighters who were specially trained and equipped to protect 
society from crime (Manning, 1977).  
These changes had the cumulative effect of focusing the police officer role 
on crime fighting through crime rate statistics. Since the inception of the UCR, 
police have been judged according to numerical standards. This has included, 
among other things, arrest rates and crime rates, but has also extended to calls for 
service and response time (Rubenstein, 1978; what Skolnick and Fyfe [1993] refer 
to as “the numbers game”). This has also resulted in police officers focusing less 
on whether they have achieved their goals and more on what they are doing 
towards those ends. In this situation, the police mandate has pushed agencies into 
a means/end syndrome where the means actually become the ends (Goldstein, 
1979). Police were crime fighting experts, a mandate which said little about crime 
preventing or reducing. Whether intended or not, this has had the ultimate 
consequence that police behavior became focused on serving themselves rather 
than on serving the public (Reiss & Bordua, 1967; Manning, 1978). 
This focus on crime statistics and the concomitant expectation that police 
can and should be able to do something about it immediately (Bittner, 1970) is 
reinforced from a myriad of sources that have taken on a life of their own. This is 
  21 
to say that a citizen need not be aware of crime statistics as such to expect police 
to engage in crime fighting through crime rate statistics. The media play an 
important role in reifying myths about the police’s role as the thin blue line 
between safety and anarchy (Manning, 1978; Potter & Kappeler, 2006). There is 
also evidence that this mandate is communicated vigorously from the political 
environment (Wilson, 1968) and the organizational environment (Slovak, 1987; 
Kappeler, Sluder, & Alpert, 1998; Manning & Van Maanen, 1978). As Kappeler 
and colleagues (1998) state, "[i]n essence, police are selected, socialized, and 
placed into a working environment that instills within them an ideology and 
shared culture that breeds unprecedented conformity to the traditional police 
norms and values" (p. 84). For the police, then, the impossible mandate is more 
than an occupational dictum: it is a moral calling filled with value-laden 
responsibility. This is a calling that many, if not most, police officers bring with 
them to the job (Raganella & White, 2004), and that police take very seriously 
(White, et al. 2010). This mandate guides the behavior of police officers and 
forms the goals to which their behavior is aimed. However, that behavior takes 
place within unique territories that also have an impact. The next section takes up 
this topic.  
Territoriality and Policing  
Since at least the beginning of the 20
th
 Century, most (if not virtually all) 
American police departments have deployed patrol officers in local beat areas 
(Walker & Katz, 2007). Indeed, although this deployment paradigm originated as 
a way of holding police officers accountable to their desk sergeants in the absence 
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of portable radios (de Lint, 2000), assigning officers to local beats – often for 
months at a time – has had the perhaps unintended consequence of encouraging 
police work-groups to develop norms and occupational world views on the basis 
of territoriality (Klinger, 1997). Thus, while the external environment of the 
police organization requires them to adopt a crime-fighting mandate, it is through 
territoriality that local police work-groups apply their knowledge of their local 
working environments in ways that allow them to try to achieve the crime control 
goals. 
Territoriality refers to "how people manage the location they own, occupy, 
or use for varying periods of time" (Taylor, 1988, p. 1). Territoriality can 
therefore be understood as a strategy of control. Sack (1986) elaborates on this 
idea in this way: "Territoriality [is] defined as the attempt by an individual or 
group to affect, influence, or control people, phenomena, and relationships, by 
delimiting and asserting control over a geographic area" (p. 19). Weber (1964) 
posited that states are essentially social aggregates commissioned to maintain 
political borders. That is, they are commissioned to maintain a politically defined 
territory. Within these borders, the state must also safeguard the well-being of the 
body politic. Weber (2004) distinguished the state from other social aggregates by 
pointing out that the state possessed a monopoly on the use of force. As Bittner 
(1970) argued forty years ago, the use of force in coercing compliance is the 
central role of police officers. Police can therefore be understood as the literal 
manifestation of the state's monopoly on the use of force. Indeed, individual 
police officers are "the most visible aspect" of the government and "that aspect 
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most likely to intervene directly" in the lives of citizens (Van Maanen, 1974, p. 
84). In carrying out this role, the police organize and behave within territorial 
units (Herbert, 1997).  
Large municipal police agencies typically divide their organizational 
hierarchy according to spatial units across the city. Precincts are supervised by 
mid-level managers; in turn, precincts comprise a collective of beats supervised 
by sergeants and patrolled by line officers. Throughout the United States there are 
variations on this organizational set up according to departmental size, geography, 
and the political environment, among other factors (Klinger, 1997), but the 
practice of organizing territorially is a constant across departments. The territories 
employed by police agencies are typically political rather than reflecting any 
organic sense of community as understood by citizens (Herbert, 2006; Klinger, 
1997). The political boundaries layered over the municipal map become so 
important that officers may cease to understand the city in terms of neighborhoods 
or landmarks; instead, it becomes "a mosaic of linked districts" (Rubenstein, 
1973, p. 26) to which the "patrolmen are tied inextricably" (Van Maanen, 1974, p. 
113).   
Social Ecology and Policing  
In general, the goals of police behavior are provided by the police 
mandate. The behavior designed to achieve these goals takes place within a 
territory. The contents of that territory will bear directly on the behavior of police 
officers. Early on, Whyte (1943) found that there were different rules for how 
police were to behave according to the kind of neighborhood in which they were 
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patrolling. Smith (1986) was one of the first scholars to empirically document this 
phenomenon. Among his findings, police were most likely to initiate contact with 
suspects and suspicious persons in racially heterogeneous neighborhoods, but 
were less likely to do so in high crime areas. Similarly, he found that in lower-
status neighborhoods, suspects were three times more likely to be arrested than in 
higher-status neighborhoods.  
Klinger (1997), drawing on the negotiated order perspective, suggested 
that the degree to which officers invoke their law enforcement powers ultimately 
rests on a collection of formal and informal work rules that are common to all 
officers. These rules provide direction to officers in negotiating contacts with 
citizens, and arise because, first, line-level officers have a high level of autonomy, 
and second, labor is divided along territorial (that is, precinct and beat) lines. 
What is more, these two facets are influenced by the social environment of the 
precinct, the police organizational mandate, and a workload that cannot be 
ignored. Essentially, every precinct has a certain level of "normal deviance", and 
any crime that departs from this mean is considered deviant and treated more 
vigorously - that is, with more official action on the part of the officer. Klinger 
(1997) argued that as crime rates increase in a precinct, "work group rules will 
hold that deviant acts of a given level of seriousness should receive less vigorous 
police attention" (p. 296). Thus far, at least four studies that have explicitly tested 
Klinger's ecological framework have found significant support (Phillips & Sobol, 
2010; Johnson & Olschansky, 2010; Sobol, 2010; Jackson & Boyd, 2005).  
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Kane's body of work has expanded this research agenda into other policing 
domains beyond the decision to arrest. For example, Kane (2002) found that 
police misconduct could be predicted by structural disadvantage, population 
mobility, and changes in the Latino population. In what can also be construed as a 
test of police territorial management, Kane (2005) found that, controlling for 
structural disadvantage, police were able to reduce rates in burglary and robbery, 
but, again, only up to a certain threshold. He also found that changes in Latino 
population were related to the allocation of police officers over time in New York 
City, but only up to a certain threshold (Kane, 2003). This finding is part of a 
larger literature that has consistently found similar racial and ethnic effects on 
police behavior. Drawing from a Weberian paradigm, Jacobs and O'Brien (1998) 
found that the police killings of Black citizens could be predicted, among other 
variables, by the economic inequality between Whites and Blacks. Jacobs and 
O'Brien (1998), as well as Kane (2002), suggest that one of the reasons that 
minority communities may be more vulnerable to police attention is because they 
lack the social capital necessary to muster resources against police violence. As 
Jacobs and O'Brien (1998) point out, without constraints, police violence is more 
probable than when under community constraints. It is important to note that 
these three studies (Kane, 2002, 2003; Jacobs and O’Brien, 1998) did control for a 
reactive hypothesis wherein police were simply responding to criminal activity 
within these communities. 
Overall, literature in this domain has found that, without appropriate 
agency controls, minority communities are more prone to police violence 
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compared to majority communities (Fyfe, 1982; Meehan & Ponder, 2002). Tying 
all these studies together (Kane, 2002, 2003, 2006; Jacobs & O’Brien, 1998) is 
the idea that the police and the social environment in which they work are bound 
together in an ecology: just as the environment impacts police behavior, such as 
misconduct, so too can police behavior impact overall patterns of citizen 
behavior, such as burglary and robbery. Importantly, the social environment under 
scrutiny in these studies (and others, e.g., Sherman, 1986; Smith, 1986) were the 
politically created and enforced boundaries of the police precinct. 
What goes on in an officer’s territory therefore guides his behavior: 
sometimes liberating it (e.g., in this neighborhood, it’s ok to …), sometimes 
constraining it (e.g., in this neighborhood, it’s best not to …). For example: a 
precinct with a particularly high crime rate will result in high levels of arrest. In 
such a neighborhood, the means of fulfilling the police mandate - arrest - is the 
accepted law enforcement response to high crime. In a precinct with lower rates 
of crime, however, arresting behavior may vary, because the mandate is more 
nebulous: The crime rate here is relatively low, so should I, as an officer, arrest 
this individual for something that in a high crime area I normally would, because 
that’s what’s expected of me there? Or can I let this slide? The answer is: it 
depends on a number of situational factors (Terrill & Reisig, 2003), precinct-level 
elements (Klinger, 1997), and ecological covariates (Kane, 2002, 2003, 2005). 
The difference between the two scenarios is largely a matter of what extra-legal 
reasons can enter the decision making picture. I submit that one such predictor is 
to be found in the overall institutional environment. 
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Isomorphism and the Institutional Environment 
According to Weber, one source of organizational legitimacy, which he 
coined rational authority, is drawn from an organization’s ability to match its 
behavior to desired outcomes. Early theorists, therefore, argued that legitimacy 
was gained through the output-oriented success of organizations. The expansion 
of the bureaucratic model and the rational acquisition of legitimacy were first 
understood in terms of economic and international competition and the 
concomitant search for the efficient means of production. Organizational theorists 
argued that to the degree that what an organization did was rationally tied to its 
outcome, and that that outcome was achieved with maximal efficiency, it earned 
and maintained legitimacy. Many contemporary theorists suggest that the tie 
between what an organization does and its outcomes may have little or nothing to 
do with an organization's legitimacy. Rather, many modern organizational 
theorists argue that legitimacy is now less tied to efficiency and is more part of 
subordinating structure and operation to the institutional plane’s status quo 
(DiMaggio & Powell, 1983). Just as Weber (1964) argued that bureaucracy was 
the inevitable iron cage of society, many modern organizational theorists suggest 
that the structure of organizations is inevitable because of the pressures exerted 
from the institutional environment (Meyer & Rowan, 1977; DiMaggio & Powell, 
1983). Clarifying his definition of legitimacy, Suchman (1995) wrote: "...when 
one says that a certain pattern of behavior possesses legitimacy, one asserts that 
some group of observers, as a whole, accepts or supports what those observers 
perceive to be the behavioral pattern, as a whole" (p. 574). 
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This shift in understanding came about largely because researchers began 
to realize that a) not all organizations behaved according to their bureaucratic 
structure, and b) not all organizations had operational (that is, quantifiable and 
measurable) goals (Parsons, 1963; Meyer & Rowan, 1977; DiMaggio & Powell, 
1983; Blau & Meyer, 1971). Yet, such organizations not only survived but in 
many cases thrived. Parsons (1963) offered one explanation for this paradox: He 
pointed out that society held intangible values that were reinforced by the political 
climate of that society. These values trickled down to organizations which 
ostensibly were set up to carry those values out. One problem with this process 
was, being intangible, the operationalization of these goals was categorical rather 
than quantitative (Meyer & Rowan, 1977).  Unable to measure their goals, 
organizations were also unable to meet the bench-marks held up by a Weberian 
bureaucracy. This threatened their legitimacy, and hence their survival. 
Organizations, therefore, had to seek legitimacy elsewhere.  
DiMaggio and Powell (1983) suggested that one way in which 
organizations acquire legitimacy is through isomorphism: "...[the] 
bureaucratization and other forms of organizational change [that] occur as the 
result of processes that make organizations more similar without necessarily 
making them more efficient" (p. 147). The point DiMaggio and Powell are 
making is that organizations copy one another not because another organization’s 
operations or structures are seen as efficient means to a promising outcome, but 
simply because another organization may be perceived as legitimate. By copying 
it, an organization hopes to acquire legitimacy itself. In a very real sense, 
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institutional isomorphism is the organizational equivalent of peer pressure: 
organizations make structural and behavioral changes according to the demands 
of their institutional environment to conform.  
DiMaggio and Powell (1983) outlined three mechanisms of isomorphic 
change. Coercive isomorphism occurs whenever powerful stakeholders put 
pressure on an organization to adopt or drop specific policies, practices, or 
organizational elements. For example: the adoption of mandatory arrest policies 
in cases of domestic violence during the 1970s and 1980s were largely in 
response to law suits and the activist behavior of women’s advocacy groups 
(Sherman, Schmidt, & Rogan, 1992). Mimetic isomorphism occurs whenever, in 
a bid to acquire legitimacy, organizations adopt the practices of similarly 
purposed organizations which are already seen as legitimate. This form of 
isomorphism is most common when "organizational technologies are poorly 
understood...when goals are ambiguous, or when the environment creates 
symbolic uncertainty" (p. 151). For example, the presence of paramilitary units in 
small town police departments which have no need of them may reflect efforts to 
imitate the police agencies from larger cities (Kraska & Cubellis, 1997). Finally, 
normative isomorphism occurs as a result of an organization seeking to couch its 
purpose and methods within the broader institutional environment, generally via 
professionalization. For example: as COMPSTAT has come to be understood as 
an effective crime fighting tool, its adoption has spread throughout the United 
States (Willis, Mastrofski, & Weisburd, 2007).   
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For all forms of isomorphism, entities already possessing legitimacy or 
holding the power to define an organization's legitimacy are called sovereigns 
(Meyer & Rowan, 1977). Sovereigns include inter alia other organizations with 
the same or similar goals. Sovereigns may also include individuals (Katz, 2001). 
This may be the case when there is a particularly charismatic chief or sheriff, such 
as Bratton, Arpaio, or Bouza. Additionally, this may occur whenever an officer is 
seen as a stand-up cop who is able to effect change. This, for example, occurred in 
Katz’s (2001) study where the commanding officer of a new gang unit was able to 
endow that unit with legitimacy. Any entity perceived as legitimate may be 
considered a sovereign insofar as its or his influence is unduly strong on the 
behavior of others or other institutional entities.  
According to the institutional perspective, organizations vie for legitimacy 
in light of the demands of sovereigns in order to survive (DiMaggio & Powell, 
1983). Failure to conform to institutional standards may result in the inability to 
acquire legitimacy, the loss of organizational relevance, and disbanding – without 
any regard for efficient productivity or the ties between practices and 
outcomes. Sovereigns exist because they are perceived to either have legitimacy, 
or because they have some resource-advantage over other units in the 
environment. Their legitimacy can come from tradition, a charismatic leader, or 
from the socio-legal environment of the society of which they are a part (Weber, 
1964). 
Suchman (1995) extends this line of thinking by pointing out that there are 
at least three ways that an organization can respond to isomorphic pressure. An 
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organization may simply conform to the expectations of their institutional 
environment. Or, they may select into another institutional environment more in 
line with the direction they want to take. Finally, an organization may attempt to 
manipulate their environment to ensure their own legitimacy and survival. In all 
three scenarios, legitimacy and its acquisition remain part of a socially constructed 
reality (Meyer & Rowan, 1977). This reality may have little or nothing to do with 
the efficient production of output-oriented goals. What matters is that 
organizations carry the appearance of conforming to the expectations of their 
institutional environment. Insofar as an organization successfully maintains the 
appearance of doing what is expected of it from the institutional environment, it 
can maintain legitimacy. This also has the effect of making organizations within 
the same institutional environment more similar to one another than different 
(DiMaggio and Powell, 1983). 
Using Isomorphism to Explain Aggregate Police Behavior 
This dissertation has thus far discussed four topics: organizational 
legitimacy, the police mandate, territoriality, and institutional isomorphism. The 
purpose of the current section is to explain how the organizational literature on 
legitimacy and institutional isomorphism can help us understand the territorial 
behavior of police given their mandate. Using institutional theory to study police 
agencies has an intuitive appeal. For one, police departments are by design highly 
bureaucratized (Roberg, Novak, & Cordner, 2005). Further, law enforcement 
agencies are attached to the executive branch of municipal, county, or state 
governments; as such, their organizational legitimacy is exposed to external 
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political pressures (Strecher, 1991). What is more, police administrators have 
historically and contemporaneously made a concerted effort to be aware of the 
practices of other agencies (Giblin & Burruss, 2009). This began as early as the 
creation of the IACP, an organization originally created in the 1890s to assist in 
apprehending cross-jurisdictional felons, and which has since evolved into an 
advocacy and professionalism group.  
The articulation of policing through the institutional lens, however, was 
not fully undertaken until the early 1990s with the work of Crank and Langworthy 
(1992; see also Langworthy, 1986). Crank and Langworthy (1992) made the 
argument that police agencies, as highly institutionalized complex organizations, 
should be studied as such. They suggested that because the police are given a 
single tool - enforcement of the law via arrests, citations, etc. - to achieve a broad 
and nebulous mandate, their legitimacy is threatened. Institutional theory predicts 
that they will look to their institutional environment for cues on how to acquire 
legitimacy. The police are part of a value laden institutional environment which 
creates an image of who the police are and what the police do. Any one police 
department seeks to conform to the expectations of its institutional environment: 
"Institutional organizations operate in environments that are complex, with 
values. The organizations, to survive, turn their focus 'outward' to acknowledge 
influential constituencies and the values they represent" (Crank, 2003, p. 186). 
The sovereigns (Meyer & Scott, 1992) included in this environment are inter 
alia political parties and actors, media, citizen groups, and, especially, law 
enforcement professional associations and other law enforcement agencies and 
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influential officers (Giblin & Burress, 2009; Katz, 2001; Crank & Langworthy, 
1992). Crank (2003) explains:  
Efficiency, however, occurs within a context in which fundamental values 
are rarely questioned. Put differently, efficiency considerations are always 
present in "means" considerations... But goals, organized and stated in 
terms of institutional values and taken for granted meanings, link the 
organization to its broader societal or community context. Institutional 
elements are fundamental to the social glue and foundational to 
interactional processes; thus, we rationally reaffirm our socially 
constructed and morally meaningful world on a daily basis (p. 204). 
 
The police mandate is endorsed by the institutional environment of the 
police, including the media (Manning, 1978; Potter & Kappeler, 2006), the 
political environment (Wilson, 1968), other officers, and the organizational 
environment (Slovak, 1987; Kappeler, Sluder, & Alpert, 1998; Manning & Van 
Maanen, 1978). Indeed, the idea that police should not be out searching for 
villains and engaging in law enforcement to protect the innocent (Klockars, 
1986), despite that this is a picture of what amounts to rare police activity 
(Manning, 1977; Klockars, 1986; Rubenstein, 1973; Wilson, 1968) is 
inconceivable to most segments of the American society - including the police 
themselves (White, et al. 2010). The police mandate is part of the overall social 
fabric that informs both politics and the institutional environment (Parsons, 1963). 
It has achieved that level of taken-for-grantedness that characterizes Suchman's 
(1995) cognitive order of legitimacy.  
These and other discussions of institutional theory and policing behavior 
lack what I contend is the key element for understanding the isomorphic 
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framework, namely: territoriality. Territoriality can be used to explain how 
isomorphism occurs. The following section elaborates on this statement.  
Isomorphic Effects on Police Territorial Behavior  
Conforming to the expectations of the institutional environment may have 
several effects on the territorial behavior of the police. First, the mandate informs 
the goals of police agencies, and territoriality helps us understand the behavior 
that officers take to achieve these goals (Katz, 2001; Slovak, 1987). Giblin (2006) 
explains that the institutional environment constrains the choices an agency can 
make in response to specific environmental exigencies.  Because police behave 
territorially, and because their behavior is guided by institutionally informed 
values, their actions in the areas for which they are responsible are constrained by 
what is institutionally allowed (Rubenstein, 1973). For example, the continuation 
of random patrol and a focus on rapid response time in the face of countervailing 
research are all the result of choices that agencies have made within the suite of 
options made available to them (Crank & Langworthy, 1992). Whatever their 
efficacy, these are activities the police are expected to engage in. 
On the other hand, the ecology of a territory may also play an important 
role. When the problems of a territory clearly align with the police mandate, 
isomorphism may have less of an effect. When the problems do not necessarily 
align with the police mandate, isomorphism may have a stronger effect in 
informing officer behavior. From Klinger (1997) we learn that each precinct has a 
going-rate of crime that is deemed acceptable. This going rate is informed to a 
great degree by a number of social variables associated with the aggregate 
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attributes of the residents. So, too, from Kane (2002, 2003, 2005) we learn that 
the ecology of a neighborhood impacts police behavior net of the ecology of 
surrounding neighborhoods. What this means is that isomorphism may behave 
differentially according to the attributes of any given areal unit.  
The third ramification has to do with the existence and influence of 
sovereigns as suggested by the institutional literature. Sovereigns define both the 
goals and the means to achieve those goals across organizations.  They are 
powerful and influential actors within the institutional environment. For the 
police, sovereigns include special interest groups, media, citizens, other policing 
agencies, other officers, professional organizations, monies granting institutions, 
and various political units (Katz, 2001). Neighboring police agencies will often 
share similar crime problems and challenges, and may therefore look to the same 
set of sovereigns for guidance on how to maintain legitimacy. Isomorphic 
processes may therefore take place spatially, spreading out centrifugally from 
those agencies most proximate to sovereigns. This would predict that agencies 
closest to one another are most similar to one another, and that similarities decline 
between agencies and sovereigns concomitantly with distance. Additionally, this 
would predict that proximity to a sovereign predicts behavior. 
The State of Institutional Research in Policing 
Since Crank and Langworthy's (1992) piece, there have been 
approximately two dozen studies that have directly or indirectly used the 
institutional framework to understand police organization behavior, the majority 
of which have found support for it generally and, for those which have studied it 
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explicitly, for isomorphic pressures specifically (Crank, 2003). Isomorphism has 
been used to explain adopting specialized policing units (Katz, 2001; Giblin, 
2006), disbanding of law enforcement agencies (King, 2009), implementing 
community policing (Giblin & Burruss, 2009) and COMPSTAT (Willis, 
Mastrofski, & Weisburd, 2007), and policing hate crimes (Jenness & Grattet, 
2005). In general, these studies have used the isomorphic framework to explain 
organizational changes. Katz (2001), for example, found that a Midwestern police 
force created and maintained a specialized gang unit ultimately to please 
community stakeholders. Both the unit's creation and activities were aimed at 
maintaining the agency's legitimacy (Katz, 2001). On the other end of the 
spectrum, King (2009) found that agencies that either cannot change according to 
environmental demands or who change in ways that are displeasing to powerful 
actors who are exterior to the department risk losing legitimacy. As a 
consequence, many such agencies in King's sample were disbanded.  
Recently, Giblin and Burruss (2009) have taken a first attempt at 
quantifying institutional processes in policing. This is an important step, as 
previous researchers have pointed out that "while institutional theory offers some 
compelling hypotheses about organizations, its propositions are not easily 
measurable and are therefore very difficult to test using macro-level survey 
research methods" (Katz, Maguire, & Roncek, 2002, p. 480). Giblin and Burruss 
(2009) were able to tease out three distinct institutional constructs: 
professionalization, publications, and mimesis. Each of these constructs bear 
directly on the topic of isomorphism insofar as they touch on the question of what 
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ways police activities are guided by non-rational principles which are influenced 
by the institutional environment. Despite Giblin and Burruss’s (2009) efforts, 
however, the study of isomorphism in the realm of policing remains akin to the 
state of social disorganization prior to Sampson and Groves (1989) and Bursik & 
Grasmick (1993): the antecedent dependent variables are examined in relation to 
endogenous variables without empirically testing the intervening processes.          
Theoretical Extension 
Institutional theory revolves around the question of organizational 
behavior. It generally seeks to explain organizational behavior in terms of the 
pressures of the larger institutional environment. This environment is composed 
of sovereigns, among which are other organizations which work in the same 
milieu.  From the discussion throughout this chapter, there is ample theoretical 
reason and empirical evidence to suggest that an attempt to understand police 
organization and behavior through an institutional lens has the potential to be 
fruitful (Crank, 2003). The bulk of research exploring isomorphism in policing 
has been inter-agency. It has asked the question to what extent can one agency's 
behavior be determined by the behavior of other agencies. There is also reason to 
expect that applying this framework to the intra-organization level may be 
fruitful, at least for larger police agencies. Large police agencies are essentially 
composed of several organizations, starting at the precinct level and even boiling 
down to the beat level. By extension, there may exist intra-agency isomorphic 
processes, where one precinct or one beat is influencing the behavior of other 
precincts or beats. This section will expand on this concept, discuss the 
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appropriate unit of analysis for isomorphic processes to most likely occur, and 
conclude with a discussion on the most appropriate dependent variable for a study 
of isomorphic effects on police behavior.    
Isomorphism as an Intra-Agency Phenomenon  
The idea that isomorphic processes may occur at the intra-organizational 
level as well as between organizations was suggested by Meyer and Rowan 
(1977) who wrote that "units within the organization use ceremonial assessments 
as accounts of their productive service to the organization. Their internal power 
rises with their performance on ceremonial measures" (p. 351). Regarding the 
police, Crank (2003) similarly suggested that isomorphic processes could be used 
to understand the behavior of the police within individual agencies. Large police 
organizations are typically composed of precincts which can be understood as 
sub-organizations drawn from the overall jurisdictional structure of the entire 
department (Klinger, 1997). These organizations within organizations can be 
analyzed using the isomorphic framework because all precincts need resources. 
To acquire these resources, they must maintain legitimacy; as the rational means 
of acquiring such legitimacy is impossible, each sub-organization must seek 
legitimacy through non-rational means. Specifically, by observing and mimicking 
the behavior of other sub-organizations with the same goals, similar problems, 
and similar challenges.  
Katz (2001) demonstrated the reality of this process by documenting that 
the continual existence of a specialized gang unit in one police department 
depended less on what they accomplished and more on the extent to which the 
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rest of the police agency perceived its existence as necessary and legitimate. At 
first, the unit was perceived as nothing more than a public relations unit 
constituted with lazy police officers. To acquire legitimacy, the unit's supervisor 
changed its structure and the behavior of the officers assigned to the unit to 
something that aligned more closely with what other officers would understand to 
be "real" police work, and networked to ensure that all gang-related information 
came to the specialized gang unit.  Because of these changes, the unit was seen as 
legitimate and necessary to the operation of the police agency. In this way, the 
unit was able to survive despite the lack of any real gang problem in their 
jurisdiction (Katz, 2001).    
Precincts, of course, are not the only sub-organizations within a police 
department, because precincts are composed of beats. Nevertheless, the policing 
literature is consonant in asserting that precincts are the most appropriate 
territorial unit to study police behavior. Rubenstein (1973) pointed out forty years 
ago that the police are only concerned with what occurs within their sector (that 
is, their precinct). Klinger (1997) extended Rubenstein's line of thought and 
argued that, because ecological research is most concerned with community-level 
research, any researcher interested in studying the ecology of the police must 
answer what constitutes a police community. He concludes that for the police, the 
precinct is the appropriate analog to a citizen’s community: 
The shared responsibility within the exclusivity across jurisdictional and 
district boundaries create distinct systems of policing at the district and 
small jurisdictional level. Thus, while all jurisdictions, districts, and beats 
are delineated by geography, only the collections of beats that form small 
jurisdictions and districts of large ones have the social and territorial unit 
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character that defines community as human ecologists ... use the term (p. 
282, emphasis in original).  
 
Most of a patrol officer's time is spent surveying specific neighborhoods 
within his precinct (Rubinstein, 1973; Klinger, 1997). Although officers may 
work in other jurisdictions through calls for service, overtime, or temporary 
assignment, the bulk of their time and concern is spent within their precinct, as it 
is on this area that their legitimacy rests (Rubinstein, 1973; Wilson & Kelling, 
1982; Klockars, 1986; Klinger, 1997). In some cases this focus is initiated by the 
patrol officer, while in others it is in direct response to a call for directed patrol 
(Sherman & Weisburd, 1995). Monthly or bi-weekly COMPSTAT meetings 
involve holding supervisors accountable for the geographic unit for which they 
are responsible; these accountability sessions trickle down to line officers (Walsh, 
2001). Perhaps most importantly, the precinct house is the center for information 
exchange among officers, thus at once limiting their knowledge and informing it 
(Sherman, 1986). 
Other theorists have also concluded that the police work group, which is 
integral to forming officer behavior, is developed and experienced at the precinct 
level (Kane, 2005; Herbert, 1997; Sherman, 1986; Klinger, 1997). What is more, 
due to the territorial nature of policing and the spatial distribution of criminal 
behavior, it is likely that precincts within close proximity of each other physically 
are likely to influence one another. For the Philadelphia officers from 
Rubenstein's (1973) study, their knowledge was essentially limited to their district 
(precinct), with the exception of officers who worked along the sectors (beats) 
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that bordered other districts: "If he is assigned to work a border sector, he may get 
to know several of the men who work opposite him; he may even share lunch 
with them occasionally. Otherwise, contacts across district lines are limited to 
chance encounters at local hospitals and occasional exchanges when the men 
come to each other's aid on assists" (p. 129). Therefore, the territorial organization 
of policing should constrain the effects of the institutional environment to those 
precincts within proximity of each other in a centrifugal pattern emanating from 
those precincts deemed to be sovereigns because of their perceived legitimacy.  
The Place of Discretionary Arresting Behavior  
It is submitted here that arresting behavior is the most appropriate unit of 
measurement for the theoretical framework that has been presented. Most 
observers have noted that police rarely invoke their full law enforcement power, 
and that a better description for what officers do is order maintenance (Wilson, 
1968; Sykes, 1986; Klockars, 1986; Crank & Langworthy, 1992). This is the 
reality of police work, but it does not necessarily reflect the institutionally 
informed rhetoric of what police “ought” to be doing. Law enforcement, with its 
ever present threat of the use of force, is the most active image of the police that 
citizens have in mind when they think about what the police ought to be doing. 
Consider one of the most common responses to being pulled over: "Shouldn't you 
be somewhere catching the real criminals?" A quick look at the most recent Crime 
in America (Federal Bureau of Investigation, 2010) statistics on the clearance rate 
suggests that arrest is simply not an efficient or effective means of catching the 
villain: the highest clearance rate was for murder/nonnegligent manslaughter - a 
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crime that typically requires very little by way of police initiative for clearance 
purposes - at 66.6 percent, compared to the lowest, motor vehicle theft and 
burglary, at 12.4 and 12.5 percent, respectively. Despites its inefficiency, arresting 
criminals is what the police are expected to do.  
It is because of this situation - that police are expected to fulfill their 
mandate of fighting crime through a less than efficient means - that Crank and 
Langworthy (1992) also submitted that arresting behavior was exceptionally 
susceptible to isomorphic pressures, "The elaborate organizational structure 
emphasizes law enforcement activities, reinforcing the police department's 
institutional image as a 'crime fighter,' in spite of inconsistencies between that 
image and the actual work of the department" (p. 344). This idea was reiterated by 
Chappell, MacDonald, and Manz (2006) who argued that arresting behavior was 
an appropriate measure of police activity because it was influenced by a variety of 
factors, including the political environment and the crime rate, and because it was 
influenced by "beliefs about justice in a particular area" (p. 293). That is, arresting 
behavior is particularly sensitive to the isomorphic processes within a given areal 
unit.  
We will most likely be able to observe isomorphic trends in those areas 
where police have the most discretion. This is especially the case with juveniles 
and non-felony offenses. Research has consistently supported the notion that non-
felony cases receive a wide latitude of police discretionary behavior (Walker, 
1993; Skolnick, 1966) as does police treatment of juvenile offenders/delinquents 
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as compared with adult offenders (Piliavin & Briar, 1964)
4
. In general, the less 
serious the offense, the more discretion the police have. Kalven and Zeizel’s 
(1966) liberation hypothesis also helps explain the discretionary behavior of the 
police. The liberation hypothesis indicates that for low-level crimes, where the 
appropriate action to take against such offenses is more or less ambiguous, justice 
actors are left to their own impressions in determining the best course of action. 
This hypothesis was tested and confirmed in 1991 by Spohn and Cederblom, who 
found, among other findings, that 
In less serious cases…the appropriate sentence is not necessarily obvious; 
consequently judges are liberated from the constraints imposed by the law, 
by other members of the courtroom work group, and by public opinion, 
and are free to take into account extralegal considerations such as race (p. 
323).  
 
For lower level crimes where action is not clear, such as drug crimes (Lynch, et 
al. 2002), or property crimes when compared to violent crimes, or for juvenile 
crimes when compared to adult crimes, police are given more latitude in terms of 
how they behave.  
 
 
                                                 
4 Arresting behavior is only one aspect of what police do that represents formal social control 
associated with their mandate. Although the literature makes a strong argument that it is the most 
likely behavior to be influenced by isomorphic trends, it is certainly not the only formal police 
behavior subject to institutional pressures. Fyfe (1982) demonstrated that official policy can sway 
the behavior of police; it therefore stands to reason that anything that can come down the 
administrative pipe-line may be influenced by the policing institutional environment. For example: 
Efforts by the Arizona legislature to require police officers to check the citizenship status of 
individuals, during a lawful stop, for whom they have a reasonable suspicion that they lack official 
documentation has caught on in several other states, including at least South Carolina, 
Pennsylvania, Minnesota, Rhode Island and Michigan (Gorman, 2010). While the analyses in this 
dissertation will focus on arresting behavior, for the reasons presented above, other potential 
targets for institutional pressure to conformity will be revisited in the final chapter.  
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Synthesis and Research Hypotheses 
Weber (2004) teaches us that for a state to exist, it must maintain its 
borders and the peace and order within those borders. Failure to do so threatens 
the legitimacy of a state, and subsequently its stability and existence.  In the 
United States, as with most democratic countries, the task of maintaining peace, 
safety, and order within the borders of the country is assigned to the police, who 
are endowed with the awesome capacity to use deadly force (Bittner, 1970). In a 
very real sense, the police represent the state’s obligations under the social 
contract (Hobbes, 2009; Locke, 1993; Rousseau, 1992). This obligation is 
articulated as a mandate for the police: to protect the innocent and capture the 
villain through the "efficient, apolitical, and professional enforcement of the law" 
(Manning, 1978, p. 8). However, the primary tool at the disposal of the police, 
law enforcement through arrest, is tenuously and irregularly associated with the 
goal – a goal which, while seemingly discrete is, in fact, nebulous (DiIulio, 1995). 
Given the disconnect between the means of law enforcement and the goal of law 
enforcement (Goldstein, 1979), the legitimacy of the police may be compromised.  
For this reason, police agencies may look elsewhere for legitimacy. 
Organizational theory suggests that one such venue is within the institutional 
environment itself (Crank & Langworthy, 1992). By acceding to the demands of 
institutional sovereigns, and by becoming more similar to other agencies 
perceived as legitimate, police agencies a) maintain legitimacy while 
simultaneously b) diminishing organizational and behavioral variation across the 
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institutional environment. This process is known as isomorphism (Meyer & 
Rowan, 1977; DiMaggio & Powell, 1983). 
Institutional theory has traditionally been applied to answer the question of 
why organizations are similar. It may also be applied to answer the question of 
why subunits within a complex organization are similar (Meyer & Rowan, 1977). 
This line of thought holds promise for the study of the precinct-level behavior of 
police agencies. Large municipal police departments (and some large county 
sheriff’s offices) are organized along early 20th century bureaucratic models, 
including a scalar hierarchy and division of labor. Each subunit acts in relative 
autonomy from its counterparts, needing to answer only to higher level command 
staff. While specialized units are delineated according to a division of labor based 
on expertise (e.g., a homicide unit), patrol officers, the backbone of any police 
department and the bulk of its sworn employees, are not. Rather, patrol districts 
are allocated according to politically designated areal units. It is for this reason 
that policing scholarship suggests that policing behavior – particularly aggregate 
policing behavior – can gainfully be understood from a territorial perspective 
(Klinger, 1997; Rubinstein, 1973; Herbert, 1997). Indeed, research has 
consistently demonstrated that the territory in which police behave impacts how 
they behave in fulfilling their mandate (Kane, 2002, 2003, 2006; Jacobs & 
O’Brien, 1998; Klinger, 1997). Therefore, in order to understand how police 
precincts acquire and maintain legitimacy, it is important to start from a territorial 
framework.    
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To explore the role of isomorphism on the behavior of police precincts, I 
propose the following hypotheses:  
1. Net of controls, the juvenile arresting behavior of police in any given PSA 
will be influenced by the juvenile arresting behavior of neighboring PSA’s 
in a centrifugal pattern. This pattern will be strongest for crimes that allow 
for more discrimination. 
a. Violent juvenile crimes will exhibit this pattern less so than other 
crimes, because violent crimes allow for less police officer 
discretion.  
b. Similarly, juvenile property crime arrests will exhibit this pattern 
less so than the two remaining dependent variables: juvenile drug 
crime arrests and juvenile gun crime arrests.  
c. Juvenile drug crime arrests will be especially prone to isomorphic 
influences, as they allow for more police officer discretion (Lynch, 
et al. 2002) than either juvenile property arrests or violent crime 
arrests. This will also be the case because the morality of drug 
crimes is not as explicit as that of violent, property, or gun crimes. 
This ambiguous morality will carry an equivocal meaning for the 
police mandate that will require PSA’s to consider the behavior of 
their neighbors for insight on how to treat such crimes.  
d. Juvenile gun crime arrests will also be prone to isomorphic 
influences; however, it is noted that this research took place during 
District of Columbia v. Heller (2008). Because of this 
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circumstance, juvenile gun crime arresting behavior will exhibit 
more spatial stability than juvenile drug crime arrests because of 
the political climate. This is to say that, because of the Supreme 
Court’s finding in DC v. Heller, we should expect to see similar 
behavior in terms of juvenile gun crime arrests across the District.   
2. The existence of sovereign precincts should be empirically observable. 
Again, for crimes with more discretion, we should see more of a sovereign 
effect insofar as the spatial dependency suggested in hypothesis 1 will 
have its effect ultimately through sovereign precincts.  
a. For juvenile violent crime arrests, this effect will be the smallest 
when compared to property, drug, and gun crime arrests. 
b. Juvenile property crime arrests will display this pattern more so 
than violent crime, but less so than the other arrest types. 
c. Given the fluid nature of drug crime arrests, sovereigns will have a 
strong effect on juvenile drug crime arrests. 
d. Sovereign effects may be noticeable for juvenile gun crime arrests, 
but ultimately, it will be a concerted agency-wide effect that we 
will witness, owing to the nature of the Heller case. 
3. The research insists that the ecology of an area is highly influential on 
police arresting behavior, and we see no reason to think that this will not 
be the case in an institutional context. It is very plausible that a PSA’s 
ecology can overwhelm any institutional effects. This is especially true in 
terms of the minority threat hypothesis and its relationship to serious 
  48 
crime. Therefore, all arrest dependent variables will exhibit ecological and 
racial effects which will ultimately weaken institutional processes. 
 Ultimately, these hypotheses tie back into the core research questions of 
the current study: why do police engage in behavior that, for all intents and 
purposes, is not associated with crime control, and why do police behave 
similarly, despite idiosyncratic exigencies. The reason that their behavior does 
not result in crime control is because the tool of law enforcement does not 
necessarily lead to a reduction in crime. This threatens their legitimacy, and 
this is why they tend to behave and organize similarly: in an effort to claim 
legitimacy, they “copy” other agencies that appear to have acquired 
legitimacy. This theory can be drawn down to an inter-agency level: precincts 
should look and behave the same, despite different environmental pressures 
and despite a disconnect between what they do and what they achieve. These 
hypotheses test whether a) police agency subunits do, in fact, behave the 
same, and b) if this is so because they are copying each other’s arresting 
behavior.  
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Chapter 3 
METHODOLOGY 
Introduction 
 Katz, Maguire, and Roncek (2002) offer among the most thorough 
investigations of police organization behavior using an institutional framework, 
doing so from a qualitative standpoint. This was necessary largely because of how 
difficult it is to quantitatively observe and measure isomorphic processes (Katz, 
Maguire, & Roncek, 2002). In this section, I propose how isomorphism may be 
quantitatively investigated, approaching this challenge indirectly: rather than 
measuring isomorphism directly, I attempt to measure it by proxy. Physicists can 
know that a planet exists prior to actually seeing it by observing its gravitational 
pull, known as g, on surrounding space objects. In a similar fashion, I argue that 
we can tap into isomorphic processes in police organizations by observing the 
“pull” of one police precinct on another. That “pull” is an indication of mimetic 
processes at work: if, in controlling for variables relevant to police activity, we 
observe influence based on the behavior of neighboring precincts, theory suggests 
that the influence is due to institutional pressures to conform. In essence, the noise 
attributable to spatial autocorrelation becomes our invisible g. This chapter 
explains the research design used to accomplish this task.  
Overview 
 Integral to this study’s methodology are the following components: 
territory, isomorphic processes, and sovereigns. In addition, other ecological 
factors associated with police behavior must be estimated, particularly those 
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developed under a social disorganization and minority threat framework (Kane, 
2003, 2005). One of the challenges of empirically studying isomorphism has been 
the difficulty associated with measuring its processes, either directly or indirectly 
(Katz, Maguire, & Roncek, 2002). Drawing theoretically from the institutional 
literature, but methodologically from the recent work undertaken in the ecology of 
policing, this study attempts to capture isomorphic effects through a territorial 
framework by employing spatial analytic techniques.  
 Data for this study were acquired from an online clearinghouse hosted by 
the District of Columbia. Called the “Data Catalog”, the clearinghouse is a host of 
publicly available data including crime reports and juvenile arrests. Importantly, 
these data contain latitudinal and longitudinal coordinates of each incident, as 
well as a number of variables associated with the incident (e.g., type of weapon 
used), the offenders (e.g., race), and other areal properties (e.g., type of location, 
such as alleyway). In addition, data for the 2000 Census were merged with the 
data collected from the D.C. Data Catalog in an effort to account for ecological 
properties and processes not available from the D.C. data.  
The Setting 
The District of Columbia  
The District of Columbia is unique in the United States as being a political 
entity set apart for the administration of governance (U.S. Const. art I. § 8). Its 
population therefore falls under the purview of the federal government, with 
relegated authority to a municipal mayor and council (only after achieving “home 
rule” in 1973). According to the US Census bureau, the population in 2010 was 
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601,723, an increase of 5.2 percent from 2000 (572,059). Approximately 50 
percent of the population is African American, and just over a third is White 
(approximately 38 percent). The District covers an area of 68.3 square miles and 
is surrounded on three sides by the State of Maryland, with the Commonwealth of 
Virginia abutting its southwestern border. The metropolitan area surrounding the 
District of Columbia is the seventh largest in the country, with over five million 
residents (US Census Bureau, 2010).  
 Concerning crime, in many ways, Washington, D.C. does not stand out 
from among other comparable cities in the United States. Looking at the UCR 
figures for available years suggests that, like the rest of the country, D.C. 
experienced a gradual post-World War II crime rate increase, punctuated by a 
sharp rise in crime in the 1980s. This was followed by an even sharper drop in 
crime during the 1990s (see Figure 1). D.C. is distinct as having had one of the 
highest numbers of murders during the 1980s and early 1990s, upwards of 400 a 
year. This compared to 186 in 2008. In 2008, there were 1,437.7 incidents of 
violent crime per 100,000 residents, and the property crime rate per 100,000 
residents was 5,104.6 (all these figures rely on the FBI’s Uniform Crime Reports, 
accessed via their website on June 1, 2011). 
Washington, DC is also considered one of the most “over-policed” cities 
in the United States with at least four major police forces claiming jurisdiction in 
both distinct and overlapping physical locations (Kane & Cronin, 2011). These 
include the DC Metro Police, which functions as the municipal police force in 
DC, the U.S. Park Police, which has jurisdiction over all monuments and federal 
  52 
Washington, DC is also considered one of the most “over-policed” cities in the 
United States with at least four major police forces claiming jurisdiction in both 
distinct and overlapping physical locations (Kane & Cronin, 2011). These include 
the DC Metro Police, which functions as the municipal police force in DC, the 
U.S. Park Police, which has jurisdiction over all monuments and federal 
Figure 1. Washington, D.C. crime rate 1995-2008. 
 
public spaces (and overlaps the most with the DC Metro), the Uniformed Division 
of the Secret Service, which patrols a broad perimeter around the White House, 
and the U.S. Capitol Police, which has jurisdiction around the Capitol Building 
and many other federal structures and institutions. 
All of this suggests that Washington, D. C. is at once similar and 
dissimilar to other cities in the United States. This observation brings into 
question the external validity of the current project. If isomorphism is found to be 
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a unique force on police organization behavior, is this because of something 
idiosyncratic to Washington, D. C.? The threat to external validity is, however, 
mitigated by a number of other factors. First, although its municipal set up differs 
from other cities, it is yet organized similarly. In addition, there is no reason to 
expect that isomorphism is place-dependent: although it may manifest differently 
in different cities, its process will still be the same. For example, even though 
police may arrest at different rates in a rural town compared to an urban city, 
police in both cities are arresting. The process is the same, it is only the outcome 
that differs. Finally, despite the large degree of decentralization that has 
historically characterized American policing, police departments around the 
nation, even very large ones such as the New York Police Department or the 
MPD, are essentially organized along similar lines, and, indeed, behave along 
similar lines. Therefore, although external validity must be kept in mind 
throughout the presentation of research findings and subsequent discussion, there 
is reason to believe that DC is comparable to at least other similarly sized police 
agencies. 
The Agency  
The D.C. Metropolitan Police Department was created in 1861 at the 
behest of President Abraham Lincoln (MPDC, nd). Although there are several 
agencies responsible for the District of Columbia, the MPD is the largest both in 
terms of size and jurisdiction. The agency is divided into seven bureaus, and lead 
by a chief of police (currently Cathy L. Lanier). According to the BJS (Bureau of 
Justice Statistics, 2008), the agency is composed of over 4,400 members, over 
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three quarters of whom are sworn officers. Of these sworn officers, approximately 
66 percent are African American and 28 percent are White. The department 
divides into 7 districts, which are further divided into Police Service Areas (PSA).  
 From the 2008 Annual Report (Metropolitan Police Department, 2009), it 
is evident that the MPD reflects the characteristics discussed above in the 
literature review chapter. Their mission statement, for example, reads “It is the 
mission of the Metropolitan Police Department to safeguard the District of 
Columbia and protect its residents and visitors” (p. 1). There is nothing 
uncommon to this mission statement (excepting, perhaps, the inclusion of 
“visitors”, which makes sense given the nature of Washington, D.C.) – which is, 
perhaps, the point of isomorphism. Further, under the mission statement are the 
Guiding Principles of Chief of Police Cathy L. Lanier. Many of these principles 
deal with community relations and interactions, innovative policing, and 
empowering line officers. The very first principle, however, is “Reduce crime and 
fear of crime in the community.” This statement clearly embraces the police 
mandate as explained above.  
 The first several pages of the Annual Report are narrative, describing the 
agency’s goals, programs, and efforts. But on the first descriptive page (7), the 
reader’s eyes are drawn to two blown up text boxes. One proclaiming “DC is no 
longer a city where one can get away with murder” and one titled “2008 Violent 
Crime Facts”. This latter box then lists reductions (by percentages) in overall 
violent crime, assaults involving guns, and robberies involving guns. Thus, while 
Chief Lanier can state in her opening message that “The officer who greets the 
  55 
residents on her beat, listens to the concerns of her community members, runs 
towards the sound of gun fire, or thwarts a violent robbery is ‘just doing her job.’ 
These critical moments are not captured in the numbers…” (p. 5), the reader is 
then immediately inundated not with stories to this effect, but numbers. From 
page 16 on, for a total of 21 pages, the reader is exposed to tables and pie charts. 
Even in the narrative starting on page 7, whenever serious crime – the type of 
crime most people are not exposed to, but that crime of which we are most fearful 
– went down, this was highlighted. Beyond crime rates, the Annual Report also 
highlights response time: “In 2008, there was also a marked decrease in officers’ 
response time to calls for service” (p. 7). I state these things not to deride or chide 
the MPD’s efforts; rather, I point them out to demonstrate that the numbers game 
(Skolnick & Fyfe, 1993) and its relationship to the police mandate is still 
applicable to the police scene in Washington, D. C.  
 What is important to remember in this discussion is that the MPD are 
pulling these numbers because they demonstrate that they are doing something; 
that they are behaving like police are supposed to behave. Pages 7 through 10 
discuss a number of programs that the MPD were engaging in in 2008, some 
innovative, some traditional. In almost all of them, however, is an explicit notion 
that the MPD are professional crime fighters. For example, their foot patrol 
program, Full Stride, “will also help MPD increase citizen participation by 
assisting MPD officers in preventing and solving crimes in the Nation’s Capital” 
(p. 7). Note that the focus is not on being co-producers of justice (DiIulio, 1995); 
it is, rather, on assisting the police in doing their job. Further, on page 9 we read:  
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Even as the Department’s relationship with the community continues to 
grow through enhanced police visibility, outreach and collaboration, and 
our Homicide Task Force efforts, the MPD understands that some 
community members remain reluctant to come forward with vital crime 
information for a variety of reasons. As a result, additional ways for 
residents to reach out to the police anonymously have been created. 
Through the MPD’s new toll-free crime tip line … anyone who has 
information concerning a homicide, gangs, guns, or other violent offenses 
can report it anonymously. Additionally, community members can now 
provide the police with information…anonymously with the new Text Tip 
Line… 
 
The subtitle for this section is “Community Support and Cooperation.” The 
message is this: we are the professional crime fighters, but we need your help to 
do your job. Your help is telling us when you see something. This falls in line with 
the police mandate to be professional crime fighters.  
 In some ways, MPD is setting itself up as a sovereign agency: a police 
agency to which other police agencies look in order to better understand their 
proper form and function. Being a sovereign carries with it the weight of 
legitimacy: if you are able to convince others that you are this sovereign, then you 
de facto gain legitimacy. So we read that Chief Lanier’s third principle is to 
“[p]osition the MPD to be viewed and respected nationally and internationally as 
a model for how it serves the community” (p. 1). MPD portrays itself as a 
sovereign, as having assumed the mantle of legitimacy: of being what a cop 
should be and doing what a cop should do. This is reinforced in their annual 
report for 2008 by the voluminous tables and pie charts that make up the bulk of 
the document. These characteristics coincide with the theory outlined above, and 
render the MPD an exemplary choice for the study of isomorphism.  
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Units of Analysis 
 Social ecological research typically takes the “neighborhood” as the most 
important “community” for analysis (Sampson, Raudenbush, & Earls, 1997). This 
can create a conundrum for ecological researchers insofar as they typically take 
administratively delineated areal units - such as census tracts or wards - as their 
units of analysis. Such units may or may not coincide with subjects’ own 
understanding of “neighborhood” or “community” (Sampson, 1997). As the 
research discussed above suggests, however, the most important “community” for 
police officers may not be the neighborhood. Rather, it is likely that areal unit 
which is most associated with their politically delineated territory. Put simply, the 
behavior under study (that of police) should determine the appropriate unit of 
analysis. This point was made both by Rubinstein (1973) and Klinger (1997) and 
reiterated empirically by Kane (2002). The community for a police officer is 
understood to be composed of the territory to which he is held accountable, a 
territory which is administratively defined. This definition, however, remains 
incomplete.  
As Klinger (1997) has also argued, a police officer’s community is also 
composed of those elements of socialization most likely to shape his character and 
behavior, namely, the work group. It is through these socializing mechanisms that 
isomorphism is likely to have its effect. For the police, the work group has its 
formation and power within the meso-level aggregate of the department, between 
the beat and, depending on the size of the agency, either the department itself or 
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the precinct (Klinger, 1997; Kane, 2005). For the MPD, this meso-level aggregate 
is the Police Service Area, or PSA.  
MPD PSA’s are a collection of beats; a collection of PSA’s make up a 
district, which is the first level of disaggregation in the MPD. There are 46 PSA’s 
in the MPD. On average, each PSA hosts about 12,000 residents (median ≈ 
11,665; standard deviation ≈ 822). This reflects the high population density 
characteristic of D.C. Reflective of the above description of Washington D.C. is 
the percentage of African American residents, with an average of 64.36 percent 
across PSA’s and a relatively small standard deviation of 5.03 (although the range 
is about 4 percent to about 99 percent, the median of 77.07 percent is not too 
distant from the mean). In 2008, across PSA’s there was a total of 3,453 juvenile 
arrests, with an average of 80.3 (median = 51) and a standard deviation of 117.72 
(range = 740).  
Data Sources 
 This study used two sources of data: the D.C. Crime Catalog and the U.S. 
Census. As already noted above, the D.C. Data Catalog contains a host of publicly 
available data, including crime data. This study made use of two samples: crime 
incidents and juvenile arrests. The Juvenile Arrests data set covers two years 
(2008 and 2009), and “contains a subset of juvenile arrest locations and attributes 
reported in the Criminal Justice Information System (CJIS) Arrest database by the 
District of Columbia Metropolitan Police Department (MPD)” (Data Catalog, 
2011). These data are drawn directly from the MPD, who provide the same data 
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but only in tabular, PDF form. These data represent actual arrests, and were 
therefore used as a measure of police behavior (see below). 
The Crime Incidents data set covers 5 years (2006 through 2010, 
inclusive), but only years 2008 and 2009 were used, as these years coincide with 
the juvenile arrest data. The crime incident data set “contains a subset of locations 
and attributes of incidents reported in the ASAP (Analytical Services Application) 
crime report database by the District of Columbia Metropolitan Police 
Department (MPD)” (Data Catalog, 2011). These data are drawn directly from the 
Metropolitan Police Department, but organized differently. Specifically: while the 
MPD provides the same data either by district or citywide, the D.C. Data Catalog 
allows downloading of single data files organized by year, with variables at the 
district level of aggregation with a variable assigning each incident’s PSA. The 
crime incidents data set is composed of reported crime, and was therefore used as 
a control for crime in the statistical models (see below). Both the Crime Incidents 
and Juvenile Arrests data sets are downloadable from the DC Data Catalog in 
spreadsheet form. In addition, the DC Data Catalog has available shape files of 
numerous areal units that were used to create spatial lag terms.  
To retrieve the Census data, the American FactFinder online clearinghouse 
for the year 2000 was used to download data for the D.C. Metropolitan area at the 
tract level. (The variables downloaded are discussed below under “Variable 
Construction.”)  Shape files from the D.C. Catalog for PSA and for tracts were 
also downloaded. Doing so allowed me to create the spatial lag variables (both 
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global and local) needed for analysis. These data sets were combined into one 
master data set. 
Dependent Variable 
The outcome that is of most interest to this study is formalized police 
behavior. As explained in chapter two, arresting behavior is one type of police 
behavior that theoretically is susceptible to isomorphic processes. To this end, this 
dissertation makes use of the juvenile arrest data set for the years 2008 and 2009. 
Juvenile arrests were used in lieu of adult arrests because it is here that 
isomorphic pressures are most likely to be experienced the strongest. As the 
seriousness of the offense diminishes, the discretion of the officer increases. If we 
understand isomorphism as a force guiding discretion, then it is reasonable to 
suspect that this force will be felt most acutely when discretion is at its apex. As 
the history and literature of policing indicate, juvenile offenders and delinquents 
are treated more leniently – that is, with more discretion – at the hands of the 
police than are adults
5
. Separate analyses were run for different categories of 
crime, specifically: juvenile violent, property, drug, and gun crime arrests. Certain 
crimes are more susceptible to officer discretion than others, and certain activities 
(e.g., felony arrests) are more valued by the organization than others, particularly 
in different places (e.g., Rubenstein, 1972; Klinger, 1997; Herbert, 1998). For 
example, violent arrests will almost universally be sought out by police officers 
                                                 
5
 Using juvenile arrests begs the question if there are important differences between the 
isomorphic processes affecting it compared to those affecting the behavior of arresting adults. 
Theory would suggest that this would be a difference of degree, not of kind. That is, institutional 
pressure would still be exerted, and towards the same ends of crime control, but in a distinct 
fashion concomitant with how criminal justice actors generally approach juveniles, as compared 
with adults. 
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and would not be expected to be influenced by isomorphic processes; however, 
drug offenses may be more or less ignored by some officers in certain situations 
(Rosenfeld et al., 2007). Moreover, in certain communities, the police may place 
greater value on drug arrests, while in others they may engage in very little drug 
enforcement. Therefore, isomorphic processes may influence some arresting 
behavior differently than others. To this end, analyses were run for juvenile 
violent, property, drug, and gun arrests. Although arrest data, such as the UCR, 
are most often used as a measurement of crime, they are more validly employed 
as a measurement of what the police actually do (Lynch & Addington, 2007).  
Key Independent Variable 
The independent variable in which this dissertation is most interested is 
isomorphism. Capturing isomorphism in any quantitative fashion is a major 
hurdle of institutional research (Katz, Maguire, & Roncek, 2002). The territorial 
nature of policing, however, suggests a methodology for studying this 
phenomenon. As was explicated in chapter two, extant research and theory 
suggest that isomorphic processes extend spatially along adjacent PSA’s: PSA’s 
abutting one another are more likely to be similar in arrests than those further 
from one another, net of controls. Although the processes themselves are not 
measured directly, the theoretical framework developed here would suggest such 
an outcome. Therefore, the current study had to find a meaningful proxy for 
isomorphism. Further, given the importance of sovereigns to institutional 
research, it also had to find a way to distinguish sovereign PSA’s from non-
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sovereign PSA’s. Both were accomplished by borrowing from spatial analytic 
techniques. 
 In any research employing data with pertinent spatial attributes, it is often 
necessary to control for spatial autocorrelation. In essence, spatial autocorrelation 
is the unaccounted for influence that neighboring areal units have on any given 
areal unit. This autocorrelation typically creates noise in regression models, 
resulting in Type I errors due to inaccurate standard errors and inflated t values 
(Ward & Gleditsch, 2008). Spatial lag terms are therefore exogenously included 
in the regression model in order to control for this noise. The use of spatial lag 
models, however, is not necessarily limited to controlling for this noise (Rey, 
2004): it has been used effectively to explore the relationship between spatially 
proximate features and theoretically “close” relationships, such as between 
economically connected institutions that may, geographically, be quite distant 
(Beck, Gleditsch, & Beardsley, 2006; Elkins, Guzman, & Simmons, 2008). 
Because of the territorial nature of policing, the process of isomorphism may 
successfully be proxied by measuring spatial dependence relative to the dependent 
variables of arresting behavior.  
 It is important to distinguish between spatial autocorrelation and spatial 
dependence. Spatial dependence describes the phenomenon when the value of the 
dependent variable in one areal unit is influenced by (and influences) the value of 
the dependent variable in neighboring areal units. Spatial autocorrelation is the 
error that results when models employing spatial data do not control for spatial 
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dependence. In other words: the autocorrelation is error, while spatial 
dependence, in the form of a spatial lag term, is a measurable phenomenon.  
The idea of using spatial dependence for something other than controlling 
residual error is not novel. Error terms caused by spatial autocorrelation, as with 
all error terms, are the sum of measurement error and unaccounted exogenous 
effects. In other words, in an error term there is inherent explaining power. This 
dissertation submits that we can tap into that explaining power in a theoretically 
meaningful way. Two seminal articles agree with this statement: the work of 
Gleditsch and Ward (2000) on democracy, war, and peace, and Anselin’s (1995) 
ground-breaking article that outlined the different types of local indicators of 
spatial autocorrelation and their uses. In this piece, Anselin (1995) not only 
defined what a LISA statistic is, and its relationship to the global spatial 
environment, but also pointed out that LISA’s represent something – that is, some 
phenomenon in the socio-spatial environment. Recall that a spatial lag term is 
more than error: it is the effect exerted on any given areal unit by its neighboring 
areal unit on the dependent variable. For example, if we are interested in police 
arresting behavior at the precinct level, and included a spatial lag term in our 
regression model, that term would indicate the degree to which a precinct’s 
arresting behavior is influenced by the arresting behavior of its neighbors. That is 
an empirical statement: the why remains a theoretical question.  
 For an example, we turn to Gleditsch and Ward (2000). In this study, the 
authors were testing the degree to which stable and fragile democracies were 
more or less war prone. They note the following early in their methodology: 
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The role of geography has been widely ignored in studies addressing 
whether domestic regime characteristics help to understand international 
conflict behavior. Many studies have utilized geographical contiguity or 
distance between capital cities [e.g., spatial autocorrelation] as “control 
variables” in statistical models to indicate the “opportunity for conflict” 
between parties, and there have been several attempts to derive measures 
of geographical contiguity or proximity for contemporary and historical 
international systems. However, few have exploited the information that 
geography provides as a principal determinant of political relevance to 
derive measures of the context of interaction that a given polity faces (p. 6, 
emphasis added). 
 
In this statement, Gleditsch and Ward (2000) are making the case that 
autocorrelation is substantively more than a control variable: it carries with it 
important theoretical meaning. The authors continue to endow spatial dependence 
with meaning throughout their article: “certain countries are connected to each 
other…and have an impact on each other” (p. 7), and “A country that experiences 
war, being located in a region of other countries also at war, is said to be 
influenced by the local spatial context of war” (p. 8, emphasis added). They then 
employ a LISA statistic to pinpoint such clustering of countries and its effect on 
democracy, war, and peace.  
 This is also not the first study to suggest that isomorphism can be 
expressed geographically: Leicht and Jenkins (1998), in a test of their proposed 
political resource theory, “attempt[ed] to take into account the embeddedness of 
subnational state governments by examining institutional isomorphism” (p. 1334). 
One of their measurements of isomorphism included what they called geographic 
mimetic pressure: the fact that neighboring states will mimic the behavior of their 
geographically proximate neighbors. This was measured by using a spatial lag 
term based on the inverse Euclidean distance between state capitals (a similar 
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methodology is used in this dissertation). Although their models indicated a 
nonsignificant lag term (yet other measures of isomorphism were statistically 
significant across their regression models), their study supports the current 
research’s goal of using spatial analysis to measure isomorphic processes.  
 The spatial lag terms were calculated using the R package spdep (Anselin, 
2003a, 2003b). Mathematically, spatial lags are the product of the dependent 
variable and a spatial weights matrix. A spatial weights matrix, or contingency 
matrix, expresses the potential influence between areal units based on some unit 
of distance or adjacency. The simplest forms of spatial weight matrices are 
calculated using adjacency: A given unit receives the score of 1 if it is adjacent to 
the target unit (or 1 divided by the number of adjacent units in row standardized 
matrices), and a 0 if it is not. A variation on this method is to use k nearest 
neighbors, where each target unit is assigned a total number of “adjacent” 
neighbors equaling k. Both of these methods lack validity in most settings. 
Concerning simple adjacency matrices, the problem arises in light of the so-called 
Tobler First Law of Geography: Everything is related to everything else, but near 
things are more related than distant things (Tobler, 1970). Adjacency matrices 
leave out any areal units that, while not imminently close to the target unit, are 
nevertheless important. Similarly, the k nearest neighbors approach projects a 
state of “neighborness” on areal units that may not be connected - literally or 
figuratively - to the target unit, in the name of filling its k quota. For example, 
census tracts located across a river from each other without a connecting bridge 
are often counted as adjacent using a k nearest neighbors scheme (Rey, 2004). In 
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the case of DC, the large tracts of land that contain universities (at least five major 
universities are located in DC), national monuments, and federal complexes may 
give the illusion of adjacency, when in fact, such large clusters of land may 
represent “interruptions” -- or ecological barriers -- in the larger urban landscape 
(much like rivers without bridges). 
 A more nuanced and valid approach to estimating a spatial weights matrix 
is to use the inverse Euclidean distance between the centroids of areal units 
(Kane, 2005; Land & Deane, 1992). Doing so accurately reflects the fact that 
distance rather than adjacency determines importance as it relates to causal 
processes. Further, it more accurately models the centrifugal process of 
isomorphism espoused in the current study. To this end, isomorphism was 
captured by the spatial lag of juvenile arrests, using a spatial weights matrix 
calculated with the inverse Euclidean distance between PSA centroids. If police 
behave territorially, we would expect institutional pressure to be exerted along 
geographically defined boundaries - PSA’s. Spatial analysis is designed to capture 
this process: insofar as the spatial diagnostic (known as Moran’s I, and is 
explained in more detail below) is significant, we have evidence of spatial 
dependence.  
Spatial analysis also suggests a means to empirically observing 
institutional (in this case, PSA) sovereigns. Areal characteristics are not always 
distributed normally within space. It is often the case that there are localized 
influences. These are captured in what are known as local indicators of spatial 
autocorrelation, or LISA (Ord & Getis, 1995). LISA statistics have been 
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interpreted as “hot spots” for various social and epidemiological phenomena, as 
well as a measure of the influence of idiosyncratic areal units on the global 
measure of spatial dependence (Anselin, 1995)
6: “These indicators allow for the 
decomposition of global indicators...into the contribution of each individual 
observation” (p. 94). Anselin also states that “the LISA for each observation gives 
an indication of the extent of [statistically] significant spatial clustering of similar 
values around that observation” (p. 94). (For an example of the use of LISA as a 
means to effectively answer research questions concerning the undue influence of 
specific areal units, see Gleditsch and Ward, 2000 and Anselin, 1995, as well as 
the discussion above.) This is done by testing the null hypothesis for each areal 
unit that its values are not different from its surrounding neighbors (Messner & 
Anselin, 2004). Insofar as any PSA can be shown to have undue, localized, and 
statistically significant influence, it may reasonably be considered a sovereign. In 
other words, sovereigns should be observable as spatial outliers: they are PSA’s 
that exert undue influence on other PSA’s. PSA sovereigns will therefore be 
observed using the LISA analytical technique, the local Moran’s I (Anselin, 
1995).  
Control Variables  
In order to capture effects associated with structural disadvantage, US 
Census data from 2000 were also be used.  It is important to include variables 
                                                 
6
 Technically, there are two types of LISA statistics: Local Moran’s I and G. The former is best 
articulated by Anselin (1995), while the latter is best articulated by Ord and Getis (1995). They 
each behavior differently, while typically returning similar results. G is an indicator of “hot spot” 
activity, whereas local I is a disaggregation of the global environment. Because this study is 
interested in the effect of sovereigns on the global environment, we employed local I over G.  
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associated with structural disadvantage for at least two reasons. First, because of 
confounding effects associated with crime rates. And second, because it stands in 
as proxy for a community’s level of informal social control, and its subsequent 
capacity to control the police (Bursik & Grasmick, 1993; Kane, 2003; Kane & 
Cronin, 2009). The following variables were used to create a factor score (or 
scores) for each precinct: percent foreign born, percent households under the 
poverty line, percent of persons 25 years or older without a high school degree or 
equivalent, population mobility (measured as the percent of persons who have 
lived at the same address for less than five years), the percent of persons under the 
age of 18, the percent of female headed households with children, the percent of 
households on public assistance, and the adult male unemployment rate. These 
variables have been employed in previous studies to capture structural elements 
associated with the ecology of both crime and police behavior (Land , McCal, & 
Cohen, 1990; Morenoff & Sampson, 1997; Sampson, 1997; Wilson, 1987; Kane, 
2002). These variables were submitted to a principle component analysis using an 
orthogonal rotation; it was expected, based on prior research that two factors 
would emerge: one for structural disadvantage and one for population mobility 
(Kane, 2011). As described in chapter 4, this was the case. 
Another important variable that must be controlled for is race and 
ethnicity. As Kane (2003) discovered, it is possible - and theoretically feasible - to 
see a nonlinear relationship between race/ethnicity and police deployment. 
Percent black per PSA was therefore controlled for, due to the demographic 
make-up of Washington, D.C., which is approximately 50 percent black. 
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Although this variable may be confounded with the structural disadvantage 
variable, it is theoretically important to analyze it separately in terms of the threat 
hypothesis (Blalock, 1967; Kane, 2003; Jackson, 1989; Chambliss & Seidman, 
1982). For the same reasons, the Hispanic population was also controlled for in 
initial models. As discussed below, however, for reasons concerning model fit, 
Hispanic population was not included in the final models.  
The most robust predictor of any police behavior is arrestable crime. 
Crime may result in arrests because it provides police with the licit opportunity to 
seize a citizen and limit their behavior. Crime also may result in arrests because it 
can lead to increased deployment and/or attention on the part of a police 
department, which then may lead to more arrests (Kane, 2003). The relationship 
between crime and arrest may be nonlinear, however, depending upon other 
neighborhood characteristics, such as race and structural disadvantage. Klinger 
(1997) has pointed out that certain areas have a distinct allowance when it comes 
to crime; it is only when something changes in that neighborhood or when 
criminal behavior “crosses the line” that arrests may be invoked. Similarly, Kane 
(2003) has demonstrated that, depending on the racial composition of a 
neighborhood, arrest may be invoked more or less often, as certain groups are 
perceived as a threat. Whereas before a given group was seen as little more than a 
nuisance, as it grows in population it may be seen as threatening, thus receiving 
more police attention. As this group’s population numbers reach a tipping point 
where it is seen as normal and part of the typical social fabric, police may reduce 
the focus of their arresting powers from this group. In order to capture the amount 
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of crime in a PSA, the data from the crime incident data set were used. Although 
practically impossible to truly measure the amount of crime anywhere at any time, 
crime reports, such as those contained in the crime incident data set, provide a 
good proxy for criminal activity (Kane, 2003; Lynch & Addington, 2007). 
Finally, since the amount of police activity is also proportional to the 
number of police officers in a given area, I also controlled for police presence. 
This was controlled for in two distinct ways: by including district dummies, but 
also via the crime reports data. This is discussed in more detail in the next 
chapter. 
Analytic Strategy 
 Once the variables were constructed, frequency statistics and correlation 
matrices were run in order to observe the nature of the data and of potential 
relationships. After this, I followed the methodology outlined by Ward and 
Gleditsch (2008). Namely, to map the data in order to get a handle on the spatial 
nature of the dependent and key independent variables. Next, in order to 
determine the existence of global spatial dependence, I employed the Moran’s I 
statistic. Then, I created the spatial lag variables and ran regression models, 
analyzing each model’s residuals. These regression models explore institutional 
isomorphism generally. Finally, I repeated the last two steps, but focused instead 
on local indicators of spatial dependence, rather than global, using the local 
Moran’s I. These models explore the specific influence of institutional sovereigns 
on the organizational environment of the MPD at the PSA level. The following 
sections detail these steps, beginning with data mapping.  
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Mapping  
In spatial analysis, maps are the basic “frequency statistic” employed to 
learn about the nature and behavior of the data, and to begin teasing out 
theoretically important relationships. To this end, choropleth maps were created 
for the dependent variables. In a choropleth map, statistical information is 
displayed visually; the statistic used can be changed according to what the 
researcher is interested in. Quartile maps were used for the current study. What 
we were looking for in these maps is evidence of similarity among abutting PSAs, 
where similarity progresses in a centrifugal manner. Considering figure 2, there is 
some evidence of this occurring: the darker areas give way to lighter areas 
concentrically, and PSA’s closer to one another are more often the same color 
than PSA’s that are distant from each other. 
Global Spatial Dependency  
Although there are several methods for estimating spatial dependency, the 
most conventional is the Moran’s I statistic (Anselin, 1988). The Moran’s I 
statistic allows us to discern meaningful patterns of spatial dependency - that is, it 
tells us if the spatial patterns we see in choropleth maps are statistically 
significant, or a fluke (Ward & Gleditsch, 2008). Understood in its most general 
form, the Moran’s I is a cross-product of spatial proximity and a measure of the 
similarity of a specific attribute. The sum of these cross-products is the Moran’s I. 
Calculating the Moran’s I is useful for the following additional reasons: First, it 
calculates the summed cross-product term and provides the resulting significance 
level. Second, it provides for visualization of the Moran’s I in the form of 
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Figure 2. 
 
scatterplots. If the Moran’s I were statistically significant, this would lend support 
to what we can see in figure 2: there is some spatial dependency among MPD 
PSA’s. If this were the case, we would be one step closer to finding empirical 
support for the theoretical framework used in this study. 
Spatial Lag Models  
Once the presence of spatial dependency had been established, a series of 
regression models were estimated to test the research hypotheses. First, a standard 
regression model was run that included all of the variables except the spatial lag 
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of the criterion. The residuals were then scrutinized to determine if 
heteroscedasticity was a problem. This included the use of Breusch-Pagen test for 
heteroscedasticity. Assuming the Moran’s I was found to be significant, it is most 
likely that heteroscedasticity would be a problem, owing to spatial autocorrelation 
(although this is not necessarily the case, see Ward & Gleditsch, 2008). Once this 
has been established, then the full spatial lag model was run. Because models 
using spatial lags typically employ maximum likelihood methods, model fit was 
established by observing the likelihood ratio, and the Akaike information criterion 
[AIC; equal to 2k - 2ln(L), where k is the number of parameters in the model and 
L is the maximum value of the likelihood function of the model] (Long, 1997). To 
further ensure the accuracy of the model fit of the spatial lag model, the LeGrange 
Multiplier was calculated. If the LaGrange multiplier was significant, this would 
add to our confidence in the model fit of the spatial lag model as opposed to a 
spatial error model (Anselin, 1988).  
 The results of these initial analyses would suggest the degree to which the 
outcome in the dependent variable could be explained by the value of the 
dependent variable of its neighbors. If the spatial lag term was significant in a 
model, net of controls, this suggested an isomorphic process at work. The 
magnitude of that affect could also be measured and compared to the model’s 
control variables. Because the dependent variable has several iterations – e.g., 
drug related arrests, etc. - I was also able to compare the impact of isomorphic 
processes on different police behavior. This is only the first step in understanding 
the nature of isomorphism on police behavior; using these same techniques, or 
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variations on these techniques, I was further able to tease out sovereigns and the 
effects of proximity to sovereigns on arresting behavior. 
LISA Analysis  
This series of analyses followed the steps outlined above for general 
spatial dependence, but with the following important distinctions. First, I used 
local Moran’s I rather than the general Moran’s I to test for spatial clustering 
(Anselin, 1995). All PSAs which had a statistically significant local Moran’s I 
were considered sovereign PSA’s. Note that the local Moran’s I is interpreted in 
the following manner: if it is positive, it suggests that surrounding areal units are 
similar on an attributional value; if it is negative, it suggests that surrounding areal 
units are dissimilar on an attributional value. There are four types of LISA units: 
high-high, low-low, high-low, and low-high. These designations refer to what the 
particular areal unit is in terms of the mean of the dependent variable, and by what 
it is surrounded. Thus, a high-high areal unit would represent a unit that is 
significantly above the mean of the dependent variable, more than what chance 
would presume, surrounded by similarly high units. On the other hand, a low-high 
unit would represent one which is below the mean, yet surrounded by units that 
are above the mean. For example, if a PSA is high-high, the high volume of 
juvenile arrests in this unit would be exerting an undue influence on the (high) 
number of arrests in its neighboring units.  
Given the theoretical framework of the current study, it was assumed that 
the LISA’s would go in the same direction. This is how sovereigns should, 
theoretically, behave: a high sovereign, where police are engaged in above 
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average arrests, should influence its neighboring PSA’s to also invoke arrest an 
above average number of times. Conversely, a sovereign PSA that does not 
consider the arrest of misdemeanor crimes, for example, to be imperative may be 
surrounded by PSA’s which, following its lead, rarely engage in arrests for non-
felonies. On the other hand, although it is assumed that LISA’s will either be 
high-high or low-low, according to the theoretical framework outlined above, it is 
still possible that low-high or high-low PSA’s may exist, as well. It may be that 
such PSA’s have territorial exigencies that are simply not in play with their 
neighbors (or lack the same exigencies displayed by its neighbors), or are “hold-
outs” against whatever pressure is being exerted on them to conform to the 
expectations of the institutional environment.  
LISA Regression  
I used a series of LISA models that consider the effect of LISA’s on the 
spatial environment. This is an appropriate tool for the current study because in 
arguing that the institutional environment of the police exerts pressures to 
conformity (e.g., isomorphism) geographically along territorially delineated 
avenues, I am essentially making an argument for spatial heterogeneity. The very 
idea of sovereigns assumes that some members of an institutional environment 
affect other units differentially. In a spatial environment, this is the same thing as 
saying that some areas affect others areas differentially, a concept known as 
spatial heterogeneity. We can use this concept to better observe the effect of 
sovereigns on the institutional environment.  
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For this analysis, I treated each LISA cluster as a dummy variable. A 
series of models for each measurement for the dependent variable were run using 
the dummy variables for that particular criterion. Each dummy variable was 
interacted with the spatial lag term. The resulting coefficient for the interaction 
term provides us with a more accurate measurement of the effects of sovereigns 
on the institutional environment than my previous analyses as it includes the 
variance associated specifically with each sovereign. In other words, this 
coefficient explains the strength of spatial dependence – that is, isomorphism - as 
expressed through sovereign PSA’s.   
What Makes a Sovereign a Sovereign 
Being able to observe sovereigns and their influence on the institutional 
environment is important and theoretically relevant: but understanding why is an 
important next step. As this dissertation stands, I have used theory to propose how 
to predict the existence of sovereigns and measure their influence on the 
institutional environment. Theory can also help us in understanding why PSA’s 
act as sovereigns – that is, why certain PSA’s seem to have undue influence on 
the behavior of their neighboring PSA’s. “Sovereigns are other actors whose 
views are significant, that is, they are entities that have the capacity to affect the 
fundamental well-being of a police organization” (Crank & Langworthy, 1992, p. 
342). Sovereigns are sovereigns because they either hold some sway over other 
institutional actors (such as purse strings or constituents) or because they are 
perceived as already possessing legitimacy. It is in this latter reason that I propose 
peer PSA’s will have their effect: those PSA’s perceived to be legitimate will 
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exert isomorphic power, not so much because of what they do, but because of 
how others perceive the importance of what they do.  
In order to understand why certain PSA’s seem unduly influential at 
certain times, I followed what other researchers have done in isomorphism 
research and the justice system (e.g, Katz, Maguire, & Roncek, 2002), namely, 
asked questions of those at the ground level about what was going on in the 
agency at that time. To this end, as permitted, I spoke with representatives of the 
MPD to get their perspective on what (and even if) any particular PSA’s were 
doing that made them so influential. These were unstructured interviews where 
the purpose was to elicit discussion from the respondent in order to construct a 
rich picture of the MPD’s institutional environment (Cook & Campbell, 1979). In 
addition, in a supplementary and exploratory analysis, I ran a logit model in an 
effort to see any relationship between being a sovereign and the other covariates 
of this study.  
The idea here is to combine what the quantitative analyses tell me – are 
there isomorphic effects among PSA’s? If so, where? And how do sovereign 
PSA’s influence neighboring PSA’s? – with interview data to create a picture of 
how isomorphism is truly going on in the MPD during my study period. As with 
all triangulation approaches, the analyses are not to be interpreted as separate 
processes. They are, in fact, complimentary and informative of one another.  
Recalling this dissertation’s research hypotheses:  
1. Net of controls, the juvenile arresting behavior of police in any given PSA 
will be influenced by the juvenile arresting behavior of neighboring PSA’s 
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in a centrifugal pattern. This pattern will be strongest for crimes that allow 
for more discrimination. 
a. Violent juvenile crimes will exhibit this pattern less so than other 
crimes, because violent crimes allow for less police officer 
discretion.  
b. Similarly, juvenile property crime arrests will exhibit this pattern 
less so than the two remaining dependent variables: juvenile drug 
crime arrests and juvenile gun crime arrests.  
c. Juvenile drug crime arrests will be especially prone to isomorphic 
influences, as they allow for more police officer discretion (Lynch, 
et al. 2002) than either juvenile property arrests or violent crime 
arrests. This will also be the case because the morality of drug 
crimes is not as explicit as that of violent, property, or gun crimes. 
This ambiguous morality will carry an equivocal meaning for the 
police mandate that will require PSA’s to consider the behavior of 
their neighbors for insight on how to treat such crimes.  
d. Juvenile gun crime arrests will also be prone to isomorphic 
influences; however, it is noted that this research took place during 
District of Columbia v. Heller (2008). Because of this 
circumstance, juvenile gun crime arresting behavior will exhibit 
more spatial stability than juvenile drug crime arrests because of 
the political climate. This is to say that, because of the Supreme 
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Court’s finding in DC v. Heller, we should expect to see similar 
behavior in terms of juvenile gun crime arrests across the District.   
2. The existence of sovereign precincts should be empirically observable. 
Again, for crimes with more discretion, we should see more of a sovereign 
effect insofar as the spatial dependency suggested in hypothesis 1 will 
have its effect ultimately through sovereign precincts.  
a. For juvenile violent crime arrests, this effect will be the smallest 
when compared to property, drug, and gun crime arrests. 
b. Juvenile property crime arrests will display this pattern more so 
than violent crime, but less so than the other arrest types. 
c. Given the fluid nature of drug crime arrests, sovereigns will have a 
strong effect on juvenile drug crime arrests. 
d. Sovereign effects may be noticeable for juvenile gun crime arrests, 
but ultimately, it will be a concerted agency-wide effect that we 
will witness, owing to the nature of the Heller case. 
3. The research insists that the ecology of an area is highly influential on 
police arresting behavior, and we see no reason to think that this will not 
be the case in an institutional context. It is very plausible that a PSA’s 
ecology can overwhelm any institutional effects. This is especially true in 
terms of the minority threat hypothesis and its relationship to serious 
crime. Therefore, all arrest dependent variables will exhibit ecological and 
racial effects which will ultimately weaken institutional processes. 
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 The methodology outlined in this chapter clearly speaks to each of these 
hypotheses: I am able to consider global spatial autocorrelation (hypothesis 1) 
while controlling for territorial characteristics (hypothesis 3). In addition, 
using LISA analysis, in conjunction with LISA dummy variable regression, I 
am able to observe and measure the distinct influence of sovereign PSA’s 
(hypothesis 2).  
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Chapter 4 
DATA MANAGEMENT AND BASIC STATISTICS 
 This chapter covers two major components: data management and basic 
frequency statistics. First, I will describe how census data were aggregated to the 
PSA level. This is an important process and deserves note because census tracts 
do not naturally aggregate to the PSA. Second, I will go over the important 
frequency statistics (mean, standard deviation, etc.) for the four dependent 
variables to present an idea of the general behavior of the data. I will proceed 
similarly with the control variables. This process will also include a series of 
choropleth maps with accompanying commentary.  
Data management 
Aggregating Census Data to PSA’s  
This dissertation uses three data sets and two polygon collections. Two of 
the data sets and the two polygon collections were downloaded directly from the 
D.C. Data Catalog as described above in the methodology chapter. The juvenile 
arrest and crime report data sets were combined to create new unique data sets: 
one for 2008 and the other for 2009. These were aggregated to the PSA level and 
joined to the PSA polygon map via ArcGIS.  
Prior to constructing the control variables derived from the census, the 
tract polygon set had to be joined with the PSA polygon set. Because tracts do not 
naturally aggregate to the PSA level (tracts are geographically smaller than PSA’s 
and are often dissected by PSA borders), areal weighting interpolation was used 
to estimate census data for the PSA’s (Wang, 2006). The tract polygons were first 
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overlaid across the PSA polygons (after having projected the tract polygons to 
match that of the PSA’s, namely “NAD 1983 StatePlane Maryland FIPS 1900”), 
creating an “intersect” polygon set. The area for these new polygons were 
calculated using the calculate geometry command in ArcGIS. The following 
formula was used to create a weight: area of the intersect polygon/area of the 
original tract. The census variables were then weighted by this quotient. Each 
PSA’s census variables were then created by summing the scores for each 
intersect variable within its boundaries (Wang, 2006).  
Missing Data and Data Set Integrity  
As data construction and analysis progressed, it became evident that the 
integrity of the 2009 data were not that of the 2008 data. First, it was noted that 
there were more data missing from 2009 than 2008 (24 percent in 2009 compared 
to 22 percent in 2008)
 7
. In addition, coefficients often behaved irregularly and 
unexpectedly - for example, crimes reported to the police was found to be 
negatively associated with juvenile arrests for violent crime in 2009. This finding, 
in and of itself, is not necessarily a “red flag”: a common complaint among 
minority communities is that they are under-policed. This would be the case if we 
were to see a pattern within the extant literature where highly reported crime was 
inversely related to a juvenile arrest rate. In the current context, however, this 
finding is suspect. First, no prior research (e.g, Kane, Gustafson, & Bruell, 2011) 
has seen a similar pattern in D.C. Second, this is not a pattern one would expect to 
                                                 
7
 The missing data is complicated by another factor, as well. My “22 percent” came from the data 
downloaded directly from the DC Data Catalog. However, when we consult the 2008 Annual 
Report (Metropolitan Police Department, 2008), this percentage is reduced to 7.9 percent. It is, 
then, perhaps safest to say that, as with all agency data, reliability is a concern (Jacob, 1984). 
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find on a city-wide context. Rather, it is something we would expect to see in 
interaction with community-level measurements. 
A third reason why the 2009 data are not reliable for areal analyses is that 
the change in coefficient magnitude between 2008 and 2009 was often too drastic 
than what could reasonably be expected. Assuming, for example, that the negative 
association between reported crime and juvenile arrests for violent crime can be 
explained as miscoding, this does not adequately explain a 2008 coefficient of 
0.85 (p < 0.001) compared to a 2009 coefficient of -0.34 (p <0.05). Indeed, it is 
somewhat doubtful that it would have gone from a positive to an inverse change 
between 2008 and 2009. This was also seen in the Moran’s I values. For example, 
the Moran’s I for 2008 total drug crime was 0.461 (p < 0.001), compared to the 
2009 coefficient of 0.178 (p < 0.05). Indeed, while exploring Moran’s I and LISA 
coefficients for a number of possible dependent variables, several that showed up 
significant and robust in 2008 failed to reach significance or be of meaningful 
magnitude in 2009. For these reasons, the data for 2009 was deemed untenable for 
analysis.  
The pattern of missing areal information just described follows a general 
pattern in the DC Data Catalog where less juvenile data each year are being 
processed areally. In 2010, 32 percent of juvenile arrests were missing areal 
information, compared to the astounding 99.6 percent of 2011. Note that this 
pattern is not as pronounced for the reported crime data sets, where, in 2008, 0.4 
percent of cases were missing PSA information, and in 2009 0.0037 percent of 
cases were missing PSA information. This pattern is confusing, equally to the 
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research analysts at the MPD Research and Analysis Branch with whom I spoke 
concerning this. A related issue is the absence of any juvenile arrest information 
for three PSA’s: 201, 205, and 707. The MPD Research and Analysis Branch 
pointed out that PSA 707 is a military base, and as such, juvenile arrests do not 
come to the MPD. As with the missing areal information, however, the analysts 
were at a loss as to the other two missing PSA’s. 
Missing data is a concern with all agency reported data: any study that 
employs such data risks less than ideal specificity (Jacob, 1984). It is a special 
case when it comes to areal data. Interpolating to which areal unit a piece of 
datum belongs, though feasible, is not always desirable or necessary. First, even if 
data are missing at random, it does not mean that they are missing at random 
spatially. Indeed, one of the things that criminologists have known since Park and 
Burgess (1967) is that crime is not randomly distributed in space. This is 
particularly the case for both census data and crime data, which often go under 
observed (in terms of data collection) in inner-cities (Haining, 2003). It is initially 
doubtful, therefore, whether the data missing areal information are doing so at 
random. The spatial patterns of juvenile arrest from the current data, however, do 
follow the same pattern observed in previous studies (Kane, 2011). It is 
reasonable, then, to assume that these missing data do not pose a considerable 
threat to model behavior.  
Regarding the three missing PSA’s, one is a military base (707), so we can 
more accurately describe this situation as two missing PSA’s: 201 and 205. While 
imputing missing areal units is feasible (but speculative; see Haining, 2003), it is 
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also unnecessary in the current situation. First, given the nature of spatial data, the 
spatial processes from PSA’s 201 and 205 are being captured by their neighbors 
(indeed, the analysis below will bear this out). As Haining (2003) points out, 
“...the presence of spatial correlation in attribution values means that 
neighbouring attribute values provide an information source for missing-data 
prediction” (p. 155). In other words, any spatial effect PSA’s 201 and 205 (and, 
ostensibly, 707) exert will be observable in the spatial environment. (In some 
ways, this is wrapped up with an important limitation of the current study: PSA’s 
that border Maryland and Virginia are not directly measuring the effects of these 
states. However, as will be demonstrated with the local Moran’s I statistics and 
LISA coefficients, there is substantial autocorrelation - both local and global - 
across dependent variables, such that PSA’s 201 and 205 are most likely behaving 
as their neighbors behave.) In analytical terms, their neighbors act as the missing 
PSA’s’ proxies. Data imputation was therefore avoided because a) it was 
unnecessary; b) it is, in many respects, speculative, given the spatial nature of the 
data; and c) to assure more conservative model estimates. Data imputation can 
push data sets towards analytical consensus, inflating the risk of Type I errors.   
Basic Frequency Statistics 
 Four dependent variables were chosen for the current study: juvenile 
arrests for violent, property, drug, and gun crimes. These four were chosen based 
on two considerations. First, in terms of discretion, we typically see violent 
crimes receiving less discretion than property crimes, which, in turn, receive less 
discretion than drug crimes, etc. Despite the war on drugs, how police handle less 
  86 
serious, but more popular drugs, is not always consistent (law enforcement 
behavior during prohibition being an excellent example [Walker, 1998]; see also 
Brooks, 2005). Gun crimes were chosen purposely because of Washington D.C.’s 
unique gun laws: at the start of 2008, all firearms had to be registered, and private 
citizens could not own handguns. This policy was struck down in 2008 by the 
U.S. Supreme Court (District of Columbia v. Heller). Choosing these four criteria, 
therefore, provide us with a wide range of discretionary behavior among law 
enforcement officers, and a special case of gun laws in the United States.  
Table 1. Descriptive statistics for dependent variables (per PSA). 
 
 
mean median SD range 
Violent crime arrests 22.28 18 17.99 59 
Property crime arrests 10.84 6 13.74 78 
Drug crime arrests 7.77 5 8.56 33 
Gun crime arrests 5.05 3 5.69 26 
 
 Table 1 presents parametric descriptive statistics for each dependent 
variable for 2008. As expected with arrest data, each variable is heavily skewed to 
the right. For example, on average, there were 22.28 violent juvenile arrests in 
each PSA for 2008. However, this is within a range of 59. Given a median of 18, 
it is clear that some PSA’s are outliers. Although the standard deviation for 
property crime arrests is less pronounced, the range is wider. Both drug crime 
arrests and gun crime arrests follow similar patterns, with more truncated ranges 
and smaller means (ranges of 33 and 26 respectively, with means of 7.77 and 
5.05). These numbers indicate that some PSA’s are much higher than others in 
these juvenile arrest categories. Table 2 presents the total number of arrests per 
crime type per PSA. It is noted that there are several cells with values of 0. As 
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will be discussed below, this reality resulted in the use of count-models that use 
either a Poisson distribution or a negative-binomial distribution (Long, 1997). 
Figure 3 presents each PSA by quartile for juvenile violent crime arrests. 
From this map, it is clear that violent crime arrests are concentrated in the 
southeast and central areas of D.C. What this map implies is more spatial stability 
in the northwest. Arrests for juvenile violent crime does display a spatial pattern, 
increasing in numbers from the northwest to the southeast.   
Figure 3. 
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Table 2. Distribution of dependent variables. 
 
PSA violent property drug gun 
101 40 23 14 9 
102 21 16 0 3 
103 46 14 13 9 
104 32 6 24 6 
105 6 3 0 0 
106 6 1 13 1 
107 26 8 2 5 
202 6 6 1 0 
203 3 0 0 0 
204 2 1 0 0 
206 2 5 0 0 
207 1 0 0 0 
208 7 12 0 2 
301 6 0 6 2 
302 43 9 6 16 
303 8 1 3 2 
304 34 3 5 2 
305 20 3 1 3 
307 13 2 4 2 
308 19 4 8 1 
401 1 1 0 0 
402 12 13 1 2 
403 27 3 8 3 
404 37 11 16 7 
405 14 4 1 2 
501 60 32 14 11 
502 18 6 5 4 
503 2 0 4 0 
504 46 16 27 15 
505 13 13 5 3 
601 19 7 12 5 
602 59 78 30 15 
603 35 19 9 4 
604 40 34 22 8 
605 2 2 1 1 
606 6 4 3 1 
607 30 5 3 6 
701 13 7 6 1 
702 17 8 6 10 
703 38 16 11 12 
704 14 18 10 4 
705 54 29 7 14 
706 60 23 33 26 
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Figure 4 presents the quartiles for property crime. As with violent crime, there are 
more property crime arrests for juveniles in the southeast than there are in the 
northwest. What is more, the change is more gradual than violent crime. Again, 
this suggests the presence of spatial processes. 
Figure 4.  
 
Figures 5 presents the quartile maps for juvenile drug arrests in 2008. 
Again, drug arrests are concentrated in the southeast. Further, there is less 
variation in this choropleth map than in the violent crime map, but more so than 
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the property crime. Again, we expect to see global spatial dependence because of 
this pattern. 
Figure 5.  
  
Finally, the gun crime choropleth map seen in Figure 6, suggests a similar 
spatial pattern. As with property crime, there is relatively little variation, 
suggesting global institutional processes rather than spatial dependence.  
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Figure 6.  
 
Control variables 
Reported Crime  
I used the variable total crime reported in an effort to control three 
processes: the dark figure of crime
8
; requests for police officer time; and as a 
proxy for number of police per PSA. We were unable to measure the number of 
police officers per PSA directly. There were two reasons for this. First, police are 
not strictly allocated according to PSA. Rather, they are assigned to districts. The 
                                                 
8
 Although this is not an ideal measurement of the dark figure of crime, as many individuals do not 
report crime, it is better than arrest and provides an added check against our arrest rate.  
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number of police officers in each PSA can therefore potentially change from time 
to time. A small variation in police officer assignment is desired, because such 
activity is one avenue through which isomorphism may function. However, this 
same situation poses a potential threat to this study’s validity insofar as it is 
difficult to claim a PSA is a sovereign when its contingent is constantly in flux. 
This is mediated, however, by at least two factors. First, the nature of each PSA 
can create its own culture, leading officers who may move in and out of the PSA 
to adopt the culture of that place, thus maintaining the normative productivity 
patterns. Such was the theoretical assertion posited by Klinger (1997) and 
supported by the literature (Phillips & Sobol, 2010; Johnson & Olschansky, 2010; 
Sobol, 2010; Jackson & Boyd, 2005).  
  Second, although the MPD does not permanently assign officers to PSA’s 
in a strict sense, it is very unlikely that there is significant week-to-week, if not 
month-to-month, turnover in those areas. Rather, it is most likely the case that 
officers move between beats within PSA's, as was the case with the Philadelphia 
Police Department (Rubinstein, 1973).  It is recalled that PSA’s are not beats, but 
are instead service areas. As such, they are composed of several beats. With the 
possible exception of special assignments that require patrol officers to focus on 
different areas of a PSA – and even these are likely to come from within the same 
district-, it is most probable that patrol officers will work in the same PSA for 
several months at a time.  
It is also noted that the MPD does not make publicly available the number 
officers per district, and were not forthcoming with this information. Controlling 
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for the district, therefore, allows us to control for police population. Assuming 
that there is a nonzero difference between districts in terms of police population, 
the correlation between police population per district and district would be 1. 
Note that there were seven police districts in 2008. The first number in each PSA 
represents the district to which is belongs: thus PSA 201 is the first PSA of the 
second district.  
We used reported crime as a general proxy for number of police officers 
because it gives us a snap shot of which officers were where in 2008 overall. 
Given the fluid nature of police officer allocation to PSA’s, this was a reasonable 
attempt to control for police officer population. As indicated in Table 3, there was 
an average of 761.59 crimes reported across all PSA’s in 2008. As with arrest 
data, report data were not normally distributed, with a median of 610 and a 
standard deviation of 495.28, across a range of 2296. Figure 7 below indicates the 
quartiles for crime reports; the map suggests some variation across space.  
Table 3. Descriptive statistics for crime reports.  
   
 Mean Standard 
Deviation 
Median Range 
Assault with a deadly weapon 62.02 48.61 46 178 
Arson 1.02 1.31 1 6 
Burglary 81.61 50.37 78 240 
Homicide 4.04 4.42 2 17 
Robbery 95.48 69.74 75 328 
Sex Abuse 8.98 7.72 7 32 
Stolen Auto 115.13 79.02 102 391 
Theft 198.63 193.80 163 959 
Theft from Auto 194.67 157.54 147 764 
Total crime reported 761.59 495.28 610 2296 
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Figure 7. 
 
Ecological Variables 
Structural disadvantage, population mobility, and race variables were 
created using the resulting data set from the areal weighting interpolation process 
described above. Percent foreign born, percent households on public assistance, 
percent households under the poverty line, percent persons 25 years or older 
without a high school degree or equivalent, percent persons living in the same 
household for five years or less, percent under the age of 18, percent female 
headed household, and the male unemployment rate were all submitted to a 
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principal components analysis with varimax rotation. As Table 4 indicates, two 
components were extracted accounting for 70.89 percent of the variance.  
Table 4. Component loadings for structural disadvantage 
and population mobility* 
 
Eigenvalue 4.33 1.34 
Percent variance explained 54.12 16.76 
Percent foreign born 
 
-0.741 
Percent in same house ≤ 5 yrs 
 
0.923 
Percent households on assistance 0.899 
 Percent households below poverty line 0.954 
 Percent persons (25+) with no HSD/E 0.74 
 Percent persons under the age of 18 0.803 
 Percent female headed household 0.72 
 Male unemployement rate 0.581   
* Varimax rotation.  
  One component, on which percent in the same household for five years or less (b 
= 0.923) and percent foreign born (b = 0.741) loaded strongly, represents 
population mobility. The other variables loaded strongly on another component, 
and represent structural disadvantage. A PCA was run for both components 
separately to create component scores using the regression method. Tables 5 and 
6 present the loadings for these components. These components correlate at -
0.394 (p < 0.01), and this reflects the patterns in the choropleth maps below 
(Figures 12 and 13).  
Table 5. Component loadings for population mobility 
Eigenvalue 1.48 
Percent variance explained 74.17 
Percent foreign born 0.861 
Percent in same house ≤ 5 yrs 0.861 
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Table 6. Component loadings for structural disadvantage 
Eigenvalue 3.937 
Percent variance explained 65.61 
Percent households on assistance 0.917 
Percent households below poverty line 0.905 
Percent persons (25+) with no HSD/E 0.771 
Percent persons under the age of 18 0.884 
Percent female headed household 0.749 
Male unemployement rate 0.583 
 
Structural disadvantage ranges from a score of -1.77 to 2.45, while 
population mobility scores range from -1.41 to 2.48. The average percent of 
Blacks across PSA’s was 64.8 percent (compared to the District’s average of 60 
percent). The average percent of Hispanics across PSA’s was 6.62 percent 
(compared to 7.9 percent across the District). Hispanic demographics were 
included initially in all models, especially given encroachment trends suggested in 
Kane and colleagues (2011). However, for 2008 and at the PSA-aggregate, there 
was no observable Hispanic affect at the bivariate level, except for property 
crime. It seems likely that this is due to a shared covariation with population 
mobility (r = 0.74, p < 0.05) and the issue of aggregating from census tracts to 
PSA’s. Hispanic population measurements are therefore not included in 
subsequent models. Choropleth maps for these variables can be found in the 
Appendix.  
Police Districts  
Police districts were included as dummy variables for the following 
reasons. First, they serve to control for work group effects as described by Klinger 
(1996). This also served the dual purpose of approximating a two level model, 
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where level 1 is the PSA and level 2 is the district. While we did observe some 
district effects (see below), a hierarchical model was not feasible owing to data 
limitations. While statistical power was not comprised in any model, our n limited 
the suite of statistics available to us. Second, the police districts control for 
district-specific policies. Finally, district dummies control for police population. 
As mentioned, we were unable to attain accurate police population data. For all 
dummy districts, district 7 was chosen as the referent district because, in 
considering the choropleth maps, it is generally at the extreme end of arrests and 
crime variables.  
Bivariate Relationships 
 Table 7 presents the zero-order correlations for all primary variables used 
in the study. Pearson’s correlation coefficients are presented in the lower triangle, 
while exact p values are presented in the upper triangle. In addition, for ease of 
interpretation, relationships significant at p < 0.05 are in bold. Regarding the four 
criteria, relationships are in expected directions and magnitude for both structural 
disadvantage and reported crime. The variable for drug arrests is an exception 
here, displaying a null relationship with structural disadvantage. Why this is is not 
immediately clear. The regression models for drug crime arrests reflect this 
relationship, and also add light to its explanation.  
 
   
9
8
 
Table 7. Correlation matrix of variables for 2008†.                           
  
I. II. III. IV. V. VI. VII. VIII. IX. X. XI. XII. XIII. XIV. XV. XVI. 
I. Violent 
arrests 
1.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.953 0.000 0.244 0.004 0.400 0.000 0.714 0.705 0.680 0.516 0.126 
II. Property 
arrests 
0.780 1.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.027 0.000 0.006 0.000 0.640 0.047 0.040 0.664 0.624 0.144 0.042 
III. Drug arrests 0.740 0.540 1.000 0.000 0.000 0.685 0.000 0.128 0.195 0.806 0.000 0.979 0.417 0.209 0.223 0.076 
IV. Gun arrests 0.900 0.760 0.750 1.000 0.000 0.753 0.000 0.187 0.002 0.763 0.000 0.858 0.524 0.515 0.391 0.019 
V. Black 
population 
0.580 0.550 0.610 0.600 1.000 0.006 0.000 0.000 0.754 0.656 0.000 0.106 0.478 0.114 0.010 0.015 
VI. Hispanic 
population 
-0.010 -0.340 -0.060 -0.050 -0.410 1.000 0.146 0.000 0.230 0.234 0.984 0.000 0.281 0.241 0.046 0.062 
VII. Structural 
disadvantage 
0.620 0.530 0.570 0.620 0.740 -0.230 1.000 0.007 0.758 0.820 0.000 0.864 0.457 0.625 0.023 0.003 
VIII. Population 
mobility 
-0.180 -0.420 -0.240 -0.210 -0.730 0.740 -0.400 1.000 0.125 0.798 0.005 0.000 0.467 0.015 0.019 0.103 
IX. Reported 
crime 
0.430 0.520 0.200 0.470 -0.050 0.190 0.050 0.240 1.000 0.512 0.658 0.495 0.553 0.988 0.509 0.547 
X. District 1 0.130 0.070 0.040 0.050 -0.070 -0.190 0.040 -0.040 0.100 1.000 0.255 0.212 0.306 0.306 0.212 0.255 
XI. District 2 -0.550 -0.300 -0.580 -0.520 -0.770 0.000 -0.640 0.420 0.070 -0.180 1.000 0.255 0.350 0.350 0.255 0.299 
XII. District 3 0.060 -0.310 0.000 -0.030 -0.250 0.780 -0.030 0.660 0.110 -0.190 -0.180 1.000 0.306 0.306 0.212 0.255 
XIII. District 4 -0.060 -0.070 -0.130 -0.100 0.110 0.170 -0.120 -0.110 -0.090 -0.160 -0.150 -0.160 1.000 0.400 0.306 0.350 
XIV. District 5 0.060 0.080 0.200 0.100 0.240 -0.180 -0.080 -0.370 0.000 -0.160 -0.150 -0.160 -0.130 1.000 0.306 0.350 
XV. District 6 0.100 0.230 0.190 0.130 0.390 -0.310 0.350 -0.360 -0.100 -0.190 -0.180 -0.190 -0.160 -0.160 1.000 0.255 
XVI. District 7 0.240 0.310 0.270 0.360 0.370 -0.290 0.440 -0.250 -0.090 -0.180 -0.160 -0.180 -0.150 -0.150 -0.180 1.000 
† Dependent variables are transformed (natural log) to induce normality. Racial/ethnic populations are presented as rates.  
    
NOTE: Statistically significant correlation coefficients (p < 0.05) are in bold. The lower triangle presents coefficients, while the upper triangle presents exact p values. 
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The inverse relationship with population mobility is explained by referring to the 
maps in the Appendix, for Figures 2A and 4A: both lower crime (including 
district 2) and high population mobility are found in the northwest of the District. 
This pattern is explained largely by the nature of the population who reside here, 
which includes college students and those attached to the national politics 
surrounding Washington, D.C. These are individuals and families who will be 
changing residences more often than is typical of most Americans, but who are 
less likely to commit the kind of street crimes being explored in this study.  
It is noteworthy that there are very few district effects for the dependent 
variables. Although district 2 is consistently influential, and districts 7 and 3 are 
also impactful at some point, most districts are not. This suggests that the 
territorial behavior of the police is not being expressed at this level of aggregation 
consistently (that is, at the district level), and what district behavior we are seeing 
is more the exception than the rule. Geographically, these exceptions make sense: 
districts 2 and 3 are located in the north and experience less crime than district 7 
in the south.  
 From an analytic stand point, the high correlation coefficient between 
certain control variables raises concerns for multicollinearity. Specifically, the 
relationship between structural disadvantage and the Black population, and 
Population mobility with the Black and Hispanic populations rise above the 
traditionally accepted threshold of r = 0.70. As will be addressed in the 
multivariate models in the following chapter, this does not become a diagnostic 
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problem for the Black population; it does, however, become so for the Hispanic 
population. Given the general pattern of correlations in Table 7, this does not 
come as a surprise. Instead, the Hispanic effect seems to have its influence 
through population mobility, with which it is highly correlated (r = 0.74). Given 
what recent work on racial/ethnic encroachment in DC has suggested (Kane, 
Gustafson, & Bruell, 2011), this is also not surprising. Given this, and in 
consideration of model fit, Hispanic population was removed from subsequent 
models.  
 The correlation values of districts 2 and 3 with Black population and 
Structural disadvantage, respectively, also raise concerns over multicollinearity. 
This played out in several of the regression models, with VIF’s exceeding values 
of 10. In addition, for the most part, the correlations between the dependent 
variables and the district dummy variables is scant, being observed mostly in 
districts 2 and 7. This was also revealed in the regression models, where district 
effects rarely surfaced, with few exceptions, which are noted. This is, in part, due 
to the modifiable areal unit problem, where processes behave differently given 
different levels of aggregation. In addition, this suggests that police population, in 
terms of where it is concentrated, is as much a product of structural disadvantage 
as it is of district location. This is supported by research from the minority threat 
family of theories that explain police presence in terms of extra-legal factors 
associated with “unwanted” populations, including structural disadvantage 
(Jacobs & O’Brien, 1998; Kane, 2003). Districts were therefore not included in 
   101 
most of the regression models, except where noted. Police population was mostly 
proxied by reported crime.  Where districts are included in the regression models, 
a note about VIF’s is included in the discussion.  
Summary 
 This chapter described how data sets were carefully merged and variables 
were created. In addition, it presented basic frequency statistics of all variables 
and gave an overview of their significance, and began the process of spatially 
analyzing the data. In addition, we began to explore the relationship between 
variables by considering their bivariate correlations. Thus far, there is clear 
evidence of spatial processes across all four criteria. Therefore, hypothesis 1 is 
tentatively supported. However, the sub-hypotheses were not fully supported; 
instead of seeing a pattern where violent crime exhibits less spatial dependence 
than property crime, which in turn exhibits less spatial dependence than either 
drug or gun crime arrests, we saw quite the opposite. The reason will be revealed 
in detail below, but it is tied up in hypothesis 3: The spatial dependence being 
exhibited by violent and property crime arrests are accounting for variance that is 
actually being exerted by ecological and racial/ethnic variables. The next chapter 
will discuss these relationships further using multivariate and spatial statistics, 
allowing us to control not just for global versus localized spatial effects, but also 
to assess the effects of these processes in light of other pertinent variables.  
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Chapter 5 
MULTIVARIATE ANALYSIS 
Introduction 
In this section, we test for global environmental effects from the institution 
as well as test for sovereign effects. Recall that global spatial dependence, net of 
controls, is assumed to be a sign of the effect of the entire institutional 
environment on individual PSA’s. To this end, Moran’s I statistics are presented 
along with a series of scatterplots and maps. Then, count models are run without 
spatial lags to check for heteroskedasticity. This is followed by a series of 
LeGrange Multiplier tests looking for the potential effects of both spatial lag and 
spatial error models. Finally, where appropriate, a spatial lag model is executed. 
Model fit and diagnostics are considered for each model. For those models 
expressing potential sovereign effects, a further regression model is run using an 
interaction term of the spatial lag X LISA dummies.  
Spatial Nature of the Data 
 The spatial nature of the data will be explored by employing the Moran’s I 
statistic and its LISA equivalent (Anselin, 1995). The coefficients are interpreted 
essentially in the same way as a Pearson’s correlation coefficient, such that a 
negative number suggests a negative association with one’s neighbors on the 
same attributional variable, and a positive number suggests a positive association 
with one’s neighbors on the same attributional variable. Additionally, the further 
away from 0 the coefficient is, the more substantial the effect is.  
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Recall that the Moran’s I is a global indicator of spatial autocorrelation in 
the same sense that Pearsons’s r considers all sources of variation shared between 
two variables. We will therefore also explore Local Moran’s I coefficients. The 
LISA statistic disaggregates the global spatial dependence into its component 
parts and tests each to see if they are statistically above the influence of their 
neighbors (Anselin, 1993). In other words, they indicate the presence of spatial 
outliers. These coefficients are presented in conjunction with LISA maps. Note 
that both Moran’s I and local Moran’s I require a normally distributed variable; 
given the skewed nature of the four dependent variables, normality was induced 
via a naturally logged rate. 
Hypothesis Tests 
 For all multivariate models, count models were employed, either using a 
Poisson or a negative-binomial distribution. Count models were necessary 
because of the skewed nature of the data (Long, 1997). Whether a Poisson or a 
negative-binomial model were used depended on the nature of the dependent 
variable, as well: if the dispersion parameter indicated that the data were over-
dispersed, a negative-binomial model was used. Otherwise, a Poisson model was 
employed.  
Juvenile Violent Crime Arrests  
Hypothesis 1a states:  
1. Net of controls, the juvenile arresting behavior of police in any given PSA 
will be influenced by the juvenile arresting behavior of neighboring PSA’s in a 
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centrifugal pattern. This pattern will be strongest for crimes that allow for more 
discrimination. 
a. Violent juvenile crimes will exhibit this pattern less so than other 
crimes, because violent crimes allow for less police officer discretion.  
This hypothesis is now tested. The Moran’s I for juvenile violent crime arrests is 
statistically significant at p < 0.001, with a value of 0.461. This supports the 
pattern displayed in Figure 3. Combined, the map and Moran’s I suggest the 
presence of spatial dependence: juvenile violent crime arrests in one PSA are 
affecting the number of violent crime arrests in neighboring PSA’s. In addition, 
this effect is exerted centrifugally, waning with distance. Thus far, there is 
evidence in support of hypothesis 1.  
To create a baseline, we ran a count regression model without a spatial lag 
term. This model is presented in Table 8. This model suggests that total crime 
reported and the total black population are statistically significant at the 0.001 
level. The coefficient for total crime reported is 0.85, or an odds ratio of 2.35. 
Similarly, the coefficient for the total black population is 0.71, or an odds ratio of 
2.04. Both of these variables are, therefore, highly predictive of juvenile violent 
crime arrests. Neither structural disadvantage nor population mobility reach 
statistical significance in this model.  
Next, we introduced a lag term into the model. A LeGrange multiplier test 
suggested that this may not, however, be necessary. Recall that the LeGrange 
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Table 8. Count model for juvenile violent crime arrests 
 
 
b SE z p 
Crime reported
†
 0.85 0.15 5.79 0.00 
Structural disadvantage 0.20 0.12 1.64 0.10 
Population mobility 0.10 0.11 0.99 0.32 
Black population
†
 0.71 0.17 4.08 0.00 
Constant -7.25 1.44 -5.05 0.00 
AIC = 314.62, -2LL = 302.624, dispersion parameter = 5.29 (p < 
0.01)  
†Natural log was used.  
    
multiplier test indicates whether or not the extant spatial dependence must be 
modeled in order to reduce heteroskedasticity. A LeGrange multiplier test is a 
statistical tool that helps us know if we need a spatial lag; it says nothing, 
however, for theory. That is, a spatial lag term may not be important in terms of 
model fit; it may, however, still provide us with meaningful information about the 
relationship between one areal unit and its neighbors. For juvenile violent crime 
arrests, the LeGrange multiplier tests did not indicate the need to include a spatial 
lag term in the regression model: neither the LeGrange multiplier test for the lag 
nor for the error models suggested this need (0.004 at p = 0.953 and 2.574 at p = 
0.109, respectively). This is not surprising, as a Breusch-Pagan test suggested that 
heteroskedacity was not a problem (BP = 7.59, p = 0.093). (The robust LeGrange 
multipliers, however, did suggest that an error model may be necessary [5.619 at 
p < 0.05]. This is explored in more detail below.] The count model, with a lag 
term, is presented in Table 9
9
. The lag term is denoted with the Greek letter rho.  
                                                 
9
 When using a count model, the lag term is the product of the fitted values from the baseline 
count model and the weights matrix (Kubrin, 2003; Kane, Gustafson, Bruell, 2011).  
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Table 9. Count model for juvenile violent crime arrests with lag 
 
 
b SE z p 
Crime reported
†
 0.85 0.15 5.76 0.00 
Structural disadvantage 0.19 0.13 1.56 0.12 
Population mobility 0.10 0.11 0.94 0.35 
Black population
†
 0.71 0.18 3.83 0.00 
ρ 0.00 0.01 0.17 0.87 
Constant -7.21 1.44 -4.99 0.00 
AIC = 316.59, -2LL = 302.594, dispersion parameter = 5.32 (p < 
0.01)  
†Natural log was used.  
    
Comparing this model with the first count model, there is almost no 
change in coefficient behavior: total crime reported (0.85) and the total black 
population (0.71) remain unchanged in both magnitude and significance, while 
structural disadvantage and population mobility remain statistically non-
significant. In addition, the lag term, rho, does not reach significance. Its value, 
listed as 0.00 in the table, is actually 0.001916, an odds ratio of 1.001918. Further, 
the model fit for the count model with the lag term is only nominally better than 
that of the model without the lag term: a change in AIC from 314.62 to 316.59. 
This is essentially no change at all. For juvenile violent crime arrests, therefore, 
neighboring PSA’s do not appear, statistically, to be influencing the behavior of 
one another.  
This disconfirms hypothesis 1. It disconfirms the general hypothesis 
insofar as, net of controls, PSA’s do not seem to be influencing the arresting 
behavior of their neighbors. This predicted institutional effect is diluted by the 
seriousness of the crime: violent juvenile crimes. Admittedly, however, “diluted” 
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appears too weak of a word to describe the relationship between violent juvenile 
arrests in one PSA and those in a neighboring PSA. A more accurate description 
would be of null effect. This is discussed further below. Now, we explore the 
second hypothesis for juvenile violent arrests:  
2. The existence of sovereign precincts should be empirically observable. 
Again, for crimes with more discretion, we should see more of a sovereign 
effect insofar as the spatial dependency suggested in hypothesis 1 will 
have its effect ultimately through sovereign precincts.  
a. For juvenile violent crime arrests, this effect will be the smallest 
when compared to property, drug, and gun crime arrests. 
Although the general, global institutional environment does not seem to 
matter for juvenile violent crime arrests, it is possible that sovereigns may be 
mediating this relationship. To this end, we run another count model, interacting 
the presence of LISA’s as sovereigns with the spatial lag term. First, testing for 
LISA clusters (see Figure 8 below and Table 1A in the appendix) suggests PSA’s 
706, 705, 703 compose a High-High cluster, PSA’s 204 and 206 are a LL cluster 
in the northeast of D.C.,  and PSA 601 as a HH cluster in the east. The PSA’s 
located in district 7 (706, 705, and 703) are located just south of Anacostia Naval 
Station and Boiling Air Force base. The MPD has essentially no activity on the 
military base. However, the remainder of district 7 – which includes, for these 
PSA’s, the neighborhoods of Bellevue, Congress Heights, Saint Elizabeths, Barry 
Farm, Douglass, Washington Highlands, and Shipley Terrace – is a hot bed of 
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activity for the MPD. Similarly, PSA 601 also receives a great deal of attention, 
being located around the National Arboretum and Kenilworth Aquatic Gardens, 
areas characterized by high-rise and low-income housing.  PSA’s 206 and 204, 
however, are located in the more affluent Georgetown and Woodley Park, and see 
less police activity.  
Figure 8. 
 
There is potential, therefore, for localized spatial effects, that is, for sovereign 
effects. Table 10 explores this in a multivariate count model, where the lag term is 
interacted with a dummy variable, where 1 = a sovereign cluster. 
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Despite the presence of LISA clusters, this model suggests that, for violent 
juvenile crime arrests, sovereigns do not have an effect: neither the LISA variable 
Table 10. Count model for juvenile violent crime arrests with 
LISA dummies 
 
 
b SE z p 
Crime reported
†
 0.88 0.15 6.05 0.00 
Structural disadvantage 0.14 0.13 1.06 0.29 
Population mobility 0.14 0.11 1.27 0.20 
Black population
†
 0.78 0.21 3.79 0.00 
ρ -0.01 0.01 -0.64 0.52 
LISA -0.40 0.69 -0.58 0.56 
ρ X LISA 0.02 0.02 1.07 0.29 
Constant -7.66 1.53 -5.01 0.00 
AIC = 318.27, -2LL = 300.266, dispersion parameter = 5.63 (p < 
0.01)  
†Natural log was used.  
    
nor the interaction of rho X LISA were statistically significant. Indeed, the 
magnitude of rho X LISA was nominal at 0.02 (odds ratio of 1.02). Otherwise, 
there was no substantive change between variables in terms of magnitude (that is, 
between total crime reported [at 0.88] and total black population [at 0.78]), nor 
was there any identifiable improvement over model fit (AIC moved from 314.62 
from the base model to 318.27). In short, hypothesis 2, like hypothesis 1, was 
disconfirmed. However, this was somewhat anticipated for juvenile violent crime 
arrests, as there is less discretion for these types of crime. But again, as with 
hypothesis 1, to suggest that “this effect will be small” is somewhat of an 
understatement: sovereigns and institutional effects generally, for juvenile violent 
crimes, had a null effect for these 2008 data. 
 
   110 
Juvenile Property Crime Arrests  
Hypothesis 1b states:  
1. Net of controls, the juvenile arresting behavior of police in any given PSA 
will be influenced by the juvenile arresting behavior of neighboring PSA’s in a 
centrifugal pattern. This pattern will be strongest for crimes that allow for more 
discrimination. 
b. … juvenile property crime arrests will exhibit this pattern less so 
than the two remaining dependent variables: juvenile drug crime 
arrests and juvenile gun crime arrests.  
In other words, juvenile property crime, because it allows police officers more 
discretion than violent crime, yet less than the other two categories of crime, 
should display some isomorphism, but not as much as we anticipate for drug and 
gun crime arrests. This hypothesis is now tested. The Moran’s I for juvenile 
property crime arrests is statistically significant at p < 0.001, with a value of 
0.347. This supports the pattern displayed in Figure 4. Combined, the map and 
Moran’s I suggest the presence of spatial dependence: juvenile property crime 
arrests in one PSA are affecting the number of property crime arrests in 
neighboring PSA’s. In addition, this effect is exerted centrifugally, waning with 
distance. Thus far, there is evidence in support of hypothesis 1.  
To create a baseline, we run a count regression model without a spatial lag 
term. This model is presented in Table 11. For this model, it was necessary to 
model a curvilinear relationship with the total black population. For this model, 
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the total crime reported, population mobility, and total black population and its 
squared term were each significant at p < 0.05. As expected, the most powerful 
predictor was total crime reported, with an odds ratio of 4.07. The nonlinear 
relationship between property crime and the total black population is also clearly 
modeled. Non-linear relationships are difficult to interpret, no less so in a count 
model. One way of understanding this relationship is that, initially, the black 
population variable does not fully engage the police in terms of juvenile property 
arrests. This is seen in the first order term where the odds ratio is 0.008. At some 
point, as the black population increases, more police turn their attention to 
juvenile property crimes. This is seen in the quadratic term where the odds ratio is 
1.59. Note that structural disadvantage is not statistically significant for juvenile 
property crime arrests.  
Table 11. Count model for juvenile property crime arrests 
 
 
b SE z p 
Crime reported
†
 1.40 0.17 8.12 0.00 
Structural disadvantage 0.24 0.15 1.60 0.11 
Population mobility -0.36 0.16 -2.22 0.03 
Black population
†
 -4.85 1.96 -2.47 0.01 
Black population
2
 0.46 0.19 2.47 0.01 
Constant 4.48 4.95 0.91 0.37 
AIC = 247.57, -2LL = 233.569, dispersion parameter =5.54 (p < 
0.01)  
†Natural log was used.  
    
Next, we introduced a lag term into the model. A LeGrange multiplier test 
suggested that this may not, however, be necessary. For juvenile property crime 
arrests, the LeGrange multiplier tests suggested neither a lag (0.4797, p = 0.4886) 
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nor an error model (0.3238, p = 0.5693) were necessary to control for 
autocorrelation. Indeed, a Breusch-Pagan test indicated that the model was 
homoscedastic (3.7879, p = 0.5803). Nevertheless, the robust LeGrange tests 
indicated a preference for a lag model (5.7474, p = 0.0165) over an error model 
(5.5915, p = 0.0181). The count model, with a lag term, is presented in Table 12. 
The lag term is denoted with the Greek letter rho.  
Table 12. Count model for juvenile property crime arrests with lag 
 
 
b SE z p 
Crime reported
†
 1.38 0.17 8.30 0.00 
Structural disadvantage 0.18 0.15 1.20 0.23 
Population mobility -0.34 0.16 -2.14 0.03 
Black population
†
 -4.58 1.93 -2.38 0.02 
Black population
2
 0.44 0.18 2.37 0.02 
ρ 0.02 0.01 1.31 0.19 
Constant 3.80 4.86 0.78 0.44 
AIC = 248.04, -2LL =232.059, dispersion parameter =6.12 (p < 
0.01)  
†Natural log was used.  
    
Comparing this model with the previous one, there is minute change in coefficient 
behavior. Most of the significant predictors decrease in magnitude while 
remaining statistically significant. To wit: both total reported crime (1.38) and 
population mobility (-0.34) each are marginally reduced in magnitude. Both terms 
for total black population remain statistically significant and follow the same 
pattern as in the previous table. Additionally, rho did not reach significance (p = 
0.19) nor was its effect size impressive (b = 0.02, odds ratio = 1.024). Further, 
model fit was not improved when the lag term was introduced, with practically no 
change in AIC between the two models (247.57 to 248.04). For juvenile property 
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crime arrests, therefore, neighboring PSA’s do not appear, statistically, to be 
influencing the behavior of one another.  
This disconfirms hypothesis 1. It disconfirms the general hypothesis 
insofar as, net of controls, PSA’s do not seem to be influencing the arresting 
behavior of their neighbors.  Again, the effect appears to be null. This is discussed 
further below. Now, we explore the second hypothesis for juvenile violent arrests:  
2. The existence of sovereign precincts should be empirically observable. 
Again, for crimes with more discretion, we should see more of a sovereign 
effect insofar as the spatial dependency suggested in hypothesis 1 will have its 
effect ultimately through sovereign precincts.   
b. Juvenile property crime arrests will display this pattern more so 
than violent crime, but less so than the other arrest types. 
As with violent crime arrests, so too with juvenile property crime arrests: the 
global institutional environment does not seem to matter. Yet it is possible that 
sovereigns may be mediating this relationship. To this end, we run another count 
model, interacting the presence of LISA’s as sovereigns with the spatial lag term. 
First, testing for LISA clusters (Figure 9, and see Table 2A in the appendix) 
suggests PSA’s 703, 705, and 704 in the southwest of D.C. and PSA’s 602, 604, 
and 601 in the east of D.C. each compose a pair of High-high clusters, while 
PSA’s 303 and 301 in the northwest represent a Low-low cluster. The High-high 
clusters correspond with those for the juvenile violent crime arrests, and are 
located in and around the same neighborhoods. PSA’s 303 and 301, located in 
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district 3, however, are unique to this model. These are around the Adams Morgan 
and Mount Pleasant neighborhoods of D.C, which have, over the past two 
decades, seen a number of revitalization efforts, and are populated by young, 
upwardly mobile adults. 
Figure 9.
 
There is potential, therefore, for localized spatial effects, that is, for sovereign 
effects. Table 13 explores this in a multivariate count model, where the lag term is 
interacted with a dummy variable, where 1 = a sovereign cluster. As with the 
previous model, there was no appreciable difference in this model in terms of total 
   115 
crime reported (b = 1.35) and population mobility (b = -0.33). The black 
population remains nonlinear (-4.14 and 0.40). Neither rho, the LISA dummy, nor 
the interaction term were statistically significant. Although there is again no 
considerable change in the AIC (from 248.04 to 248.19), the log likelihood 
Table 13. Count model for juvenile property crime arrests with 
LISA dummies 
 
 
b SE z p 
Crime reported
†
 1.35 0.15 9.04 0.00 
Structural disadvantage 0.07 0.14 0.51 0.61 
Population mobility -0.33 0.15 -2.23 0.03 
Black population
†
 -4.14 1.78 -2.33 0.02 
Black population
2
 0.40 0.17 2.38 0.02 
ρ 0.00 0.02 0.23 0.82 
LISA 0.36 0.46 0.80 0.43 
ρ X LISA 0.01 0.03 0.31 0.75 
Constant 2.64 4.49 0.59 0.56 
AIC = 248.19, -2LL = 228.194, dispersion parameter = 9.10 (p < 
0.01)  
†Natural log was used.  
    
consistently decreases across models: 233.569, 232.059, 228.194. Therefore, 
despite the suggestion of spatial dependence and the presence of sovereign LISA 
clusters, the multivariate model suggests that there are no sovereign influences in 
terms of juvenile property arrests.  
In short, hypothesis 2, like hypothesis 1, was ultimately disconfirmed. For 
juvenile property crime arrests, there was no indication of sovereign effects, thus 
disconfirming the hypothesis. However, this was anticipated for juvenile property 
crime arrests, as there is less discretion for these types of crime than others 
explored in this dissertation. But again, as with hypothesis 1, to suggest that “this 
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effect will be small” is an understatement: sovereigns and institutional effects 
generally, for juvenile property crime arrests, had a null effect. 
Analysis and discussion. The findings for juvenile violent and property 
crime arrests do not support the theory presented in this dissertation. This was not 
unanticipated, however. As explained in the literature review, there is less 
discretion allowed for these crimes than for drug or gun crimes. In addition, there 
is evidence from previous research that such crimes are very susceptible to 
ecological and demographic variables. Such was the case in the current study: the 
ecology and racial demography of the PSA may have simply overwhelmed any 
institutional processes that were going on for these crimes.   
 For property crime arrests, population mobility played an important role. 
Indeed, with an odds ratio of 0.70, it was second only to total crime reported in 
predictive capacity (which had an odds ratio of 4.07) (ignoring, for the moment, 
the nonlinear relationship with total black population). For property crime arrests, 
population mobility continued to be statistically significant across all models, 
with very little change in magnitude (from an odds ratio of 0.70 to 0.71 to 0.72). 
This, despite the fact that property crime arrests suggested spatial dependence 
both through Moran’s I’s and LISA maps. Structural disadvantage was not 
statistically significant, however. Structural disadvantage is highly correlated with 
the black population (r = 0.740); in this particular model, despite a lack of 
multicollinearity (VIFs for first order terms never rose above 10), it is most likely 
that black population is accounting for much of the variance in structural 
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disadvantage. A first order regression model without structural disadvantage 
indicates that the coefficients for the black population variables are -5.67 and 0.56 
(first order and quadratic terms, respectively), both statistically significant at p < 
0.05. When structural disadvantage is reentered into the equation, the magnitude 
is decreased somewhat for the black population to -4.85 and 0.46. However, when 
the reverse operation is done for structural disadvantage (removing total black 
population and its squared term from the regression equation and then re-entering 
them), the coefficient for structural disadvantage is reduced from 0.35 (p < 0.05) 
to 0.23 (p = 0.11)
10
.  
There is also some indication that threat hypotheses are at work in these 
data. Specifically, for violent crime arrests, the total black population is 
significant across all models, with the largest effect size, second only to total 
reported crime. This effect size remains stable across the models where a lag term 
was introduced, moving from 2.04 to 2.03 to 2.17. Although bivariate scatterplots 
suggested a nonlinear relationship between the total black population and juvenile 
violent crime arrests, it was not necessary to model this relationship in the 
regression model. (This topic is taken up in much more detail below in the final 
chapter.) This non-linear pattern was especially evident for juvenile property 
arrests. As described above: initially, the total black population poses no “threat” 
at the PSA level. However, as the number of African Americans increases, the use 
of arrest against juvenile property crime also increases, net of controls. This study 
                                                 
10
 Despite this, structural disadvantage is retained in order to avoid the pitfalls of step-wise 
regression. 
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therefore corroborates the role of threat, violent crime, and minority populations 
in police behavior (Jacobs & O’Brien, 1998) as well as the canon of work on 
police ecology (Kane, 2002) – but adds to this literature by exploring this ecology 
at the PSA level. 
It is worth taking a moment to reflect on the LaGrange multiplier tests for 
the juvenile violent crime arrest models. While the non-robust tests indicated no 
need to employ a spatial lag or error term, the robust tests suggested an error term 
in preference to a lag term. An error model was therefore run to explore this (see 
Table 3A in the Appendix)
11
. This model did not perform better than its non-error 
linear model with an AIC of 96.656 compared to 97.467. Total reported crime 
remained statistically significant (odds ratio of 2.70), as did the total black 
population (odds ratio of 1.26). These odds ratios are comparable to what was 
expressed in Table 8 for the initial first order model. In addition, structural 
disadvantage reached significance at p < 0.05 (odds ratio of 1.37). Lambda, the 
error coefficient, was 0.36 and significant at p < 0.05.  
Spatial error models suggest that the residual errors of the regression 
model are correlated with one another, rather than spherical (Ward & Gleditsch, 
2000). Typically, this suggests the presence of heteroskedacticity. Such was not 
the case with the current models, however, as neither residual plots nor Breusch-
Pagan tests suggested as much. What the error model might be suggesting is that 
                                                 
11
 To my knowledge, there is no way to calculate an error model without a count distribution. 
Therefore, this exploratory model is calculated under a linear model, using Anselin’s (2003) R 
package spdep, call errorsarlm. The dependent variable is the natural logarithm of the total 
number of violent crimes.  
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there is some unknown spatial event going on that we were unable to tap into with 
the current models. If the theoretical underpinnings of the current study are valid, 
then that missing “something” cannot be isomorphic pressures as here treated. 
They could, however, be other processes associated with institutional pressures.  
DiMaggio and Powell (1983) pointed out that there are many forms of 
isomorphism coming from many sources. The current study only considered other 
PSA’s as a source of institutional pressure. As Katz (2001) pointed out, key 
political stakeholders may also be considered sovereigns. In addition, community 
organizers and leaders may also be part of the sovereignty. It is possible that these 
elements are impacting the territorial behavior of the police at the PSA level, and 
doing so in a spatial manner. In fact, it is quite plausible: serious crime is typically 
what is necessary for community organizers to organize and community actors to 
act. Given their voluminous homicide rate of the 1990s, the attention of D.C. 
residents to violent crime patterns may be aggrandized, and their ability to focus 
police efforts on such crimes well practiced. Perhaps, then, violent crime is not so 
far removed from the pressures of isomorphism; rather, we need to expand our 
scope of who is and can be a sovereign. This discussion is taken up in later 
chapters. 
Juvenile Drug Crime Arrests  
Hypothesis 1 states:  
1. Net of controls, the juvenile arresting behavior of police in any given PSA 
will be influenced by the juvenile arresting behavior of neighboring PSA’s 
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in a centrifugal pattern. This pattern will be strongest for crimes that allow 
for more discrimination 
c. Juvenile drug crime arrests will be especially prone to isomorphic 
influences, as they allow for more police officer discretion (Lynch, et al. 2002) 
than either juvenile property arrests or violent crime arrests. This will also be 
the case because the morality of drug crimes is not as explicit as that of violent, 
property, or gun crimes. This ambiguous morality will carry an equivocal 
meaning for the police mandate that will require PSA’s to consider the behavior 
of their neighbors for insight on how to treat such crimes.  
These hypotheses are now tested. The Moran’s I for juvenile drug crime 
arrests is statistically significant at p < 0.001, with a value of 0.311. This supports 
the pattern displayed in figure 5. Combined, the map and Moran’s I suggest the 
presence of spatial dependence: juvenile drug crime arrests in one PSA are 
affecting the number of property crime arrests in neighboring PSA’s. In addition, 
this effect is exerted centrifugally, waning with distance. Thus far, there is 
evidence in support of hypothesis 1. 
To create a baseline, the regression model for juvenile drug arrests is 
presented in Table 14. This model includes the district dummies as a test of work 
group norms, district-specific policies, and potential police presence. As already 
discussed, districts are highly collinear with the total black population, and were 
therefore not included in the violent and property crime arrest models. For this 
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model, however, VIF’s did not rise above 6.443 for any variable12. Districts were 
therefore retained (no threat to power was noticed, remaining near 0.80). 
The negative binomial model suggests several interesting relationships. As 
expected, reported crime is significant at p < 0.05, with a coefficient of 0.71 (odds 
ratio of 2.04).  Structural disadvantage, however, is not significant, and neither is 
total black population. It is likely that their effect is being swallowed up by the 
variation from the district dummy variables. Population mobility is significant (b 
= 0.85, p < 0.01, odds ratio = 2.34). The sign of population mobility is in a rather  
unexpected direction. This is discussed in detail below. In addition, districts 2 and 
3 (in the northwest, b = -4.38 and -2.28, respectively) are each statistically 
different from district 7 (in the south). It is possible that whatever spatial 
processes are occurring are doing so at the district level. 
Next, we introduce the lag term into the model
13
. In the spatial model 
(Table 15, below), the lag term is represented by the Greek letter rho. Despite the 
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 According to Kennedy (2008), VIF’s in excess of 10 when using standardized variables require 
attention to multicollinearity.  
13
 Thus far, we have employed negative-binomial models with a lag term based on the fitted 
values from a first-order count model. This is due in part to the nature of the data, and in part to 
the nature of the spatial lag term itself. First, the data are non-normally distributed with an over-
dispersed Poisson distribution. This includes some zeros. Negative-binomial models are designed 
to handle this type of distribution without transforming in the dependent variable (Long, 1997). 
Second, regarding the lag term, it is a product based on the dependent variable, thus creating a 
problem for model behavior when entered into a regression equation. The spatial lag model 
suggested by Anselin (2007) inherently handles the endogeneity problem of introducing a lag term 
based on the dependent variable. To date, no such formula exists for the generalized linear model. 
Rather, researchers use the cross-product of a weights matrix and a first-order model’s fitted 
values to estimate a spatial lag term that can then be used in the regression equation (Kubrin, 
2003; Kane, Gustafson, & Bruell, 2011; Nielson, et al., 2009). For juvenile drug arrests, all models 
after the first order count model are linear, converting the dependent variable into a naturally 
logged rate. This decision was made for the following reason: the count model with the spatial lag, 
the LISA dummy, and the interaction term behaved exactly as the previous models with one 
important exception: the standard errors for a number of predictors exceeded the coefficient values 
by an exceptional amount. By itself, this pattern is not necessarily remarkable (some of the 
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Moran’s I value, a Breusch-Pagan test indicated no heteroskedacticity (10.2933, p 
= 0.4151). LeGrange multipliers also did not suggest that an error model or spatial 
model would be necessary to accommodate for heteroskedacticity. (Spatial lag 
test = 0.7308, p = 0.39; spatial error test = 0.008, p = 0.93. There were no changes 
from these tests to the robust lag and error tests, except a reduction in p values.)  
As can be seen, this model behaves very similarly to the previous count model: 
total crime reported (b = 0.50) and population mobility (b = 0.68) remain 
statistically significant, as do districts 2 and 3. Districts 1 and 4 also reach 
significance in this model, after introducing the lag term, rho. Rho itself is not 
statistically significant; although the coefficient sign is negative, its effective 
value is 0. It does not, therefore, appear that the arresting behavior for juvenile 
                                                                                                                                     
coefficients in the models for the other criteria also have standard errors as much as twice as large 
as the coefficient itself – these are isolated, however, and did not reach the magnitude seen in this 
model). This pattern was seen throughout the juvenile drug arrest model and for the majority of 
non-significant variables. For example:  
 
  b SE 
Structural disadvantage 0.04 0.24 
District 5 -0.05 0.55 
District 6 -0.15 0.43 
ρ -0.01 0.05 
LISA 0.20 1.73 
ρ X LISA 0.03 0.15 
 
This is a good indication of poor model fit. To mitigate this, a number of different variable 
transformations were tried. In each case, either model fit was unmitigated or decreased, standard 
errors increased, or, just as often, models failed to converge. Therefore, the linear model provided 
by Anselin (2007) via the command lagsarlm in the R package spdep was used. In many ways, 
this was preferable to the count models, insofar as the lag term was now based not on predicted 
values, but on actual values, thus minimizing model error. Importantly, a first-order OLS model 
(that is, without the lag terms) returned results comparable to the negative-binomial model 
reported above (see Table 4A in Appendix). In addition, linear models are more robust than count 
models. There is no reason, therefore, to suspect that linear spatial models reported here are in 
anyway different from a hypothetical count model.  
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Table 14. Count model for drug related crime.  
 
 
b SE t p 
Crime reported
†
 0.71 0.24 2.96 0.00 
Structural disadvantage 0.06 0.24 0.27 0.79 
Population mobility 0.85 0.29 2.89 0.00 
Black population
† 
 0.53 0.56 0.94 0.35 
District 1
††
 -0.55 0.50 -1.11 0.27 
District 2 -4.38 1.67 -2.62 0.01 
District 3 -2.28 0.79 -2.88 0.00 
District 4 -1.05 0.55 -1.91 0.06 
District 5 0.22 0.51 0.43 0.67 
District 6 0.10 0.39 0.27 0.79 
Constant -5.44 3.78 -1.44 0.15 
AIC = 248.39, -2LL = 224.387, dispersion parameter = 2.783 (p < 
0.01)  
†Natural log was used.  
    
†† Referent group = district 7 
   drug crimes from nearby PSA’s affect any given PSA’s own juvenile arresting 
behavior. Rather, it appears to be a conflux of reported crime, population 
mobility, and district-effects, which may represent police presence, work-group 
norms, and district policies.  
This evidence appears to disconfirm hypothesis 1. PSA’s do not, 
generally, appear to be influencing each other’s arresting behavior, and PSA’s do 
not appear to be influencing each other’s juvenile drug crime arresting behavior. 
Again, the effect appears to be null. This is discussed further below. 
Now, we explore the second hypothesis for juvenile drug crime arrests:  
2. The existence of sovereign precincts should be empirically observable. 
Again, for crimes with more discretion, we should see more of a sovereign 
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effect insofar as the spatial dependency suggested in hypothesis 1 will have its 
effect ultimately through sovereign precincts. 
c. Given the fluid nature of drug crime arrests, sovereigns will have a 
strong effect on juvenile drug crime arrests 
Table 15. Spatial lag model for drug related crime. 
  
 
b SE z p 
Crime reported
†
 0.50 0.20 2.46 0.01 
Structural disadvantage 0.21 0.20 1.05 0.29 
Population mobility 0.68 0.24 2.86 0.00 
Black population
† 
 0.07 0.41 0.16 0.87 
District 1
††
 -1.02 0.46 -2.25 0.02 
District 2 -3.10 1.16 -2.68 0.01 
District 3 -2.18 0.68 -3.21 0.00 
District 4 -1.18 0.48 -2.43 0.02 
District 5 0.28 0.48 0.57 0.57 
District 6 -0.06 0.38 -0.16 0.87 
ρ -0.18 0.16 -1.18 0.24 
Constant -0.63 2.76 -0.23 0.82 
AIC = 113.34, -2LL = 87.332 
   
†Natural log was used.  
    
†† Referent group = district 7 
   Although the general, global institutional environment does not seem to 
matter for juvenile drug crime arrests, it is possible that sovereigns may be 
mediating this relationship. To this end, we run another count model, interacting 
the presence of LISA’s as sovereigns with the spatial lag term. First, testing for 
LISA clusters (Figure 10, and see Table 5A in the Appendix) suggests PSA’s 602 
and 601 create a HH cluster in east D.C., along with PSA 504 (which extends 
outward from the National Arboretum into Galladuet, Trinidad, and Ivy City). 
This is our first indication of an arrest pattern superseding districts, and thus gives 
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us the strongest evidence yet of sovereign effects at the PSA level. PSA 208 
(around Dupont Circle) is also a LL cluster in the northeast of the District. 
There is potential, therefore, for localized spatial effects, that is, for 
sovereign effects. Table 16 explores this in a multivariate count model, where the 
lag term is interacted with a dummy variable, where 1 = a sovereign cluster. This 
model behaviors similarly to the previous model: total crime reported (b = 0.62) 
and population mobility (b = 0.65) remain statistically significant with 
comparable b values. In addition, districts 1 through 4 remain statistically 
significant. However, the magnitude of the coefficients for district 2 is reduced 
considerably, from -3.10 to -2.10. This is important, because it means that spatial 
processes are eating away at the variation otherwise observed in a specific district. 
Most importantly, rho, the LISA dummy variable, and the interaction term of rho 
X LISA dummy are each statistically significant.  
Interpreting spatial lag terms beyond direction and magnitude is not a 
straight forward process (Ward & Gleditsch, 2002). No less in the current 
regression model. Both rho and the LISA dummy are negative, suggesting that a) 
any given PSA’s juvenile drug arresting behavior is inverse that of its neighbors; 
and b) being a LISA PSA, which I understand to be a sovereign PSA, means that 
your juvenile drug crime arresting behavior is less than all other PSA’s. There are 
two processes at work here. First, in regards to the LISA dummy, this coefficient 
is being driven by PSA 208, a Low-low sovereign located in the northwest of 
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D.C. (this is also why district 2’s coefficient is diminished, as PSA 208 is located 
in district 2)
14
. Second, in regards to the spatial lag term, a similar process is 
Figure 10. 
 
occurring. By way of example: referring back to the map of 2008 juvenile drug 
crime (Figure 5), PSA 208 is abutted by PSA 101, which, in 2008 totaled 14 
juvenile drug crime arrests, which is almost two standard deviations above PSA 
                                                 
14
 In 2008, there were 0 juvenile drug crime arrests, compared to PSA’s 602 (30), 601 (12), and 
504 (27). When naturally logged, PSA 208 remains at 0, while the other PSA’s change, 
respectively, to 3.43, 2.56, and 3.33. 
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208. Similarly, PSA 504, part of the High-high sovereign, abuts PSA 102, which, 
in 2008, totaled 0 drug arrests as well, compared to PSA 504’s 27.   
Table 16. LISA model for drug related crime.  
 
 
b SE z p 
Crime reported
†
 0.62 0.20 3.15 0.00 
Structural disadvantage 0.07 0.19 0.39 0.70 
Population mobility 0.65 0.22 2.90 0.00 
Black population
† 
 0.41 0.40 1.02 0.31 
District 1
††
 -1.08 0.41 -2.61 0.01 
District 2 -2.43 1.12 -2.17 0.03 
District 3 -2.10 0.62 -3.38 0.00 
District 4 -1.35 0.44 -3.06 0.00 
District 5 0.03 0.45 0.06 0.95 
District 6 -0.45 0.38 -1.20 0.23 
ρ -0.30 0.15 -1.98 0.05 
LISA -3.09 1.35 -2.29 0.02 
ρ X LISA 1.47 0.53 2.75 0.01 
Constant -3.43 2.91 -1.18 0.24 
AIC =  109.58, -2LL = 79.584 
   
†Natural log was used.  
    
†† Referent group = district 7 
   It is for these reasons that the coefficients are negative. Rho is a 
measurement of global spatial dependence. As with all omnibus tests, it is 
affected by outliers. In such situations, analysts will often remove outliers so that 
their data behave better. This presents a potential quandary for the current study: 
Because we are interested in sovereigns, we actually want outliers. As 
demonstrated in the above comments, a handful of outliers are pushing this effect 
(PSA’s 208 and 504, for example). This can therefore be understood as a 
statistical artifact.  What is important is how they behave when interacted with 
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one another. (It is also interesting to note that the lag term only reaches 
significance when the LISA dummies and the interaction term are introduced.) By 
interacting rho with the LISA dummies, we are no longer using an omnibus test; 
instead, we are partialing out the effects of the outliers on their own terms. The 
process is similar (analogously and mathematically) to running an ANOVA 
followed by post-hoc Bonferonni tests of multiple comparisons. ANOVA, as an 
omnibus test, tells us if the variation between groups is due to the random 
variation within groups or to the explicable variation between groups. It cannot, 
however, indicate which groups differ from which. Bonferonni tests do. Spatial 
lags (rho), for all intents and purposes, act like our omnibus ANOVA. By 
interacting it with LISA dummies – which are, after all, spatial outliers – we 
partial out the spatial effects of rho according to its geographic location, in a 
process like our post-hoc Bonferonni tests.   
Interaction terms express the explanatory capacity of two events co-
occurring. In probability, this is expressed as a product, or the joint-probability of 
two events. The interaction term of rho X LISA dummy can therefore be 
understood as the effect of the spatial lag as exerted through the dummy variables. 
Stated in terms of the current theoretical framework: the interaction term 
represents the effect of sovereigns on the institutional environment. The 
coefficient is significant (p < 0.05), and equals 1.47. Converted to an odds ratio, 
this is 4.35 – second only to being part of district 2 or district 3 in terms of 
predictive capacity. This coefficient can be understood to say that the sovereign 
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PSA’s are influencing juvenile drug arrests: Being a sovereign PSA means that 
your juvenile drug arresting behavior is influencing other PSA’s juvenile drug 
arresting behavior. Because our lag term is based on the inverse Euclidean 
distance, this influence extends outwardly, diminishing centrifugally. This finding 
is also supported both by the choropleth map for juvenile drug arrests and for its 
LISA map (see Figures and 10).  
Thus presented, this model suggests that traditional ecological processes 
are occurring in the prediction of drug arrests when controlling for spatial 
processes, as well as important district effects, which may include police presence 
and district policies. Additionally, the final model suggests that the spatial 
dependence is expressed through these LISA clusters. In terms of the study: 
juvenile drug arrests are susceptible to the isomorphic pressures or influence from 
sovereign PSA’s, net of controls. From this, we conclude that hypothesis 2 is 
supported.  
Analysis and Discussion. Thus far, the juvenile drug arrest models stand 
out as the only models where spatial dependence remained apparent once entered 
into a regression equation. What is more, spatial dependence ultimately had its 
effects not globally, but locally via sovereign PSA’s. By themselves, neither the 
sovereign LISA’s nor the rho were statistically significant. Whereas for other 
criteria the sovereign effect was swept away by the presence of ecological and 
threat variables, for drug arrests the sovereign effect remained strong. This 
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finding was anticipated due in part due to the amount of discretion associated with 
drug arrests. There is yet, perhaps, more to the explanation.  
First, different approaches are taken in different areas and according to 
different drugs. This is particularly the case for how drugs are trafficked and sold. 
For drugs that are sold indoors, police are less likely to have the opportunity to 
make arrests. PSA’s that are characterized by drug sales that take place primarily 
out of doors may behave differently insofar as police will have different 
surveillance techniques and arrest opportunities (Walker & Katz, 2008; Eck, 
1994).  When it is unclear how to treat some drug offenses, yet clear for other 
drug offenses, there may be sovereign effects for one, but not the other. This is 
especially the case if certain drugs rise to the attention of commanding officers 
during COMPSTAT. Because MPD does not disaggregate their public data by 
drug type, this may be confounding any sovereign relationship for specific types 
of drugs. Another confounding effect may have to do with shifting drug markets 
(Walker & Katz, 2008). If this was the case, then “sovereignty” may have more to 
do with where the crime is at, rather than how the crime is dealt with. On the other 
hand, from an ecological perspective, we would expect areas characterized by 
traditional police activity – such as high crime, including drug crime – to be 
considered sovereigns insofar as other officers will look towards these areas as 
chances to do “real” police work.  
Second, the “war on drugs” is relatively new - unlike other, more 
traditional crimes, such as homicide and robbery, which have been a consistent 
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concern of society for thousands of years (Walker, 2012). It is perhaps for this 
reason that the morality of using drugs is more ambiguous than, say, robbing 
someone. Depending on the audience, the officer, the drug, and the circumstances, 
substance possession may be construed as a mala prohibita offense or a mala in 
se offense. The implication for the police mandate, therefore, is potentially 
unclear: is enforcing drug laws part of capturing the bad guy and protecting the 
innocent? In some cases, the answer is most likely yes, particularly when drug 
dealers are perceived as taking over a neighborhood and corrupting younger kids. 
In other situations, such as the college student smoking marijuana, the connection 
to the police mandate may be less than clear. The meaning of drug possession and 
use for the police mandate may be further confounded when high-level and 
popular politicians, such as Marion Barry, Jr., current member of the D.C. 
Council for the 8th Ward, and the second and fourth mayor of the District of 
Columbia, are publicly known for hard drug use (Kappeler, Sluder, & Alpert, 
1998).  
With such an equivocal message concerning how to treat drug crimes, 
PSA’s may not know how to respond to such crimes on a consistent basis, yet 
understand that they must respond if they are to maintain legitimacy. This is 
especially true for D.C., which, particularly throughout the 1990s, has had a 
history of narcotics trafficking recognized as a public problem (Kappeler, Sluder, 
& Alpert, 1998). It is here where the institutional environment may step in and 
have an effect. Recall that whenever a mandate is ambiguous or unobtainable via 
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rational mechanisms, an organization’s legitimacy is threatened. In the case of 
drug arrests, the MPD may be faced with both scenarios. On the one hand, the war 
on drugs is, as with all wars against crime, “the wrong way to fight crime” 
(Walker, 2012, p. 20). As Walker also stated, “traditional police crackdowns will 
not reduce illegal drug use or serious crime associated with drugs” (p. 313). There 
is ambiguous evidence that police have any immediate, direct, or lasting impact 
on drug possession when left to their own devices (Walker, 2012; Lynch, et al. 
2002). If legitimacy is garnered through the connection of what police do and the 
outcome of their actions, then the legitimacy of the MPD is in jeopardy when it 
comes to drug enforcement.  
On the other hand, there is wide variation in how police officers treat drug 
arrests (Lynch, et al. 2002):  
Drug arrests involve the greatest amount of police discretion because 
much of drug enforcement is not directly activated by citizen complaint 
the way violence is.  Police target drug dealers and drug users and 
additional targets by putting pressure on the suspects in hand. Citizens 
have much less control over the invocation of coercion for drugs than they 
do for violence (p. 13).  
 
Certainly, as the statutory or perceived seriousness of the drug in question 
increases, or the scope of the problem increases, discretion is likely to be diluted. 
As with most crimes, however, so too with drug offenses: the majority of 
possession charges are minor in nature and scope (Walker, 2012). Further, one 
reason so many of the interdiction and eradication efforts are “doomed to fail” is 
because the “20,000-mile border of the United States is too great, the possible 
methods of smuggling drugs too many, and the people engaged in the trade too 
   133 
numerous” (Walker, 2012, p. 314). Stated otherwise, the “drug problem” in the 
United States is, itself, nebulous: at once localized, common, yet benign, and at 
the same time national, overwhelming, and frightening in its association with 
drug-cartels and violent crime. It presents law enforcement officers with an 
especially “gray-area” problem that traditional police actions have done little to 
solve. Again, this puts the legitimacy of the MPD in jeopardy. 
Searching for any clue on how to treat drug arrests, PSA’s may look 
towards their institutional environment. The results found in Table 16 indicate 
that crime reports, social ecological variables, and minority threat concepts are all 
at work in explaining drug arresting behavior, particularly population mobility. 
(This latter finding may be explained in terms of the minority threat hypothesis 
and the Latino community, and is taken up below.) Above and beyond these 
findings, however, is the indication that the global, institutional environment is 
following the patterns exhibited by four sovereigns: PSA’s 208, 504, 601, and 
602. There are several things that stand out concerning these PSA’s. First, 
although PSA 208 is a low low, while PSA’s 504, 601, and 602 are high high 
LISA’s, they are each positive in the direction of association. That is, they are 
unduly influential in the classical correlative sense of positive, where, as juvenile 
drug arrests move in one direction in each LISA, their neighbors move in that 
same direction. From our theoretical framework, this is what was expected. If low 
high or high low PSA’s were to be found, it was to be assumed that they were 
either waning sovereigns, or sovereigns in embryos. No such sovereigns were 
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found in the current study. Given the centrifugal behavior of juvenile drug arrests 
(see Figure 5), this pattern of positive association for each LISA will continue in 
an outward, concentric pattern.  
Second, PSA’s 504, 601, and 602 abut one another. In a sense, then, they 
form a single sovereign in the institutional environment for the MPD. This 
explanation is particularly compelling and suggestive of the internal validity of 
the theoretical model because these three PSA’s span two districts: 5 and 6. If 
PSA LISA’s were fully concentrated in districts, the explanation that similitude in 
behavior is due to district allocation would be more likely than institutional 
sovereigns. This is, however, not the case in the current study. Rather, there is 
evidence that sovereignty surpasses district norms, policies, and practices. Indeed, 
once identified as a sovereign, and introduced into the regression equation, PSA 
208 reduced the effect of district 2. Furthermore, as indicated by Table 16, the 
sovereign effects remained even though several district dummy variables were 
significantly different than the referent variable, including district 2, but not 
including district 5 or 6 – of which PSA’s 504, 601, and 602 are a part. These 
findings are further bolstered by chi-square results (found in Table 6A in the 
Appendix), which tests if LISA location and district are associated. Except for 
district 2, there is no indication that there is an association between MPD districts 
and PSA LISA’s, and it is noteworthy that only one PSA in district 2 is a 
sovereign LISA.  Taken together, the analyses for juvenile drug crime arrests 
support the current theoretical framework: when the police mandate is ambiguous, 
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and when traditional police activity does not result in the mandate’s achievement, 
police may look towards institutional sovereigns for cues on how to behave.  
Conversations with the MPD also highlighted why these PSA’s may stand 
out as important when it comes to juvenile drug arrests. First, there is a possibility 
that the effect of PSA 504 is a social artifact. The juvenile processing center is 
located in this PSA, and it is often the case that, for custody orders, police indicate 
the juvenile processing center’s address as the location of arrest. However, out of 
104 juvenile arrests in PSA 504 in 2008, the most arrests that were at the same 
address across different days was 23. It is unlikely, therefore, that this LISA effect 
is a social artifact. More likely, it has something to do with the focus police have 
in this and the other two PSA’s (601 and 602). For example, it was pointed out 
that Benning Road runs along the south border of 504, along which a number of 
public housing projects are located. As one MPD representative put it, it “comes 
up in a lot of conversations.”  
Indeed, for both PSA 504 and PSA’s 601 and 602, public housing “came 
up a lot.” Particularly in district 6, “crews” in public housing were perceived as a 
problem. Crews are distinct from gangs. As explained to me by representatives of 
the MPD, gangs can be understood as essentially hierarchical in their 
organization, and are therefore “easier” (per se) to deal with than crews, which 
are organized more laterally. Crews, essentially, are quasi-organized groups of 
juveniles who engage in delinquent activities. In the high-rise and public housing 
neighborhoods located in PSA’s 601 and 602, crews are seen as a particular 
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challenge to law enforcement. It makes sense, then, that these PSA’s would show 
up as sovereigns because of the drug-associated behavior of crews and gangs in 
general. Because these PSA’s (504, 601, and 602) represent archetypical drug 
areas, police in surrounding PSA’s may look towards them to get a handle on how 
to best deal with their own juvenile drug incidents.  
PSA 208, on the other hand, was found to be a low-low sovereign PSA, 
meaning that not only was it statistically below the mean of juvenile arrests, but it 
unduly influenced its neighbors (again, recalling that “neighborliness” is 
measured in terms of distance, not adjacency). This area encompasses Dupont 
Circle. Dupont Circle is important insofar as it has been at the center of 
revitalization for the past 15 or so years, and has experienced incredible turn over 
in terms both of population and business. Whereas the southeast of D.C. can be 
characterized in terms of family units – and therefore, a larger juvenile population 
-, the northwest, and particularly the areas surrounding Dupont Circle and Adams 
Morgan, is characterized by “young, upwardly mobile professionals.” There is, as 
one MPD representative continued, “an absence of a juvenile population” with 
which to occupy the police. The numbers bear this out, and suggest that the police 
in PSA’s neighboring PSA 208, when faced with the prospect of a juvenile drug 
arrest, may look towards this area of revitalization to know how best to behave. 
This may be the case because of how rare the crime actually may be in the 
northeast: by virtue of how uncommon it is, police may not have a standard 
“going rate” (Walker, 2012) for juvenile drug offenses. This is no surprise, as the 
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frequency table demonstrates 0 cells for all of district 2. It is meaningful, 
however, that only PSA 208 was pinpointed as a sovereign. This suggests that 
there is some social process at work in PSA 208 such that it in impacting the 
arresting behavior of its neighbors, even those with (low) arrest numbers, such as 
can be found in district 3.  
Juvenile Gun Crime Arrests  
Hypothesis 1a states:  
1. Net of controls, the juvenile arresting behavior of police in any given PSA 
will be influenced by the juvenile arresting behavior of neighboring PSA’s in a 
centrifugal pattern. This pattern will be strongest for crimes that allow for more 
discrimination 
c. Juvenile gun crime arrests will also be prone to isomorphic 
influences; however, it is noted that this research took place during District of 
Columbia v. Heller (2008). Because of this circumstance, juvenile gun crime 
arresting behavior will exhibit more spatial stability than juvenile drug crime 
arrests because of the political climate. This is to say that, because of the 
Supreme Court’s finding in DC v. Heller, we should expect to see similar 
behavior in terms of juvenile gun crime arrests across the District.  
This hypothesis is now tested. The Moran’s I for juvenile gun crime arrests 
is statistically significant at p < 0.001, with a value of 0.353. This supports the 
pattern displayed in Figure 6. Combined, the map and Moran’s I suggest the 
presence of spatial dependence: juvenile gun crime arrests in one PSA are 
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affecting the number of gun crime arrests in neighboring PSA’s. In addition, this 
effect is exerted centrifugally, waning with distance. Thus far, there is evidence in 
support of hypothesis 1.  
To create a baseline, the regression model for juvenile drug arrests is 
presented in Table 17. Unlike the other models, the dependent variable was not 
overdispersed for juvenile gun crime arrests (dispersion parameter = 13, standard 
error = 10.5, p > 0.05). As such, a count model with a Poisson distribution was 
used. This model includes the district dummies as a test of work group norms, 
district-specific policies, and potential police presence. As already discussed, 
districts are highly collinear with the total black population. For this model, 
however, VIF’s did not rise above 6.10 for any variable. Districts were therefore 
retained (no threat to power was noticed, remaining near 0.80). This model is 
presented in Table 17. 
The count model indicates that total crime reported (b = 1.08), population 
mobility (b = 0.67), and total black population (b = 1.11) are all statistically 
significant at p < 0.05. The odds ratio for black population is a particularly 
compelling quotient at 3.021, suggesting that police juvenile arrests for gun 
related crimes are especially pronounced in PSA’s with large black populations. 
Also of note is that every district is statistically significantly different from district 
7: all coefficients are negative, which indicates that, as noted, district 7 is a hot-
bed of arrests in general, and especially of gun related juvenile crimes. But this 
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finding also indicates a general district effect across D.C. when it comes to 
juvenile gun crimes.  
Table 17. Count model for gun related crime.  
 
 
b SE z p 
Crime reported
†
 1.08 0.15 7.35 0.00 
Structural disadvantage -0.09 0.16 -0.58 0.56 
Population mobility 0.67 0.20 3.26 0.00 
Black population
† 
 1.11 0.47 2.34 0.02 
District 1
††
 -1.32 0.30 -4.46 0.00 
District 2 -2.74 1.20 -2.28 0.02 
District 3 -2.01 0.49 -4.12 0.00 
District 4 -1.52 0.37 -4.07 0.00 
District 5 -0.53 0.28 -1.93 0.05 
District 6 -0.56 0.21 -2.66 0.01 
Constant -11.78 3.17 -3.72 0.00 
AIC = 194.05 
    
†Natural log was used.  
    
†† Referent group = district 7 
   Next, we introduce a lag term into the model. A LeGrange multiplier test 
suggests that this may not, however, be necessary, at least for controlling spatial 
autocorrelation. For juvenile gun crime arrests, the LeGrange multiplier tests did 
not indicate the need to include a spatial lag term in the regression model: neither 
the LeGrange multiplier test for the lag nor for the error models suggested this 
need (0.001 at p = 0.978 and 0.384 at p = 0.536, respectively). This is not 
surprising, as a Breusch-Pagan test suggested that heteroskedacity was not a 
problem (BP = 17.275, p = 0.069 – although this approaches the conventional 
alpha level of 0.05). The robust versions of the LeGrange tests were no different 
(robust lag model: 0.356, p = 0.551; robust error model: 0.739, p = 0.390).The 
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count model, with a lag term, is presented in Table 18. The lag term is denoted 
with the Greek letter rho.  
Table 18. Count model for gun related crime with lag 
 
 
b SE z p 
Crime reported
†
 1.03 0.15 7.07 0.00 
Structural disadvantage -0.08 0.16 -0.52 0.60 
Population mobility 0.81 0.21 3.92 0.00 
Black population
† 
 1.15 0.48 2.42 0.02 
District 1
††
 -0.93 0.35 -2.68 0.01 
District 2 -2.33 1.21 -1.92 0.05 
District 3 -1.89 0.49 -3.85 0.00 
District 4 -1.13 0.42 -2.70 0.01 
District 5 -0.11 0.33 -0.34 0.74 
District 6 -0.25 0.25 -0.99 0.32 
ρ 0.07 0.03 2.22 0.03 
Constant -12.39 3.22 -3.85 0.00 
AIC = 191.36 
    
†Natural log was used.  
    
†† Referent group = district 7 
    
Comparing this model with the previous count model, there are several 
important coefficient behavioral patterns to note. First, the fit of the model 
remains basically on par with the previous model (from an AIC of 194.05 to 
191.36). Similarly, total crime reported (b = 1.03), population mobility (b = 0.81), 
and the total black population (b = 1.15) remain statistically significant and their 
effect sizes are not appreciably changed. Districts 5 and 6, however, drop from 
significance. Most importantly, rho is statistically significant at p < 0.05. The 
effect size, however, is quite nominal, at b = 0.07 and an odds ratio of 1.07. For 
juvenile drug crime arrests, therefore, neighboring PSA’s do appear, statistically, 
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to be influencing the behavior of one another. The size of this effect, however, is 
not impressive. 
These findings partially support hypothesis 1. Net of controls, PSA’s do 
seem to be influencing the juvenile drug arresting behavior of their neighbors. 
This relationship, however, is weak – indeed, almost too weak to definitively aver 
a substantively important relationship. This is discussed further below. Now, we 
explore the second hypothesis for juvenile drug arrests:  
2. The existence of sovereign precincts should be empirically observable. 
Again, for crimes with more discretion, we should see more of a sovereign 
effect insofar as the spatial dependency suggested in hypothesis 1 will 
have its effect ultimately through sovereign precincts.  
d. Sovereign effects may be noticeable for juvenile gun crime arrests, 
but ultimately, it will be a concerted agency-wide effect that we 
will witness, owing to the nature of the Heller case. 
Although the general, global institutional environment does not seem to 
matter for juvenile gun crime arrests substantively, it is possible that sovereigns 
may be mediating this relationship, as we saw with juvenile drug crime arrests. To 
this end, we run another count model, interacting the presence of LISA’s as 
sovereigns with the spatial lag term. First, testing for LISA clusters (Figure 11, 
and see Table 7A in the appendix) suggests PSA’s 705, 706, and 703 compose 
High-high cluster in the southwest – similar to the neighborhoods discussed in the 
previous models. 
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 There is potential, therefore, for localized spatial effects, that is, for 
sovereign effects. Table 19 explores this in a multivariate count model, where the 
lag term is interacted with a dummy variable, where 1 = a sovereign cluster. 
Figure 11. 
 
As can be seen in Table 19, this model does not behave much differently than 
previously models: crime reported (b = 1.03), population mobility (b = 0.77), and 
total black population (b = 1.14) remain statistically significant, as do districts 1 
through 4. While districts 5 and 6 again fail to reach significance, it is important 
that all coefficients have a less likelihood than district 7 of seeing police presence 
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in regards to juvenile gun arrests. Rho drops from significance, and neither the 
LISA dummies nor the interaction term reach significance. In short, the 
hypothesis is ultimately disconfirmed: it does not appear that sovereigns have an 
effect on the institutional environment when it comes to juvenile gun crimes. 
Rather, it appears that ecological and district-related effects are at work for this 
dependent variable.  
Analysis and Discussion. The models for juvenile gun arrests are some of 
the most unique across the dependent variables, insofar as there were clear district 
effects across all districts. In addition, all district coefficients were negative, 
suggesting that district 7 was a hot-bed of gun activity. Also interesting was that a 
Poisson distribution was necessary for model fit: in other words, the data were too 
skew to use a linear model without transformation, yet not skewed enough to 
employ a negative-binomial distribution.   
As with the violent and property arrests, neither a lag model nor a LISA 
model was necessary to fit the data: sovereign pressures were not apparent, nor 
did isomorphism extend centrifugally according to geographic patterns (although 
statistically significant, the coefficient was too low to be of substantive value). 
Instead, the models indicate an institution-wide effort at juvenile gun arrests as 
suggested by the district effects. Additionally, these effects were strongly seen 
where population mobility was high, a variable highly correlated with the Latino 
population. This speaks most directly to the minority threat hypothesis: insofar as 
the traditionally White, affluent diplomats and government workers in the 
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northwest are concerned with the encroachment of Latinos (Kane, Gustafson, & 
Bruell, 2011), they may take actions to influence the police in focusing on crimes 
that are particularly frightening. In the United States, this is especially the case 
with gun crimes, which are so often tied to fatalities (Zimring & Hawkins, 1997).  
Table 19. Count model for gun related crime with LISA 
dummies 
 
 
b SE z p 
Crime reported
†
 1.03 0.18 5.84 0.00 
Structural disadvantage -0.11 0.17 -0.62 0.53 
Population mobility 0.77 0.22 3.42 0.00 
Black population
† 
 1.14 0.48 2.37 0.02 
District 1
††
 -0.84 0.40 -2.09 0.04 
District 2 -2.24 1.26 -1.78 0.07 
District 3 -1.77 0.57 -3.11 0.00 
District 4 -1.06 0.45 -2.36 0.02 
District 5 -0.07 0.39 -0.19 0.85 
District 6 -0.20 0.32 -0.61 0.54 
Ρ 0.08 0.06 1.32 0.19 
LISA 0.39 0.84 0.47 0.64 
ρ X LISA -0.03 0.09 -0.34 0.73 
Constant -12.45 3.20 -3.89 0.00 
AIC = 195.12 
    
†Natural log was used.  
    
†† Referent group = district 7 
   Many arrests for gun crimes are discretionary because they are the result 
of pretextual stops or Terry pats (Roberg, Novak, & Cordner, 2005). This makes 
them ripe for isomorphism, as we see with juvenile drug arrests. The district wide 
effects, however, which sweep out any isomorphism, may be a result of the 
particular political climate of 2008. There were two phenomena in 2008 that may 
help to explain the juvenile gun crime arrest models. First, there was a concerted 
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focus on foot patrol and getting officers in neighborhoods. This was an agency-
wide effort encapsulated in two programs, All Hands on Deck and Full Stride. As 
the 2008 Annual Report indicates (Metropolitan Police Department, 2009): 
The total number of arrests and the total number of arrests for violent 
offenses during All Hands on Deck weekends have consistently and 
substantially increased. Since the start of the Full Stride foot patrol 
program, officers assigned to foot patrol alone, made over 1,000 arrests, 
recovered 22 guns, and distributed over 11,000 PSA flyers and 69,000 Full 
Stride cards. (p. 8) 
 
Second, it was in 2008 that the United States Supreme Court ruled on DC 
v Heller, which, among other things, legalized hand gun possession in the United 
States and interpreted the second amendment to apply to gun ownership without 
regard to a “well organized militia.” This may have created a very tenuous time 
for MPD officers who, as a whole, and with or without agency support or 
direction, may have begun focusing efforts to get guns off of the street as soon as 
possible at the heels of this ruling.    
The politics of a municipality do affect the behavior of the police. This 
was brought to light early in the career of James Q. Wilson (1968) who 
demonstrated that police behave differently according to the political disposition 
of their city. Zhao and Hassell (2005), in a test of Wilson’s hypotheses 30 years 
later, while finding little support for Wilson’s main hypotheses, concluded with 
the following:  
Although we find that Wilson’s measure of local political culture no 
longer impacts police organizational behavior in quite the same way, we 
do not purport that police organizations are fully shielded from local 
politics. A substantial body of research demonstrates the powerful 
relationship between police organizations and their external environment... 
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Police organizations, as institutionalized organizations, must 
accommodate and adapt to the forceful demands of their environment (p. 
426). 
 
This is evidence of isomorphism at a level beyond the PSA and even outside of 
the police department, and therefore beyond the scope of this study. While it is 
speculative at best to suggest that this is more evidence for the current theoretical 
framework, it is at least promising that the results for gun crime make sense in 
light of current research and the political climate of 2008 Washington D.C., and 
that these studies, too, point towards institutional pressures towards conformity in 
proffering potential explanations for these findings. 
Social Ecology and Demographics  
This section discusses hypothesis 3, which states:  
3. The research insists that the ecology of an area is highly influential on 
police arresting behavior, and we see no reason to think that this will not be the 
case in an institutional context. It is very plausible that a PSA’s ecology can 
overwhelm any institutional effects. This is especially true in terms of the 
minority threat hypothesis and its relationship to serious crime. Therefore, all 
arrest dependent variables will exhibit ecological and racial effects which will 
ultimately weaken institutional processes. 
This was certainly the case with the current data. Table 20 summarizes the results 
for all first order count models for the juvenile violent, property, and gun arrest 
outcomes. Structural disadvantage never reached significance in any of the 
models, largely because of its correlation with the total black population or with 
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geographic variables, including the spatial lag term and district dummies. (Indeed, 
the total black population remained statistically significant across each of these 
models. For property arrests, it was necessary to model a quadratic term to 
capture the nonlinear relationship between this variable and total juvenile property 
crime arrests.) Part of the reason is the nature of structural disadvantage in D.C., 
as well. As a representative from the MPD told me, PSA’s in the southeast were 
fairly uniform in structural disadvantage, where “generally, neighborhoods were 
characterized by high crime and structural disadvantage.”  This is especially true 
for the neighborhoods of Anacostia and Washington Heights.  
Table 20. Summary of ecological and demographic variables†. 
   
 
violent (8) property (11) drug (14) gun (17) 
Population mobility - - + + 
Black population + - - + 
Black population
2
 n/a + n/a n/a 
† Numbers in parentheses indicate the associated table. Sign indicates direction 
of coefficient. 
 
Population mobility was significant for both property and gun arrests, and, 
in the presence of multiple predictors, behaved in unanticipated yet explainable 
ways. Recall that Hispanic was not added to the models due to extreme 
multicollinearity with population mobility. Given that both population mobility 
and the Hispanic population are concentrated in the northwest, this is not a 
surprise. In fact, the northwest, in the past decade or so, has seen a shift in 
demographics such that one police officer can note that Columbia Heights used to 
be an African American neighborhood, and is not best portrayed as a Hispanic 
neighborhood. As population mobility is negatively associated with each 
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dependent variable, so too is the Hispanic population (see Table 7 for an 
overview). Additionally, it is correlated with population mobility at 0.740. At the 
PSA and bivariate level, then, Hispanic population does not seem to behave 
according to the threat hypothesis in the same manner as Black population. This 
appears to be at odds with Kane and colleagues (2011), who found that Hispanic 
populations predicted increased misdemeanor arrests in historically white 
neighborhoods in Washington, D. C.  
Yet population mobility behaved very differently when entered into a 
multivariate regression equation with other variables: for property crime arrests, 
the coefficient for population mobility was negative and statistically significant, 
as expected. However, for drug and gun crimes, population mobility was 
significant and non-linearly associated with the criterion. This inherent 
nonlinearity was not necessary to model in the regression equations (that is, for 
the sake of model fit). For the sake of exploration, a model was run where 
Hispanic and Hispanic
2
 were entered into the regression equation in lieu of 
population mobility for drug arrests (again using a negative binomial 
distribution). The results suggested that a higher concentration of Hispanic 
persons in a PSA results in more drug arrests, such that the first order term b = -
2.87 (p = 0.07) and the squared term b = 0.41 (p < 0.05). The same pattern was 
exhibited for gun crimes (bHispanic Population = -4.153, bHispanic Population
2
 = 0.554, both p 
<0.001, using a Poisson distribution). Population mobility, and by extension, 
Hispanic population, behave differently (in terms of drug and gun arrests for 
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juveniles) when considering the entire complex social ecology of D.C. police 
services areas
15
. Additionally, their behavior falls in line with what we should 
expect from a threat perspective.  
From this, it is concluded that hypothesis 3 is supported: the ecology, both 
structural and demographic, of a PSA not only impacts the behavior of the police 
in that PSA, but also impacts the nature of institutional processes. In most cases, it 
appears to overwhelm any spatial (e.g., institutional) processes we observe at the 
bivariate level. Such was the case for three of the four criteria: juvenile violent, 
property, and gun related crime arrests. For juvenile drug arrests, ecological 
variables remain significant and meaningful across all models, and it is only 
through sovereigns that the institutional environment appears to have any effect 
on juvenile drug arrests.  
Summary and Conclusions 
The multivariate models presented in this chapter, along with the bivariate 
correlation table from the preceding chapter, suggested the presence of both 
global institutional effects and more localized sovereign effects. However, the 
multivariate models were more equivocal. The models effectively controlled for 
the most pertinent territorial predictors of aggregate police behavior, including 
ecological variables (structural disadvantage and population mobility), district 
effects (policies and police population), and reported crime. Among these models, 
ecological variables seemed best to explain property and violent crime arrests, and 
                                                 
15
 Population mobility was preferred over Hispanic as a control not to ignore this effect but to 
provide a parsimonious model.  
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district wide policies (and background political exigencies) seemed best poised to 
explain gun crime arrests. For juvenile drug crime arrests, however, there was 
indication of sovereign influence pushing the territorial arresting behavior of the 
police at the PSA level. From these findings, we conclude that there is partial 
support for hypotheses 1 and 2.Violent and property crime arrests do exhibit 
(considerably) less institutional and sovereign effects than drug and gun crime. In 
addition, gun crime arrests display behavior that suggests an organization-wide 
behavior that also takes precedence over isomorphic or sovereign processes. 
Further, there is ample support for hypothesis three: the ecology of a PSA matters 
for predicting police behavior as much as it does at the tract or beat level. 
These findings shed much light on the theoretical outline developed in 
chapter two. First, it indicates that institutional pressures and their effects are 
more nuanced than perhaps anticipated. Again, we fall back on the premise that 
the etiology of police behavior is understatedly complex at all levels of analysis. 
Second, it supports a host of previous research in its efforts to explain police 
behavior. As noted, ecology, demographics, and reported crime continue to 
explain police behavior at aggregate levels. Additionally, the seriousness of the 
crime continues to predict levels of allowable discretion. Third, while equivocal, 
we can nonetheless conclude, confident in our models’ behavior, that the 
methodological/theoretical framework guiding the current study can successfully 
a) pinpoint sovereigns and b) measure their effect or, in the case of three of the 
four models, non-effect. When spatial dependence is modeled it is no longer 
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noise: it is a measurable phenomenon. Perhaps because of Tobler’s law, this 
phenomenon is typically treated as a given and provided almost no theoretical 
justification. This study asserts that spatial dependence holds theoretical meaning 
for the territorial study of the police: it is, in part, the institutional effect of 
sovereigns on other areal policing units. To the degree that we can pinpoint the 
origin of its effects (ie., sovereigns), we are in a better position for effecting 
organization-wide change (this is developed fully in chapter 6).   
 These findings, of course, beg the question, what makes a sovereign a 
sovereign? The short answer to this is any PSA perceived as legitimately 
accomplishing the police mandate becomes a sovereign. This explanation, 
however, is somewhat loaded and unsatisfying. What we really want to ask is, 
how do we empirically predict who is a sovereign? That is, how do we predict 
which PSA will show up as High-high or a Low-low LISA cluster?  
Among our dependent variables, juvenile drug arrests indicated the 
potential for sovereign institutional effects.  As a tertiary goal of this dissertation, 
we wanted to understand why these PSA’s are sovereigns. For the sake of 
exploration, we employed logistic regression. The sample size is too small to use 
multinomial logit regression (Fox, 2008), and there are not enough “1” cells to 
use separate logit models for LL and HH sovereigns (assigning 1 to either HH or 
LL). Therefore, we use a logit model were 1 = sovereign and 0 = non-sovereign. 
We increase power by reducing the number of variables used in the model: rather 
than employing all district dummies, we remove them from the model. The 
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negative binomial and LISA regression models have already established that the 
sovereign effects supersede district effects. This is confirmed in Table 6A, which 
suggests that only district 2 has a relationship with the sovereign dummies. This is 
not surprising considering the consistent effect demonstrated by district 2 in the 
correlation tables and those regression models that use the district dummies. The 
results of the logit model are displayed below in Table 21.   
Table 21. Generalized linear model (logit link) for sovereigns 
 
 
b SE z p 
Juvenile drug arrests† 0.77 0.82 0.94 0.35 
Crime reported
†
 1.62 1.24 1.30 0.19 
Structural disadvantage -0.04 0.98 -0.04 0.97 
Population mobility -0.27 0.81 -0.33 0.74 
Black population
† 
 -0.70 1.21 -0.58 0.56 
Constant -10.28 11.01 -0.93 0.35 
AIC = 32.44.  
    †Natural log was used.  
 
    As can be seen, no variables reach significance
16
. Similar results are 
reached if we run a linear model – the economist’s “bivariate regression” model. 
Ordinary least squares is more robust a model than that which uses a logit link. 
Nevertheless, even with the most robust multivariate statistic at our disposal, we 
fail to find any significant relationship between the covariates and being a 
sovereign for juvenile drug arrests. Regarding therefore the question what makes 
a sovereign a sovereign, we can only say not these covariates with these data. We 
                                                 
16
 Juvenile drug arrests and the dependent variable are related: the local Moran’s I that we used to 
create the LISA dummy (described above) is a product of juvenile drug arrests and a weights 
matrix. However, there are enough mathematical steps involved in this process that entering 
juvenile drug arrests in the logit model does not raise endogeneity concerns. 
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can further only provide speculation at this point, based on theory and previous 
research. This topic is more fully revisited in the next and final chapter. 
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Chapter 6 
DISCUSSION 
Introduction  
This chapter has two purposes. First: It presents a more detailed theoretical 
discussion of the findings presented in chapters 4 and 5, building on the limited 
remarks found in those chapters. Second, it presents summary and concluding 
remarks, including theoretical and policy implications, limitations to the research 
design, and ideas for future research. Ultimately, it suggests the following: That 
the theoretical framework outlined in chapter two is supported, but that this 
statement must be qualified. Police PSA’s do behave both territorially and 
according to isomorphic pressures, at least with regard to certain types of 
arresting behavior. Such institutional effects compete with other meso-level 
processes, however, including those associated with the ecology of policing, such 
as structural covariates and variables typically associated with threat theory, and 
the general political climate of Washington, D.C. The study’s theory was not, 
therefore, completely supported. It is, however, a starting point for understanding 
institutional processes empirically, and should be further extended by future 
research. In the end, this study underscores the driving theme behind its research 
questions: The etiology of police behavior is understatedly complex. 
 This study began with two related questions:  
why do police behave in ways that, for all intents and purposes, are 
detached from their goal? 
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why is it that police appear similar, in form and function, despite 
idiosyncratic pressures that may lead to great variations in the ways in which 
they behave?  
The connection between these two questions is explained by way of institutional 
theory: it is impossible (Mandate, 1979) left to their own traditional devices (e.g., 
arrest, see Herbert, 2001) for police to effectively control crime. But being unable 
to achieve one of their mandates threatens their legitimacy; therefore, they look 
towards sovereigns and each other to figure out “what a cop does” and “what a 
cop looks like”. Thus, they appear more similar than different, and engage in 
behavior that is loosely connected (Crank, 2003) to their ultimate goal of crime 
control. Although police can and do have an impact on the crime rate, relying 
solely on arrest is not very effective, if at all effective. To the extent that police 
rely on this form of social control, what they do is detached from what they are 
trying to accomplish, and their legitimacy is threatened.  
 For this study, there was reasonable support for some hypotheses, while 
others were disconfirmed. Juvenile arrests in a PSA were influenced by juvenile 
arrests in other PSA’s, net of controls, but this pattern was specific to a particular 
crime – that is, drug crimes. For violent, property, and gun crimes the spatial 
effects were only apparent at the bivariate level. Ecological variables, such as 
population mobility or race, overwhelmed any spatial effects at the PSA level. 
This finding, in itself, supports the third hypothesis that the ecology of an area is 
highly influential on police behavior, as well as supports a host of literature on 
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both the ecology of policing (Kane, 2002) and the minority threat hypothesis 
(Jacobs & O’Brien, 1998). Finally, when spatial dependence was apparent, the 
second hypothesis was also supported because the influence of spatial processes, 
that is, of isomorphism, was seen via sovereign PSA’s (but again, only for 
juvenile drug arrests). While tentative, this study has succeeded in its two 
overarching goals: providing a theoretical and analytic means of empirically 
pinpointing sovereigns and of observing their effects on the institutional 
environment in policing. 
Limitations 
There are noteworthy limitations to this study. Having only one year of 
usable data limits both external validity and our ability to make causal statements 
with any confidence. Although not ideal, given that one purpose of this study was 
to find a way to empirically observe isomorphism, this limitation is acceptable in 
the current setting. If isomorphism is found, future research can attempt to tease 
out causation with more robust research designs. As with all research involving 
agency data, there is a concern with the accuracy of the reporting process, 
particularly as it relates to reliability (Jacob, 1984). The poor quality of the 2009 
data is witness to this problem. This limitation is associated with one of the most 
pressing disadvantages of the study: the missing data. This topic was already 
discussed in detail above in chapter 4. By way of summary: There are data 
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missing areal identifiers, and three PSA’s that have no arrest reports17. While 
there are ways to interpolate missing spatial data (including entire areal units) 
(Haining, 2003), this was both undesirable and unnecessary in the current study. 
First, it was undesirable because there is no evidence that such data are either 
missing at random or not missing at random. Second, it was unnecessary because 
the influence of the missing PSA’s is observable through their neighbors in the 
form of spatial dependence.  
This situation, too, relates to another limitation: the fact that we are not 
controlling for neighbors outside of Washington, D.C. The District is surrounded 
by Maryland and Virginia. It is at once reasonable and theoretically feasible that 
the greater metropolitan area surrounding Washington D.C. is also having an 
effect on the arresting behavior of the PSA’s which border Maryland and 
Virginia. In some respects, this is compensated for in the same manner as the 
missing PSA’s: although unobserved, their effect is detectable through spatial 
dependence. A similar limitation is that we are only observing and measuring the 
arresting behavior of the MPD. While the MPD accounts for most municipal 
arrests in the District, it is only one of several law enforcement agencies (at both 
the municipal and federal level) responsible for police functions in D.C. Because 
the arresting behavior of these agencies was not controlled for, much of their 
variation will appear in this study’s models or in the form of measurement error 
(for example, in the spatial error model for juvenile violent crime arrests).  
                                                 
17
 In reality, there are only two: in discussion with the research arm of the MPD, it was clear that 
PSA 707, the military base, essentially does not experience arresting behavior at the hands of the 
MPD. 
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One particular concern deals with the PSA’s encompassing the National 
Mall (the National Mall is spread across the first district). The National Mall is 
heavily policed, but particularly by other law enforcement agencies, such as the 
National Park Service and the police attached to the United States Supreme Court. 
If there were no MPD police activity there by design (e.g, not because there was 
no criminal activity but by administrative policy), this would constitute a spatial 
island: an area of null influence that would unduly influence the nature of the 
environment’s spatial dependence. This potential turned out not to be such a 
concern. First, because we employed inverse-distance weights, rather than 
contiguity weights, as the multiplier for our weights matrix, the effect of other 
PSA’s is not influenced by the presence of islands. It is for this reason why the 
relationship between PSA 706 and PSA 104 is not affected by the missing PSA 
707: relationship is based on distance, not adjacency. Second, across all four 
dependent variables, PSA’s in district 1 were represented, including PSA’s 104 
and 101, those most closely aligned with the National Mall. Indeed, one of the 
strongest indicators that the National Mall did not present an analytical problem is 
that, despite district 1 being quite high in total juvenile arrests (particularly PSA 
101 with 742 in 2008), and consistently showing up as a potential LISA in Moran 
scatterplots for the dependent variables (which were not reported; rather, see 
LISA coefficient tables in the Appendix, which are more valid), the LISA 
statistics successfully indicated that, although high in crime and crime arrests, it 
was ultimately not “unduly” influential. This is what we would expect from an 
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organizational perspective: a sense among police officers that the National Mall 
was “different” and deserves its unique “going rate” of crime control (Klinger, 
1997).  
The limitation that demands the most attention from future studies is that 
the processes underlying isomorphism (that is, mimetic, coercive, and normative) 
were not measured. Rather, this study presented spatial dependence as a proxy for 
global institutional effects and local indicators of spatial dependence as proxies 
for sovereign effects. The empirical study of isomorphic processes at the meso-
level of policing, as presented in this dissertation, finds itself in the same position 
as social disorganization prior to Sampson’s (Sampson & Groves, 1989) and 
Bursik’s (Bursik & Grasmick, 1993) pioneering work of the late 1980s and early 
1990s: measuring the antecedent events and the outcome without directly 
observing the intervening processes. Although not ideal, this is acceptable 
because the current study’s purpose was to create both a theoretical and analytical 
framework for pinpointing institutional and sovereign effects in the police 
department empirically. Having accomplished this (at least with regards to 
juvenile drug arrests), the next important step is to find a way to meaningfully 
measure those processes described by the institutional literature as isomorphic.  
A final limitation to consider is the low cell size apparent across PSA’s. 
Referring back to Table 1, for example, the average drug crime arrest per PSA is 
7.77 and the average gun crime arrest is 5.05. In addition, the median for both is 
less than the mean (5 and 3, respectively). The ranges, however, are larger than 
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one might expect given their means: for drug arrests, the range is from 0 to 33, 
while for gun crime arrests, it is from 0 to 26. It is evident from Table 2 that some 
PSA’s are far from these baselines. In terms of the regression models that were 
employed in this study, this does not present an analytical problem. Count models 
are expressly designed to use data with this sort of 0-heavy distribution
18
. For the 
drug arrest lag models, data were induced to normality using accepted methods 
(that is, the natural log) when it became clear that the count models were not 
behaving appropriately. The concern with the low cell-sizes, therefore, is one of 
theory and practicality. In effect, it forces us to ask the question: can we 
reasonably conclude that sovereign effects exist when the phenomena under 
investigation are so scarce?   
The answer to this question is a qualified yes. The qualification comes 
from two sources: the nature of the crime and the nature of sovereigns. Regarding 
the former: it has been put forth in this study that sovereigns will have their 
strongest effect when two moments converge: a high level of discretion in tandem 
with a nebulous goal. As discussed above regarding drug crime, for example, it is 
not always clear how to treat certain drug offenses, considering the political 
climate of D.C. In addition, drug crimes receive more discretion than many other 
crimes. Both criteria are therefore met
19
. Such a situation can also produce wide 
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 It is noted that tests for zero-inflated models (Long, 1997) were also run for all criteria. None of 
the criteria necessitated using a zero-inflated model.   
 
19
 What is more, some drug crimes receive more discretion than others: marijuana, for example, 
can be treated more leniently than methamphetamine. Given the nature of the MPD data, I was 
unable to delineate by drug crime type: these findings encapsulate all drug crimes across the entire 
discretion continuum. This, in and of itself, is a limitation. 
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variation between officers – and consequently between territorial units – in terms 
of arrests. One of the explanations for the distribution for drug crime arrests is 
therefore the nature of the crime itself, which concomitantly lends itself to 
sovereign effects.    
The most compelling qualification has to do with the nature of sovereigns. 
This dissertation is a meso-level study; given these low-cell sizes, however, we 
are approaching individual-level research. Given that so many PSA’s have so few 
arrests, it is possible that the arrests in these PSA’s are being performed by only a 
handful of officers – or, just as reasonably, one officer. The nature of sovereigns 
may be understood not in terms of the PSA, per se, but in terms of individual 
officers who are able to endow their PSA with legitimacy. When neighboring 
PSA’s pick up on this legitimacy, they may instinctively begin copying the 
behavior of that PSA, as well. This theme is discussed in more detail below. For 
the present, it suffices to point out that if this is the case, low cell sizes are no 
longer a significant theoretical problem; rather, they help point us in the direction 
of low-low sovereigns, as much as higher than average cell sizes point us in the 
direction of high-high sovereigns. In addition, it contributes to our overall 
theoretical model by requiring us to consider the individual-level effects of highly 
influential officers.  
Theoretical Implications 
Findings from this study suggest discussion for at least three major 
theoretical areas: the social ecology of policing, the minority threat and policing, 
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and isomorphism and the policing environment. Each of these three areas is 
enlightened (or bolstered) by the introduction of territoriality in the theoretical 
discussion. Recall that territoriality denotes a behavioral organizational 
framework: a police officer’s conception of her job is defined by territorial 
exigencies (Herbert, 1997). How one’s job is understood and carried out is 
organized according to the territory in which one is situated. For the police, 
territory comes with social ecological variables, such as racial make-up and 
population mobility, but is also laden with a political context. As the literal 
manifestation of the state’s function to uphold its part of the social contract 
(Hobbes, 2009), the police are subject to unique political realities. The uniqueness 
of these political realities is to be found in the fact that they are coupled with the 
state-sanctioned capacity to take life (Bittner, 1970). Authors have recognized that 
these realities seep down to the line level and affect the behavior of patrol officers 
(Lipsky, 1980; Rubinstein, 1973; Wilson, 1968). Because police behavior is 
organized within a specific geographic context, this behavior plays out in a 
territorial fashion. While this study is focused on police territoriality and 
isomorphism, it is worthwhile to highlight some of the findings as they touch on 
the relationship between the social ecology of policing and the minority threat. 
The Social Ecology of Policing  
Much has been written and theorized about the social ecology of policing 
(e.g, Kane’s body of work and Klinger’s 1997 article). These articles have laid the 
foundation for understanding the police not only as individual officers working 
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within a bureaucracy, but as a complex collective of “street level bureaucrats” 
(Lipskey, 1980) who must negotiate achieving their mandate with limited 
resources in what amounts to a hostile environment. These contemporary studies 
reflect the findings of Whyte (1943) and Smith (1986) who found that police 
behave differently not only according to the demeanor of the suspect, but also 
according to the make-up of the neighborhood. As Kane (2002) found, the 
ecology of a neighborhood can predict not only licit police behavior, but also 
misconduct. 
The current study replicates these earlier findings, and in doing so adds 
support to their theoretical underpinnings. For example, both juvenile drug arrests 
and juvenile gun crime arrests were predictable from the population mobility of 
the PSA. Not only do these findings corroborate earlier research, but they extend 
the research from the neighborhood, tract-level unit of analysis to the meso-level 
unit of a police organization. Remembering that PSA’s are composed of several 
sections of disparate tracts, it is noteworthy that the social ecology is yet 
predictive of police behavioral outcomes. These findings withstood the 
introduction of spatial lags and district-level variables, indicating a unique process 
at the PSA level. This finding is meaningful because, for all intents and purpose, 
the PSA is the ecological “neighborhood” most pertinent to the police.   
It is interesting that for most of the models, despite exceptional Moran’s I 
coefficients, spatial dependency did not remain significant once entered into the 
regression equation. This does not follow the pattern demonstrated from previous 
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studies (e.g, Kane, 2003). Typically, at the tract level, spatial lags must be 
introduced into the regression model to reduce heteroskedacticity. This was not 
the case for the PSA level. While I will have more to say on this below under 
Isomorphism and policing, for the current topic, the finding that there is little 
spatial dependency for arresting behavior when ecological variables are 
introduced suggests the strength of the ecology in determining police behavior at 
the PSA level – a level analogous to precincts in other large police agencies.  
Moran’s I’s for each dependent variable suggested evidence of spatial 
dependence for both structural disadvantage (0.577, p < 0.001) and population 
mobility (0.758, p < 0.001) that is larger in magnitude than any of the those for 
the dependent variables. As with the earlier models, however, if we entered lag 
terms based on structural disadvantage and population mobility into regression 
models, these lag terms did not reach significance or affect the models, except for 
property crime arrests and for structural disadvantage. Here, the coefficient for 
structural disadvantage was 6.584 (p < 0.01). Considering the earlier maps and 
discussion of structural disadvantage and population mobility, this makes sense. 
Population mobility is almost completely concentrated in the northwestern PSA’s. 
This relates largely to the fluid movement of politically affiliated residents who 
live in this more affluent area of Washington, D. C. Population mobility is simply 
too concentrated to be have a spatial effect on neighboring PSA’s.  
Structural disadvantage, however, is less concentrated. While structural 
disadvantage is certainly focused in the southeast, there is more spatial variation 
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in it than in population mobility. For juvenile property crimes, at least, arresting 
behavior is influenced not only by the ecology of the PSA, but by the ecology of 
neighboring PSA’s. This effect also may have something to do with the 
population make-up of structurally disadvantaged neighborhoods as compared to 
those with high rates of population mobility, a subject taken up in the next 
section.  
In summary, the current study adds its voice to the corpus of research 
indicating that the ecological make-up of the police territory does influence their 
behavior. As this research has suggested, this may be because of a work-group 
impact that determines how police behave in specific neighborhood/PSA settings 
(Klinger, 1997; Phillips & Sobol, 2010; Johnson & Olschansky, 2010; Sobol, 
2010; Jackson & Boyd, 2005) or it may have to do with the collective capacity of 
the PSA citizenry. PSA’s with high population mobility may lack the necessary 
social capital to muster resources against police behavior - either in the form of 
police violence (Kane, 2002, 2003; Jacobs & O’Brien, 1998) or simply intense 
arresting behavior (that is, over-arresting). The fact that ecological variables 
remain significant in these models (as in the models from other studies -  Kane, 
2002, 2003; Jacobs & O’Brien, 1998) indicates that there is more at work here 
than police response to illicit juvenile behavior. 
Minority Threat and Policing  
While detaching minority threat completely from the subject of structural 
disadvantage is unnecessary and ultimately incorrect, it is done so here to 
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highlight the relationship between territorial police behavior at the PSA level, 
minority threat, and police behavior in Washington D.C. It is understood, 
however, that minority threat, and minority communities, are complexly 
associated with crime, arresting behavior, structural disadvantage, and population 
mobility at all levels of aggregation. In this study, the importance of the minority 
threat was seen across all models in one form or another. And as with social 
ecology, this was presaged by previous research.  
To underline the relationship with structural disadvantage, it is noted that 
Kane (2002, 2003) and Jacobs & O’Brien (1998), discussed in the previous 
section, both found important racial effects when it came to police covariates. 
Kane (2003), for example, found that changes in Latino population were related to 
the allocation of police officers over time in New York City, but only up to a 
certain threshold (Kane, 2003). Similarly, Jacobs and O'Brien (1998) found that 
the police killings of Black citizens could be predicted, among other variables, by 
the economic inequality between Whites and Blacks. The minority threat 
hypothesis, at its most essential, explains these patterns in terms of the perceived 
threat by the minority community posed to the majority community, and the use 
the police resources (including behavior) in suppressing this perceived threat 
(Blalock, 1967; Jackson, 1989). As noted by Kane (2003), the “threat” is not 
linear: small minority populations and larger minority populations do not 
necessarily pose a threat. Either they are seen as too insignificant to matter, or 
they are too ensconced in the political and social processes of the community to 
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be construed as a threat. It is, instead, the change that is predictive of threat and a 
concomitant increase in police resources. Stated empirically, the relationship 
between minority populations and police resources may be nonlinear.   
This nonlinear pattern was most pronounced in the property related crime 
arrest models - although there was some indication of a nonlinear relationship 
between Black population and each dependent variable, it was only for property 
arrests that it became necessary to model. Note that the first order coefficient is 
negative, whereas the squared term is positive. Interpreting nonlinear 
relationships imposed on a linear model is inherently difficult. Therefore, figure 
12 displays the relationship between property crimes arrests and the black 
population graphically. As can be seen, the relationship between the Black 
population and juvenile property crime is nonlinear such that there is a threshold 
effect. In other words, at some point, the Black population ceases to be perceived 
as a “threat”, and police activity vis-à-vis juvenile property crimes “winds down” 
accordingly. This is supported by the current body of research on urban minority 
threat (Kane, 2003). 
Recall that total Hispanic population was not added to the models due to 
extreme multicollinearity with population mobility. Given that both population 
mobility and the Hispanic population are concentrated in the northwest, this is not 
a surprise (the correlation coefficient for the Hispanic population with population 
mobility at 0.740). The bivariate association with juvenile arrests appears to be 
negative, however. At the PSA and bivariate level, then, Hispanic population does 
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Figure 12.  
 
not seem to behave according to the threat hypothesis in the same manner as 
Black population. This appears to be at odds with Kane and colleagues (2011), 
who found that Hispanic populations predicted increased misdemeanor arrests in 
historically white neighborhoods in Washington, D. C. Yet population mobility 
behaved very differently when entered into a multivariate regression equation 
with other variables: for drug and gun crime, the coefficient for population 
mobility was positive and statistically significant. As discussed above, this is 
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because of an inherent nonlinearity that, for the sake of model fit, was not 
necessary to model in the regression equations. When it was modeled, for the sake 
of exploration, it became clear that Hispanic population, as well, was nonlinearly 
related to juvenile arrests.  
As with the Black population, this finding suggests another threshold 
effect. This relationship makes sense in light of the concept of racial/ethnic 
encroachment, as discussed by Kane, Gustafson, and Bruell (2011). An 
established and concentrated Hispanic population – such as in the southeast of 
Washington D.C. -- would not be perceived as a threat. It is, instead, the 
movement of Hispanic populations into traditional White neighborhoods in the 
northwest that is perceived as a threat. As Hispanics move into traditional white 
neighborhoods – even in small numbers – their behavior triggers a defended 
neighborhood response, and juvenile arrests increase in response. Recall the 
comment above from the MPD that one police officer can note that Columbia 
Heights, located in the Northwest, used to be an African American neighborhood, 
and is not best portrayed as a Hispanic neighborhood. 
It is noted that there are important differences between this study and that 
done by Kane and colleagues (2011). The first are methodological: because of the 
modifiable areal unit problem, it is anticipated that results from Kane, Gustafson, 
and Bruell (2011) and the current study may differ: whereas they used tract level 
data, I use PSA data. The ecological fallacy directs us not to make conclusions 
between different levels of aggregations. In a similar vein, the dependent 
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variables from both studies differ: Kane and colleagues (2011) were focused on 
misdemeanor arrests; this study considers arrests using a different typology. In 
either case, comparing both studies directly is an apples-to-oranges dilemma.  
In addition, Kane, Gustafson, and Bruell (2011) used a change score in 
order to tap into the effect of minority population change on misdemeanor arrests. 
It is therefore a more direct test of the minority threat hypothesis and defended 
neighborhoods. This study was only interested in controlling for such effects; as 
such, it only employed a static measure of population. Relatedly, Kane and 
colleagues’ (2011) study used earlier data than that employed here. The change 
score they used measured the unaccounted for variation in minority population 
from 1990 to 2000. Just considering raw percentage changes from the U.S. 
Census bureau, from 1990 to 2000 this change was 2.5 percent (5.4 percent to 7.9 
percent), compared to 2000 to 2010 (1.2 percent change to 9.1 percent). This 
change is even more impressive when we consider the raw count: from 1990 there 
were 32,710 Hispanics in D.C., compared to 44,953 in 2000 and 54,749 in 2010. 
This increase from 1990 to 2000 came at a time when the total population of D.C. 
actually decreased by about 6 percent, from 606,900 to 572,059, compared to an 
increase of about 5 percent between 2000 and 2010 (601,723). Note that the 
White, non-Hispanic population increased between 1990 to 2000 by only 1.2 
percent, compared to the increase from 2000 to 2010 of 7.7 percent. In other 
words, in 2000 there was more of a “threat” perceived by the Hispanic population 
relative to the White population, compared to 2010.   
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Despite these differences, ultimately, both studies support the minority 
threat hypothesis, but at different levels of aggregation. For the current study, the 
minority threat was most pronounced for gun and drug related crimes. These 
crimes are among those which Americans fear the most and, indeed, represent one 
of the most unique features of American crime phenomena (Walker, 2012; 
Zimring & Hawkins, 1997). Within a Police Service Area, gun and drug crimes 
appear to be especially sensitive to threat circumstances.  
In a related vein, this study also confirms Kalven and Zeisel’s (1996) 
liberation hypothesis: the less serious the crime, the more discretion the police 
were given. Further, it lends support to Spohn and Cederblom’s (1991) test of the 
liberation hypothesis. Spohn and Cederblom (1991) found that it was the 
interaction between race and crime variables that best predicted various 
sentencing outcomes: race only became a factor when it was coupled with less 
serious crimes. So, too, in the current study: race became a significant factor only 
for those crimes with more discretion, in areas characterized by structural 
disadvantage and population mobility. What is interesting is that these 
relationships held up for a very specific unit of analysis that lies somewhere 
between a police beat and a police district – the Police Service Area – and is, in 
many respects, independent of neighborhoods. As with the threat hypothesis, the 
liberation hypothesis therefore has meaningful theoretical extension into new 
territory.   
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Isomorphism and Policing  
The key contribution of the current study is its integration of several 
disparate theoretical concepts that answer two important and related questions: 
why do police behave in ways that, for all intents and purposes, are detached 
from their goal? and why is it that police appear similar, in form and function, 
despite idiosyncratic pressures that may lead to great variations in the ways in 
which they behave? Essentially, I theorized that police behaved in this manner in 
an effort to fulfill their mandate of crime control - a mandate that, as Manning 
(1978) puts it, is impossible. Realizing that what they do (traditional arrest) is not 
necessarily tied in to what they must accomplish (crime control), police look for 
other ways to accomplish their mandate. One such way is to look to their 
institutional environment and ask themselves, “how are other police behaving? 
how are they responding to this problem?” and then to adjust their own behavior 
accordingly. Insofar as this can be done, they can preserve legitimacy and in so 
doing acquire important resources to exist. Failure to retain legitimacy can have 
dire organizational consequences, even up to being disbanded (King, 2009).  
As was discussed in chapter 2, legitimacy is a societal purchase. That is, as 
Suchman (1995) explains, public institutions are essentially in the business of 
selling a public service commodity. As long as the public continues to purchase 
their commodity, public institutions continue to exist. However, once that 
commodity is seen as no longer necessary, or as a particular agency fails to 
provide the desired commodity, its existence becomes jeopardized. For the police, 
   173 
because traditional law enforcement does not always result in a decrease in crime, 
and because this is so intimately tied into their legitimacy, they may attempt to 
copy the behavior of other agencies or police officers that they perceive to already 
have legitimacy. Doing so aids in procuring their own legitimacy. For example, 
one of the things that the gang unit described in Katz’s (2001) research did in 
order to gain legitimacy was to avoid the appearance of “soft” police work and to 
instead engage in behavior more closely associated with what was perceived to be 
“real” police work. This image of real police work came, ultimately, from how 
other patrol officers and special units were behaving in the same agency.   
Empirically, the search for isomorphic processes has been difficult. Most 
published work has remained theoretical (e.g., Crank, 2003) or qualitative (e.g, 
Katz, 2001). Those studies that have undertaken to empirically pinpoint the 
existence and effects of isomorphism have done so myopically, and have as a 
consequence missed the mark (e.g, Giblin & Burruss, 2009). It was necessary for 
this study to not only draw on the institutional literature, but also to creatively 
design an analytic method for studying the institutional behavior of the police. To 
this end, techniques were borrowed from spatial analysis. This was possible 
because police are at once organized and behave territorially (Rubinstein, 1973; 
Herbert, 1997). It was proposed that, net of controls, isomorphism would be 
expressed as spatial dependence at the PSA level, and that sovereign effects 
would be expressed as local indicators of spatial autocorrelation. Although not all 
of the dependent variables followed this pattern, there was much in the results that 
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informs the development of institutional theory and the use of spatial analysis in 
the study of policing.  
Firstly, what does it mean that the theory was, ultimately, only supported 
for one dependent variable - juvenile drug arrests? It is noted that all of the 
criteria suggested spatial dependence at the bivariate level (ie., Moran’s I). This 
relationship typically disappeared across all multivariate models. Partly, this was 
a methodological issue resulting from the modifiable areal unit problem: spatial 
autocorrelation at the tract level is readily apparent in almost any study of 
policing that employs areal units. This was not the case at the PSA level. It was 
also due in part to the dependent variables that were chosen: some were more 
susceptible to isomorphism (e.g., drugs) than others (e.g., violent crime). As 
discussed throughout this dissertation, this was anticipated. As contended early on 
in this dissertation, police behavior is understatedly complex: to assume that any 
variable will predict behavior uniformly across all possible outcomes and in 
tandem with other (equally complex) social processes is naive. As presented in 
this study, isomorphism is one more piece to the puzzle of the etiology of police 
behavior. It is, moreover, an important piece that cannot be ignored in future 
policing studies. 
It was anticipated that isomorphic pressures would be weakest for violent 
and property crime. This hypothesis was not truly supported: They were indeed 
the “weakest”: they were non-existent once controls were entered into the 
multivariate equation. As explicated in the above sections, there is ample reason 
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for this to be the case. Additionally, the district effects on juvenile gun arrests are 
explained in part by the political climate of the District in 2008 and new 
innovative police practices of the MPD. Drug crime arrests seemed to be in the 
best position, theoretically, to be explained by institutional pressures. Although 
such pressures were not observed globally, their effect was evident when 
considering the effects of sovereign (that is, LISA) PSA’s. Theoretically, then, 
sovereigns do have a real influence, and analytically we can pinpoint who is a 
sovereign and measure their overall effect – for specific types of crime.  
Given the small cell sizes in Table 2 regarding juvenile gun crime arrests, 
however, this begs the question about the source of arresting behavior for juvenile 
gun crimes. As discussed above under Limitations, there is justifiable reason to 
consider these effects as emanating not from the PSA as a whole, but rather from 
specific individual officers within the PSA. This again raises the idea that 
individual officers can themselves act as sovereigns, endowing their PSA with a 
source of otherwise missing legitimacy. This may especially be the case for 
crimes where the appropriate police response may be unknown, or, at best 
nebulous, such as for juvenile gun crimes. However, given the political climate of 
D.C. in the wake of D.C. v Heller, as well as the institution wide efforts at gun 
control described by the MPD 2008 Annual Report (MPD, 2009), these effects 
may also have come from individual officers regardless of their PSA. That is, 
given the agency-wide focus on gun crimes, police may have been more alert to 
the practices of individual officers throughout the department. Policing remains a 
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politically charged profession (Strecher, 1991), and one where the politics are felt 
as much at the line level as above (Wilson, 1968; Lipskey, 2010).  These 
institution-wide effects, impacted as they were by the politics surrounding the 
District, may have been picked up and reacted to by individual officers, whose 
influence may have guided their fellow officer’s behavior throughout the agency’s 
entire jurisdiction.  
In many respects, the idea that police are influenced by political and 
institutional pressure is nothing new, in terms of analytic explanations for 
behavior observed empirically. Indeed, the entire structure of my theoretical 
integration is built on a historic and contemporary body of research that suggests 
as much. More often than not, however, such explanations are not fully 
anticipated. Rather, they are provided post-hoc or simply in passing. For example, 
in discussing police discretion generally, Brooks (2005) notes that “[t]o 
understand the behavior of the police, we need to first clarify the functions of the 
police or the police role in society” (p. 92, emphasis added). A paragraph 
discussion on the scholarly take on the role of police in society then ensues. 
 Similarly, Hunt (1985) points out that individual officer decisions are highly 
influenced by a number of factors, particularly their training. She argues, “When 
recruits leave the formal world of the academy and are assigned to patrol a 
district, they are introduced to an informal world in which police recognize 
normal as well as legal and brutal force” (p. 341). Although Hunt explains that 
such behavior has its source in an image of how police ought to behave, the 
   177 
discussion is never fully extended into a conversation about an “impossible police 
mandate” and how this mandate is tied into the geographic nature of a police 
officer’s job – in other words, to the source of this image. Even the monies 
provided by the Clinton administration in the 1990s (Walker, 1998,  2012) to hire 
more police officers and create specialized units were allocated under an idea of 
what a police officer looks like and how an officer behaves.  
What these and other studies have in common is a taken-for-granted 
assumption that there is a normative police behavior scheme. Few studies go so 
far as to explain the etiology of this normative framework, settling for an 
explanation of what this normative behavior “is”. The current study finds this 
normative behavior rooted in the police mandate and the behavior of police as 
being explained by the nexus of territoriality and the acquisition of legitimacy. Of 
course, this is not the first study to consider these elements (e.g, Klinger, 1997, 
Crank, 2003). What is lacking is a theoretical picture that explicitly integrates 
these covariates in the etiology of police behavior. While many researchers have 
discussed the importance of the institutional environment to the behavior of the 
police (Kappeler, Sluder, & Alpert, 1998), few have tied this in to the territorial 
behavior of the police. And those who have (e.g., Herbert, 1997) studied the 
territorial nature of the police have stopped short of integrating an explicit 
institutional explanation. Even Herbert (1997), who starts with Weber, only goes 
so far as to say “Weber’s interest in territorial control inheres in his definition of 
the state” (p. 14). Herbert (1997) ultimately misrepresents Weber when he writes 
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“Weber sought to describe a variety of rationalities that determine human action, 
but, when discussing modern bureaucratized society, emphasized purposively 
rational action and downplayed normative or affectual action” (p. 16). Herbert has 
fallen into the same pattern criticized by Meyer and Rowan (1977) as ignoring 
that half of Weber’s theoretical underpinnings that deal with Vorstellung and 
shared, normative concepts of a legitimate social order apart from the rational 
behavior of bureaucracy.  
The current study brings Weber’s concept of Vorstellung to the fore and 
combines it with his definition of a state as a social aggregate geographically 
bound with a vested interest in protecting its borders (Weber, 2004). As the literal 
manifestation of the state’s efforts to protect its borders (that is, to maintain the 
peace within those borders), the police are subject to those social pressures 
shaping and defining legitimacy, and their behavior may be analyzed according to 
the nature by which it is organized, namely, territorially. This study therefore 
presents a cogent theoretical structure and analytic framework to answer the 
questions why do police behave in ways that, for all intents and purposes, are 
detached from their goal? and why is it that police appear similar, in form and 
function, despite idiosyncratic pressures that may lead to great variations in the 
ways in which they behave? In short: police often behave in ways that, for all 
intents and purposes, are detached from their goal of crime control because, inter 
alia, they must achieve legitimacy in novel ways that do not result in crime 
control. When the mandate is to be nebulously obtained with limited resources 
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(such as controlling drug crime with traditional arrests), there is a disconnect 
between what police are doing and what is being accomplished. There is so much 
similarity between police in terms of form and function despite unique 
circumstances because, inter alia, their behavior is influenced, in a geographic 
manner, by the behavior of those institutional actors which they perceive to be 
legitimate. By observing the territorial nature of police through spatial analytic 
techniques, this theory is at least partially supported by the current study. It 
warrants more, and more nuanced, research to bolster this statement and to refine 
the theoretical and analytic underpinnings experimented with in this dissertation.   
Future Research 
This study did not tap into the functions underlying isomorphism. Rather, 
its focus was on how isomorphism may express itself (territorially) within a large 
police agency. When DiMaggio and Powell (1983) discussed isomorphism, they 
did so in terms of three distinct processes: coercive, mimetic, and normative 
isomorphism. As outlined in chapter 2, coercive isomorphism occurs whenever 
powerful stakeholders put pressure on an organization to adopt or drop specific 
policies, practices, or organizational elements, whereas mimetic isomorphism 
occurs whenever, in a bid to acquire legitimacy, organizations adopt the practices 
of similarly purposed organizations which are already seen as legitimate. Finally, 
normative isomorphism occurs as a result of an organization seeking to couch its 
purpose and methods within the broader institutional environment, generally via 
professionalization. Each of these forms of institutional pressure could be 
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expressed spatially; future research should aim to at once disentangle the separate 
effects of each of these forms and find ways to meaningfully measure them.    
This is inherently a difficult process: "[W]hile institutional theory offers 
some compelling hypotheses about organizations, its propositions are not easily 
measurable and are therefore very difficult to test using macro-level survey 
research methods" (Katz, Maguire, & Roncek, 2002, p. 480). What efforts have 
thus far been attempted have fallen short in finding, on any meaningful level, 
much significant isomorphic effects in policing (e.g., Giblin & Burruss, 2009). 
This is a result of the methodology rather than the phenomenon under study. The 
current corpus of Giblin and Burruss’s work (Giblin, 2006; Giblin & Burruss, 
2009) is simply too positivist in nature, attempting to capture a nebulous social 
process with a few survey questions or social artifacts. For example, attempting to 
capture coercive processes in terms of funding availability, received COPS grants, 
and how many other government grants were used. By narrowing coercive 
isomorphism to just three variables, they risk a Type I error. A more sophisticated 
methodology would be to provide more exhaustive measurements of isomorphic 
processes or to find a proxy that more meaningfully captures each process.  
Relatedly, future research needs to consider isomorphic processes beyond 
the law enforcement organization. The current study was concerned with 
pinpointing sovereign police precincts for a very specific policy reason (see 
below); but other researchers have pointed out that the institutional pressure 
placed on specific police units come not only within the agency, but also from 
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without (see, especially, Katz, 2001). Progress therefore needs to be made not 
only in measuring and observing actual isomorphic behavior among police 
agencies and precincts, but also extra-departmental sources of isomorphism 
should be pinpointed. While the current study assumes that these processes are 
going on, it says nothing about which are the most influential, how they operate, 
and why they might be influential. There are variables (particularly those 
suggested by Giblin and Burruss [2009]) that should be incorporated into the 
regression equation. Such variables could include: membership and attendance at 
professional meetings, sources of accreditation, involvement in a POST program, 
etc. Such studies might also consider the origin of the police chief as a normative 
and mimetic process. For example: when Bratton moved to the LAPD from the 
NYPD, he immediately began introducing a more NYPD-style COMPSTAT 
model (Bratton & Malinowski, 2008).    
This relates to one of the most intriguing suggestions from this study: the 
idea that individual officers may endow their PSA with legitimacy. Future 
research needs to tap into this possibility. Bratton’s experience described above, 
as well as the individual commanding officer described by Katz (2001; see 
below), point to this possibility. Legitimacy, at the organizational level, is 
typically conceived as a meso-level phenomenon. The reality may be more 
complex: by way of analogy, sources of organizational legitimacy may be multi-
leveled, emanating from the individual level and the organizational level in 
tandem. Future research should explore this concept further, clarifying the role of 
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individual officers vis-à-vis institutional legitimacy, and employing multi-level 
analytic techniques, combined with spatially informed variables, to test any 
theoretically informed hypotheses. 
This study was focused exclusively on arresting behavior. This decision 
was guided by theory: the mandate of the police is largely encapsulated in the law 
enforcement function (Bittner, 1970), and therefore most susceptible to 
institutional pressures within discretionary limits. Although this may be the case, 
it certainly does not preclude other behavioral variables from being influenced by 
the institutional environment. Within an organization, any behavior that is highly 
discretionary should be prone to institutional pressures. This could include, for 
example, traffic citations, deployment of less-than-lethal weaponry, or use of 
Terry pats. In addition, this particular theoretical framework may help explain 
racial patterns of vehicle stops and different police practices within specific 
neighborhoods. In terms of how police agencies behave, this could include 
variables such as the presence of police paramilitary units, use of a specific 
firearm/electrical conductive device, or use of force matrices. As with property 
and violent crime arrests, different behavioral variables may exhibit distinct 
patterns when it comes to how they respond (if at all) to environmental pressure. 
Such variables and relationships should be further explored by future research.  
 Future research should also extend the current theoretical paradigm and 
analytic framework to the relationship between police agencies across the nation. 
It is possible that there are police agencies which stand out as sovereigns. For 
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example, the NYPD was very influential in spreading both COMPSTAT and 
zero-tolerance policing across the United States (and in other countries) 
throughout almost 20 years (Eck & Maguire, 2000). Agencies closer in proximity 
to one another may be more similar in their behavior than those more distant by 
virtue of their proximity. This poses several interesting research questions and 
theoretical puzzles. First, what behavior at the agency level might be influenced in 
this fashion? Arresting behavior is only one possibility. As with intra-agency 
isomorphism, there may be other behavior researchers could be interested in, such 
as the existence and use of paramilitary units such as SWAT-teams, or the use of 
COMPSTAT or other actuarial models of crime control. And second, how do we 
define proximity? As Ward and Gleditsch (2000) have indicated, “proximity” can 
be understood as a normative concept rather than as a strictly geographic concept. 
Perhaps proximal agencies can best be defined by their size: do larger agencies 
resemble other larger agencies not only because they share many of the same 
problems, but because they are looking to one another for ideas about how best to 
deal with those problems? Or, perhaps proximity can be understood in terms of 
the degree to which agencies are involved in professional associations: agencies 
involved in such organizations may be considered “close” to one another, and 
therefore become more similar. Sovereigns would be those agencies with 
members in leadership positions in such professional organizations.  
 This latter point begs a research question that this dissertation has only 
considered tentatively: why is a sovereign is a sovereign. In general, sovereigns 
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are understood as those entities in the institutional environment which hold some 
special sway over the rest of the environment. In some cases, this may be due to 
holding purse strings; in other cases, it may be due to being perceived as 
legitimate. For example: A small town police department may behave like a large 
city police department because that large city police agency is perceived as doing 
what “real cops” do. This, of course, is tied into the mandate of policing and how 
it relates to organizational expectations: if the mandate is tied into a “protect the 
innocent and capture the villain” mantra, then those agencies best reflecting those 
practices may arise as sovereigns in their institutional environment. In future 
research projects, more time should be spent on discerning why a certain PSA (or 
a certain police agency, etc.) stands out as a sovereign. The current study only 
touched on this, both theoretically and empirically. If, as the policy implications 
discussed below suggest, the utility of the theory and method outlined in this 
dissertation will assist in disseminating behavior and policy changes within a 
police agency, then if we are also able to endow a precinct with perceived 
legitimacy, in effect rendering it a sovereign, the relevance of this dissertation’s 
findings is increased. By understanding what makes a sovereign a sovereign, 
future research might make such a situation a possibility. 
Policy Implications 
 This section concludes my dissertation by discussing possible policy and 
practice applications of these findings and their underlying theory. I briefly 
discuss the social and racial/ethnic ecology of policing and what it means for 
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police practice. As this is not the focus of my dissertation, and as other authors 
have spent considerable time on this topic, my remarks are brief. More time is 
spent on what this theory means for police organizational change. Attention is 
given both to change within a police agency and change between agencies. As will 
be explained, the importance of this study is its findings that the territorial nature 
of policing is, in a sense, a “naturally occurring phenomenon” that can be tapped 
into to effect organizational behavioral change. What is more, with an increased 
understanding of the nature and role of sovereigns, the territorial nature of 
policing can be manipulated to not only effect change, but to purposefully 
facilitate its implementation.  
The Social and Racial/Ethnic Ecology of Policing  
Kane (2002) noted, “The very communities likely in need of the most 
protection by the police due to conditions favoring deviance also may be in need 
of the greatest protection from the police due to conditions favoring deviance” (p. 
891). This statement is supported by the current study: PSA’s with high 
population mobility (and, by extension, Hispanic populations) and majority Black 
neighborhoods have more concentrated arrests, net of controls (including reported 
crime). On the one hand, these increased arrests may be due to increased 
opportunities for arrest: the correlation between violent arrests and crime reports 
in 2008, for example, is 0.43, and between violent arrests and Black population is 
0.58. In addition, the relationship between Black population and structural 
disadvantage in 2008 was correlated at 0.74. On the other hand, the partial 
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correlation coefficient between Black population and all criteria (when 
statistically significant) remained positive net of crime reports to the police. Given 
that these reports not only help control for “the dark figure of crime”, but also 
control for police presence, it is clear that there are simply more police in PSA’s 
with large Black populations and high population mobility than what one might 
otherwise expect.  
For the citizens, this presents the dilemma of needing the police, as a form 
of strong, public control in light of the lack of private and parochial control 
(Bursik & Grasmick, 1993) yet being unable to effectively moderate their 
arresting behavior (Kane, 2003). If understood through a threat perspective, the 
current study agrees with Kane and colleagues’ (2011) findings that Black 
residents remain a threat to the White majority despite the “otherwise social and 
political influence of black residents in DC” (Kane, Gustafson, & Bruell, 2011, p. 
21). Police presence may therefore be seen as an effort to maintain housing 
stratification between the northwest and the southeast. Although the current study 
does not test the threat hypothesis directly, its findings are congruent with those of 
Kane and colleagues (2011) regarding both the Black and Hispanic populations. 
For the Hispanic population, however, the situation is especially apparent for gun 
and drug crimes and their perceived presence in northwestern D.C.   
Organizational Behavioral Change  
One of the most pressing policy implications from the current study is the 
idea of organizational change. As Merton (1957) noted, organizations which are 
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bureaucratically organized resist change. Part of this resistance stems from 
occupational psychosis, which Merton, borrowing from Dewey, explains in this 
manner: “As a result of their day to day routines, people develop special 
preferences, antipathies, discriminations, and emphases” (p. 105). Such special 
preferences limit the degree to which bureaucrats are able or interested in 
effecting a change that, given novel exigencies, may be requisite. The police also 
resist change. Among other things (such as the conservative nature of most police 
officers), this may be a consequence of being a bureaucracy. Bureaucracies are 
maladaptive to change not only because of occupational psychosis, but because by 
design bureaucracies are meant to conserve: they are tightly structured under the 
assumption that each part works in a specific way, and to deviate from this is to 
invite poor productivity (Weber, 1964). Yet, as Merton (1957) points out, it is this 
pressure to conform that can ironically limit a bureaucracy’s ability to produce.  
To suggest that police never change is not at all accurate. The changes 
experienced by police agencies from the 1920s to the 1950s was anything but 
gradual (this paragraph relies on Walker, 1998): police began regularly and 
consistently carrying firearms, the two-way radio became a main-stay of police 
tools, and the patrol car quickly replaced foot patrol. There were numerous 
changes beyond these tangible ones, as well. Under the work of Vollmer and later 
Hoover police became more professionalized. The idea that police officers needed 
a college education was first formulated by Vollmer at Berkeley (although it 
would take until the 1960s and 1970s for this idea to truly gain any footing), who 
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also insisted that officers be trained in an academy setting. Hoover carried the 
training on to in-service, using his own FBI officers both as an example and as 
instructors. Further, police performance began to be measured not by the Peelian 
objective of “absence of crime”, but by arrest numbers in the form of the Uniform 
Crime Reports (Skolnick & Fyfe, 1996). These were rapid changes not only to 
how police functioned and were organized, but how they saw themselves: as 
specialized crime fighters with a mandate to protect the innocent and catch the 
bad guy. It was a dramatic and relatively swift change from the quasi-despotic and 
social-service oriented police agency of the so-called political era of policing.  
Such a change did not happen in the 1980s or 1990s with the advent of 
community policing. The race riots of the 1960s had brought the poor relationship 
between the police and minority communities to the fore, forcing police agencies 
to contemplate change. This change was also pushed at the federal level in the 
form of federally available monies for training and education (Walker, 1998). 
Community policing grew out this of era (Angell, 1971), and was first given 
coherent articulation from Trojanowicz and Bucqueroux (1990). Scholars 
continued to write about the utility and potential of community policing, giving 
special attention to the role of organizational change in making what amounts to a 
paradigm shift in the police mandate a reality (Cordner, 1999). Yet, to date, there 
is no evidence that community policing has been adopted wholesale among police 
agencies (with the Chicago Police Department standing out as a possible 
exception - yet even this change began in 1993 and continues to be redefined 
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today - see Chicago PD’s website called “ClearPath”). In other words, it is 
difficult to assess whether community policing “works” because it is difficult to 
pinpoint its adoption. Scholars are left evaluating community policing piecemeal, 
such as focusing on foot patrol or community meetings (Alpert & Moore, 1993; 
Greene & Taylor, 1988). Although this is too broad of a topic for the current 
study, it is worthwhile to note that such studies confound the practice of 
community policing with its ontology: A concern with community responsiveness 
and well-being has and continues to be at the core of the police mandate. As such, 
it has demanded the attention of scholars for decades (Reiss, 1971; Reisig, 2010). 
Such a concern, however, is couched within the traditional definition of “what the 
police do” (Zhao & Thurman, 1997). Despite federal monies (Zhao, Scheider, & 
Thurman, 2002), community policing remains a “tool” rather than the 
paradigmatic overhaul it was intended to be (Maguire, 1997; Zhao, Lovrich, & 
Robinson, 2001).  
This begs an important question: why were Vollmer and others able to 
institute change, yet the scholars of the late 1900’s could not? This is a question 
with a complex answer. Part of the answer, as supported by the current study, is 
the following: Vollmer and others carved out a police mandate that earned 
legitimacy among the body politic; community oriented policing did not try to fit 
within this traditional mandate. Indeed, it attempted to replace the mandate of 
professional crime fighter with co-producer of justice with the community (Zhao, 
Thurman, & Lovrich, 1997). Other policing innovations that were tried around the 
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same time as community policing, such as zero-tolerance or problem-oriented 
policing and COMPSTAT, maintained the role of police as expert, and have 
flourished and continue to flourish (Walker & Katz, 2008). There is an important 
lesson here about the role of the police mandate in instituting organizational 
change. Namely: as one avenue towards organizational change, considering the 
nature of the police mandate, and considering those elements of the police 
institutional environment which best represent that mandate, may be fruitful.  
More specifically, this study suggests that organizational change can occur 
through sovereigns. Sovereigns represent those entities in an institutional 
environment with undue influence. Their undue influence is a product of many 
things, including the perception among the rest of the environment that this entity 
has acquired legitimacy. To associate oneself with or to mimic a sovereign is to 
acquire a modicum of that legitimacy. Within a police agency, that is, at the 
police precinct level, precincts that appear to be legitimate are those that 
epitomize the police mandate: professional crime fighters that “get the job done”, 
and who “keep the brass off their back.” As was demonstrated in this dissertation, 
there were sovereigns in the MPD which unduly influenced the rate of juvenile 
drug arrests, net of controls. If the MPD were to effect change in its drug 
enforcement procedures, one potential and innovative way to do so may be to 
implement such changes in those sovereign PSA’s first. According to the 
territorial nature of policing, that behavioral change would then extend out 
“naturally” from the sovereign PSA’s to other Police Service Areas.  
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This process would have the additional benefit of avoiding “change by 
memo” and its associated resistance by police officers. One common complaint 
among police officers regarding organizational change is its seemingly cyclical 
nature and associating innovative programs with a chief’s pet project of the year 
(Thurman, Zhao, & Giacomazzi, 2001). From experience, veteran officers 
understand that programs come and go with little impact on what “real” police 
work looks like. It is therefore often ignored and/or endured. By relying on the 
ecological and territorial nature of the police organization, change-makers might 
overcome this obstacle by acquiring “buy-in” from those elements of the police 
organization perceived as legitimate. Insofar as the program does not wander too 
far off the path of “traditional policing”, it will automatically be associated with 
the police mandate, thus weakening resistance to its implementation.  
This process could be facilitated further if administrators were able not 
just to tap into the available sovereigns in their agency, but if they were in fact 
able to manufacture sovereigns. The current study only touches on this idea, and 
the ability to explain what makes a sovereign remains equivocal in the current 
work. As explained above, this is an element of the theory ripe for empirical 
exploration and explanation. To the extent that it can be done, however, 
administrators would have a powerful tool at their disposal for implementing 
change. One possible starting place for understanding this process is suggested in 
Katz (2001). The gang unit in Katz’s study acquired legitimacy through a number 
of strategies. At the heart of many of these strategies was the second commanding 
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officer of the gang unit. As Katz (2001) explains: “...the lieutenant instituted a 
number of organizational changes and operational strategies...in an effort to 
receive support from administrators and police officers in the Junction City Police 
Department, as well as sovereigns outside of the police department” (p. 60). 
Stated simply, sovereigns may be the product of insightful leadership keenly 
aware of the police mandate and how to move within the political waters of the 
policing milieu. Tapping into the qualities of these individuals may have the 
cascading effect of bringing an entire precinct to legitimacy and becoming unduly 
influential upon the institutional environment of the agency as a whole.  
One of the most novel aspects of the current study was its explicit focus on 
within organizational isomorphism. It is reasonable to extend its implications to 
the between organizational level of analysis, as well. Police organizational change 
at the institutional level and across states has, since the 1960s, been the concerted 
effort of the Department of Justice through federally allotted monies. Such efforts 
created education requirements, diversity hiring and promotion requirements 
(Walker, 1998), innovative policing practices, special units training (Kraska & 
Kappeler, 1997), and the implementation of new technologies (Stroshine, 2005; 
Pelfrey, 2005). These efforts are manifest in the late LEEP programs and the more 
contemporary COPS office (Zhao, Scheider, & Thurman, 2002). Although there is 
ample evidence that such programs have had an effect on the nature of policing in 
the United States, it is not clear that they have any intended effect at 
organizational change (Zhao, He, & Lovrich, 2003; Zhao, Scheider, & Thurman, 
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2002; Worrall & Kovandzic, 2007). Rather, the evidence suggests that police 
departments use the program monies for whatever they perceive to be a need 
(Greene, 2003; Worrall & Kovandzic, 2007). These results point to the conclusion 
that even when offered money for integrating COP style programs, police 
agencies will only do so insofar as the impact on their day-to-day behavior is 
limited to “classical” policing; the rest, as Greene (2003) suggests, is window 
dressing (e.g., revised mission statements, websites, stickers on the sides of 
vehicles, etc.). 
Perhaps, then, a more fruitful way for the federal government to effect 
change in police behavior is not (only) through monies, but by targeting those 
agencies that seem to lead the nation in policing practices. The New York Police 
Department and its practices in the 1990s of COMPSTAT and zero-tolerance 
style policing is one such example: although such practices have not been adopted 
uniformly throughout American police agencies, and when implemented often are 
done so on an ad hoc basis
20
, this example nevertheless suggests that the idea that 
police agencies are “watching each other” for cues on how to behave regardless of 
what they should be doing is tenable. To wit: while some studies have found a 
connection between zero-tolerance/order maintenance policing and the 1990s 
New York Crime Drop (Levitt, 2004; Zimring, 2007), others have not 
                                                 
20
 I am reminded of a COMPSTAT meeting I attended with the Goodyear (AZ) Police Department 
where mid-level managers explained what they were doing to combat crime. The officers were 
comparing January to February statistics in a March meeting. Crime had, obviously, gone down 
uniformly across crime type and area. The analyst who prepared the crime maps explained at the 
beginning of the meeting that this was anticipated: there are simply more days in January than 
February, and this is a pattern that they have observed for several years. Still, the officers took 
credit for the crime drop, and were commensurately congratulated for their efforts by the chief. 
This is in stark contrast to the typical image of NYPD or Baltimore PD COMPSTAT meetings.  
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(Rosenfield, Fornango, & Baumer, 2005; Rosenfeld, Fornango, & Rengifo, 2007). 
Despite the equivocal empirical data on the impact of zero-tolerance policing and 
COMPSTAT, both have spread throughout the United States (Weisburd, et al. 
2003; Herbert, 2001). While only anecdotal, this observation opens the door for 
not only future research in the area of institutional isomorphism at the between 
agency level, but also at the idea of tapping into sovereign agencies to effect 
behavioral changes at a national level. 
This idea is surely to be compounded by a number of factors, particularly 
agency size. Such covariates would need to be controlled. Yet, smaller police 
agencies with no apparent need for paramilitary units indeed have SWAT-like 
units (Kraska & Kappeler, 1997), due largely to federally provided monies. As 
previously mentioned, this begs the question of why would the federal government 
believe that small police departments require such units? It is suggested that this 
is wrapped up in the idea of what do police look like and how do they behave. 
Sovereign and other institutional effects through isomorphism are therefore 
probable regardless of agency size. In addition, the concept of “adjacency” will 
most likely change, as discussed above. Nevertheless, the use of the analytic 
techniques employed in the current study will be applicable at the national level. 
The utility of the current study’s findings for organizational change, whether 
within an organization or between organizations, is therefore at once viable and 
intriguing.  
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Concluding Remarks 
The current study adds answers to questions that have only been suggested 
by the policing literature: why is so much that the police continue to do 
ineffective, and why do they behave similarly despite distinct environmental and 
political exigencies? The answer, supported by both previous research and the 
current study, is that an important element is how we view the police, and how 
they view themselves. In other words, what their mandate is and how this 
mandate is wrapped up in their behavior. In addition, because their behavior is 
largely determined by the territories in which they are organized, this mandate 
plays out behaviorally in a territorial manner. In short, police appear so similar 
because of an institutional consensus on what police do and how police look; this 
consensus is communicated territorially and is especially promoted by sovereign 
entities. When all is said, this pattern is possible because of a search for 
institutional legitimacy: the right to exist in society. Because police are unable to 
achieve this legitimacy directly by achieving their mandate through traditional, 
law enforcement efforts, they must associate and copy the behaviors of those who 
are already perceived to be legitimate. The end result is a police function that is 
not wholly connected to its mandate, yet common among all police.   
 The utility of this theory has been presented in terms of organizational 
behavioral change, with a focus on arresting behavior. It is easily and importantly 
extend-able to other forms of police behavior. Such behavior may include how 
police relate to the public, or, importantly, police misconduct. A certain level of 
   196 
misconduct is tolerated among police officers and kept guarded by a fraternal 
code of silence (Skolnick & Fyfe, 1993). In many ways, it supports the legitimacy 
of the police by giving them illicit avenues to achieving their crime control 
mandate (Crank & Caldero, 2002). It is feasible that a sovereign entity could 
behave in such a way that the patterns associated with misconduct were no longer 
tolerated. Doing so may have the potential of actually breaking down barriers to 
healthy police-community relationships and fulfilling the vision of the 1965 
Presidential Crime Commission’s report and call for “more extensive community 
programs providing special, intensive treatment as an alternative to 
institutionalization” (Walker, 1998, p. 203). While this vision was couched in the 
treatment focus of the 1960s, the ideal lives on in contemporary policing policy 
and scholarship, such as the role of the COPS office and the creation of new 
forms of police accountability maintenance (Walker, 2005). In addition, this study 
adds its voice to the canon of work demonstrating that the relationship between 
the police and minority communities remains tenuous. Co-opting the powerful 
and natural influence of institutional actors may be an additional step in 
improving these relations. 
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Table 1A. LISA coefficients for juvenile violent 
crime arrests in 2008.  
 
PSA Local I Z p 
705 2.024 3.697 0.000 
703 1.229 2.603 0.005 
204 1.410 2.594 0.005 
706 2.219 2.287 0.011 
206 1.506 2.229 0.013 
601 1.189 2.187 0.014 
207 1.460 1.513 0.065 
208 0.474 1.402 0.080 
602 0.932 1.395 0.082 
303 0.429 1.277 0.101 
401 1.202 1.250 0.106 
202 1.149 1.196 0.116 
203 1.149 1.196 0.116 
504 0.551 1.030 0.151 
402 0.646 0.950 0.171 
301 0.220 0.628 0.265 
308 0.212 0.625 0.266 
501 0.167 0.501 0.308 
603 0.179 0.479 0.316 
103 0.182 0.475 0.317 
105 0.112 0.266 0.395 
403 0.148 0.250 0.401 
702 0.058 0.189 0.425 
604 0.074 0.177 0.430 
101 0.072 0.169 0.433 
107 0.035 0.150 0.440 
505 0.008 0.066 0.474 
305 -0.002 0.065 0.474 
302 0.001 0.064 0.475 
404 -0.003 0.042 0.483 
502 -0.032 -0.017 0.507 
405 -0.077 -0.054 0.522 
503 -0.130 -0.154 0.561 
701 -0.097 -0.190 0.575 
104 -0.229 -0.210 0.583 
106 -0.132 -0.270 0.606 
606 -0.148 -0.288 0.613 
102 -0.166 -0.339 0.633 
607 -0.198 -0.453 0.675 
304 -0.190 -0.522 0.699 
307 -0.281 -0.649 0.742 
704 -0.314 -0.667 0.748 
605 -0.326 -0.710 0.761 
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Table 2A. LISA coefficients for juvenile property 
crime arrests in 2008.  
 
PSA Local I Z p 
602 3.238 5.046 0.000 
705 1.651 3.200 0.001 
604 1.527 2.949 0.002 
703 0.914 2.058 0.020 
303 0.622 1.913 0.028 
601 0.951 1.861 0.031 
704 0.738 1.848 0.032 
301 0.635 1.782 0.037 
204 0.742 1.466 0.071 
304 0.368 1.288 0.099 
305 0.306 1.018 0.154 
302 0.297 0.870 0.192 
208 0.260 0.838 0.201 
706 0.697 0.781 0.218 
404 0.258 0.618 0.268 
206 0.353 0.582 0.280 
702 0.201 0.546 0.293 
202 0.383 0.440 0.330 
203 0.383 0.440 0.330 
403 0.257 0.434 0.332 
207 0.352 0.407 0.342 
603 0.138 0.402 0.344 
402 0.243 0.401 0.344 
106 0.105 0.338 0.368 
105 0.138 0.334 0.369 
401 0.251 0.298 0.383 
307 0.070 0.249 0.402 
607 0.060 0.229 0.409 
504 0.089 0.213 0.416 
102 0.054 0.196 0.422 
104 0.146 0.184 0.427 
405 0.131 0.168 0.433 
107 0.022 0.123 0.451 
103 0.001 0.059 0.476 
701 -0.007 0.045 0.482 
308 -0.014 0.027 0.489 
502 -0.034 -0.022 0.509 
606 -0.052 -0.069 0.528 
605 -0.064 -0.099 0.539 
501 -0.130 -0.295 0.616 
505 -0.162 -0.304 0.619 
503 -0.494 -0.727 0.767 
101 -0.735 -1.324 0.907 
  
   213 
Table 3A. Spatial error model for juvenile violent crime 
arrests 
 
 
b SE z p 
Crime reported
†
 0.99 0.17 5.75 0.00 
Structural disadvantage 0.31 0.16 1.96 0.05 
Population mobility 0.20 0.14 1.42 0.15 
Black population
† 
 0.67 0.19 3.46 0.00 
λ 0.36 0.16 2.29 0.02 
Constant -8.11 1.58 -5.13 0.00 
AIC = 96.656, -2LL = 82.656 
   †Natural log was used.  
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Table 4A. Linear model for drug related crime.  
 
 
b SE t p 
Crime reported
†
 0.47 0.24 1.98 0.06 
Structural disadvantage 0.18 0.24 0.74 0.46 
Population mobility 0.67 0.28 2.41 0.02 
Black population
† 
 0.03 0.48 0.07 0.95 
District 1
††
 -0.94 0.53 -1.77 0.09 
District 2 -2.98 1.36 -2.19 0.04 
District 3 -2.13 0.80 -2.66 0.01 
District 4 -1.11 0.56 -1.98 0.06 
District 5 0.27 0.56 0.47 0.64 
District 6 -0.08 0.44 -0.18 0.86 
Constant -0.58 3.26 -0.18 0.86 
R
2
 = 0.6099, F = 5.002, p < 0.001 
  
†Natural log was used.  
    
†† Referent group = district 7 
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Table 5A. LISA coefficients for juvenile drug 
crime arrests in 2008.  
 
PSA Local I Z p 
601 3.231 5.888 0.000 
602 3.106 4.580 0.000 
504 1.539 2.807 0.003 
208 0.570 1.676 0.047 
206 1.083 1.618 0.053 
303 0.491 1.454 0.073 
204 0.709 1.329 0.092 
207 1.083 1.132 0.129 
401 1.007 1.054 0.146 
202 0.942 0.988 0.162 
203 0.942 0.988 0.162 
402 0.608 0.898 0.185 
305 0.256 0.826 0.205 
703 0.317 0.710 0.239 
604 0.342 0.660 0.255 
302 0.213 0.610 0.271 
304 0.166 0.598 0.275 
704 0.233 0.591 0.277 
301 0.132 0.402 0.344 
605 0.127 0.354 0.362 
702 0.102 0.290 0.386 
403 0.131 0.226 0.411 
701 0.046 0.181 0.428 
505 0.056 0.167 0.433 
405 0.125 0.153 0.439 
103 0.039 0.146 0.442 
705 0.052 0.138 0.445 
603 0.025 0.116 0.454 
502 0.030 0.113 0.455 
706 0.083 0.109 0.456 
501 0.015 0.102 0.459 
607 -0.002 0.056 0.478 
107 -0.004 0.050 0.480 
503 -0.004 0.029 0.488 
606 -0.027 -0.008 0.503 
307 -0.050 -0.065 0.526 
101 -0.101 -0.136 0.554 
404 -0.104 -0.167 0.566 
308 -0.210 -0.495 0.690 
105 -0.629 -1.185 0.882 
102 -0.672 -1.548 0.939 
106 -0.652 -1.566 0.941 
104 -1.991 -2.012 0.978 
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Table 6A. Chi-square tests 
for districts and LISA. 
 
 
X
2
 p 
District 1 0.323 0.570 
District 2 4.460 0.035 
District 3 0.323 0.570 
District 4 0.074 0.786 
District 5 0.074 0.786 
District 6 0.389 0.533 
District 7 0.183 0.668 
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Table 7A. LISA coefficients for juvenile gun crime 
arrests in 2008.  
 
PSA Local I Z p 
705 2.766 5.190 0.000 
706 4.049 4.285 0.000 
703 1.897 4.108 0.000 
601 0.788 1.508 0.066 
208 0.456 1.387 0.083 
204 0.644 1.244 0.107 
206 0.737 1.143 0.126 
504 0.568 1.091 0.138 
602 0.614 0.960 0.169 
303 0.291 0.910 0.182 
202 0.831 0.899 0.184 
203 0.831 0.899 0.184 
402 0.499 0.764 0.223 
207 0.653 0.712 0.238 
401 0.649 0.708 0.240 
105 0.287 0.624 0.266 
304 0.145 0.541 0.294 
106 0.172 0.501 0.308 
301 0.153 0.467 0.320 
307 0.138 0.421 0.337 
403 0.241 0.399 0.345 
305 0.089 0.341 0.366 
702 0.065 0.211 0.417 
607 0.047 0.190 0.425 
308 0.046 0.190 0.425 
404 0.033 0.121 0.452 
605 0.026 0.121 0.452 
103 0.017 0.096 0.462 
505 0.011 0.074 0.471 
604 0.003 0.050 0.480 
102 -0.008 0.040 0.484 
501 -0.014 0.027 0.489 
502 -0.020 0.007 0.497 
107 -0.030 -0.016 0.506 
405 -0.042 -0.019 0.508 
503 -0.067 -0.064 0.526 
104 -0.086 -0.065 0.526 
603 -0.052 -0.067 0.527 
704 -0.072 -0.113 0.545 
302 -0.206 -0.481 0.685 
606 -0.497 -1.131 0.871 
101 -0.869 -1.533 0.937 
701 -0.602 -1.541 0.938 
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Figure 1A. 
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Figure 2A.  
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Figure 3A. 
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Figure 4A. 
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